1009 



1009 




ORGANIZATION 



OF THE 



SERVICES OF SUPPLY 

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY 
FORCES 



i..^ 



Monograph No. 7 



Prepared in the 

Historical Branch, War Plans Division 

General Staff 



June, 1921 




WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

1921 



^ior,r. 



Wae Pepabtment 

Document No. 1009 

Office of The Adjutant GcmraJ 



LIBRARY Of O^NQHESS 



^J'V?^ 



1 DOCUMENTS DlViSlON 



ys I 



■^0 



,7^ 



h' 



WAR DEPARTMENT, 

Washington, April 12, 1920. 
The following monograph, entitled *' Organization of the Services 
of Supply, American Expeditionary Forces," prepared in the His- 
torical Branch, War Plans Division, General Staff, is approved and 
published for the information of all concerned. 

[322.06, A. Q. O.] 

By order of the Secretary of War : 

PEYTON C. MARCH, 

General, Vhief of Staff. 
Official : 

P. C. HARRIS, 

The Adjutant General. 

8 



GENERAL SCHEME OF MONOGRAPHS, HISTORICAL 

BRANCH. 



(Where a title is given witliout special mark, the monogi-aph is contemplated or 
in preparation ; a title with a single * indicates a monograph completed and 
awaiting publication ; a title with two ** indicates a published monograph.) 

I. Narratiae History of Military Operations. 

The Major Operations of the A. E. F. (G. O. 83, W. D., 1919.) 
*" Cambrai." H. B. Monograph No. 5, W. D. Doc. 1017, 1920. 
" Somme Defensive and Lys." 
" Aisne and Montdidier-Noyon." 
" Champague-Marne and Aisne-Marne." 

(a) " The 3d Division on the Marne." 
" Somme Offensive, Oise-Aisne, Ypres-Lys." 

**(c) "Operations 2d Corps in Somme Offensive." H. B. 
Monograph No. 10, W. D. Doc. 1016, 1920. 
" St. Mihiel." 
" rkleuse-Argonne." 
** "Blanc Mont (Meuse-Argonne-Champague.) H. B. Monograph No. 
9, W. D. Doc. 1010, 1920. 
" Vittorio-Veneto." / 

* " Operations in North Russia, 1918-1919.''^ 
" Operations in Siberia, 1917-1920," 
" Operations in Italy, 1917-1918." 
II. Studies of Services of Supply. 

** " Organization of Services of Supply, A. E. F." H. B. Monograph No. 7, 
W. D. Doc. 1009, 1920. 
" Replacement of Personnel, A. E. F." H. B. Monograph No. 8. 
" Procurement of Supplies, A. E. F." 
" Initial Equipment and Supply, A. E. F." 

III. Special Tactical Studies. 

** " A Survey of German Tactics, 1918." H. B. Monograph No. 1, W. D. 

Doc. No. 883, 1918. 
** " A Study in Troop Frontage." H. B. Monograph No. 4, W. D. Doc. 

No. 992, 1919. 
** " A Study in Battle Formation." H. B. Monograph No. 6, W. D. Doc. 

No. 1012, 1920. 

IV. Military AcTmTiES in the United States. 

** " Economic aiobilization in the United States for the War of 1917." 

H. B. Monograph No. 2, W. D. Doc. No. 885, 1918. 
** " A Handbook of Economic Agencies of the War of 1917." H. B. Mono- 
graph No. 3, W. D. Doc. No. 908, 1919. 
V. Histories of Troop Units. 

" Outline History of Divisions." ^ 

" Outline History of Regular Regiments. 



PREFACE. 



It is evident that within the limits of this monograph only a very 
small part of available material can be included. The difficulties 
have been those incident to selection rather than location of data. 

The object of this monograph is to present its subject in its broad- 
est aspect ; but at the same time, by means of references to available 
sources, to point out the direction for more exhaustive study. Other 
more detailed monographs covering the general subject of the 
Services of Supply are contemplated by the historical branch. Gen- 
eral Staff. 

General sources of information are referred to by number. The 
bibliography appearing at the end of the monograph contains the 
numbered references. 

Services and departments that functioned directly under General 
Headquarters are not discussed in this monograph. 

5 



CONTENTS. 



Page. 
I. Conditions Leading to the Selection of the Line of Communi- 
cations : 

Gen. Pershing's instructions from the War Department 9 

French interest in Paris and British interest in channel ports_ 9 

Report of the Military Railway Commission 10 

Report of the Board on Ports 10 

II. The Line of Communications Selected : 

Summary of Gen. Pershing's problem 11 

Memorandum of Gen. Harbord 12 

Definite selection of a line of communications 13 

Chapter note 13 

III. Geographical DrvisioN of France fob French Administrative 

Purposes 13 

IV. Organization of the Line of Communications : 

Relation of the Services of Supply to the War Department 15 

Relation of the Senuces of Supply to General Headquarters 15 

The interior development of the Services of Supply 17 

Designation of sections and services 17 

Resum§ of advance section, intermediate section, sections 

No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 20 

Authority exercised by section commanders 24 

Table of totals of personnel in sections, Nov. 11, 1918 25 

V. Organization of Headquaktebs, Services of Supply : 

Chief of Staff 26 

Deputy Chief of Staff 26 

The General Staff (chart) 26 

Assistant Chiefs of Staff 27 

The Adjutant General 27 

The Inspector General 30 

The Judge Advocate 30 

French and British Military Missions 30 

VI. The Military Board of Allied Supply 31 

VII. The General Purchasing Board 35 

VIII. The Army SER\^CE Corps, American Expeditionary Forces 37 

IX. Chemic-vl Warfare Service, American Expeditionary Forces 44 

X, Chief Engineer, American Expeditionary Forces 49 

XI. Medical Corps, American Expeditionary Forces 56 

XII. Motor Transport Corps, American Expeditionary Forces 62 

XIII. Ordnance Department, American Expeditionary Forces 69 

XIV. Quartermaster Corps, American Expeditionary Forces 77 

XV. Signal Corps, American Expeditionary Forces 84 

XVI. Transportation Corps, American Expeditionary Forces 89 

XVII. Renting, Requisition, and Claims Service, American Expedi- 
tionary Forces 101 

Bibliography 105 

Appendice's 111 

7 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 



[Figures in superior type C) refer to footnotes; figures in text type (1) refer 

to bibliograpliy.] 

I._CONDITIONS LEADING TO THE SELECTION OF THE 
LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS. 

Maj. Gen. Pershing arrived in France with* instructions — 

That tlie forces of the United States are a separate and distinct component 
of the combined forces, the identity of which must be preserved. (1) 

A study of the military situation in Europe "^ convinced the com- 
manding general, American Expeditionary Forces, that the plans 
of the United States must be based upon an American force several 
million strong. (1) 

CHOICE OF SECTOR. 

The above two conditions, namely, an American force of several 
million operating as a distinct component, necessitated a large front. 
But there were other considerations no less important. France was 
particularly interested in the safety of Paris, and would hold 
large masses of her troops under French command to protect all 
approaches to her capital. (21) The channel ports were vital to 
Great Britain,"" and she would undoubtedly exercise the same care for 
their safety. (21) These considerations pointed toward the selec- 
tion of an American sector well toward the eastern portion of the 
allied front. The French Government suggested Lorraine to the 
commanding general, American Expeditionary Forces, as a suitable 
region for our troops. (1) This region was not occupied in force 
and was a quiet sector, and therefore particularly suitable for the 
billeting and training of newly raised forces. (1) On June 21, 
1917, staff officers were sent to study the Province of Lorraine with a 
view to its occupation as the American sector, having in mind that 
it was the intention of the American Army to act on the offensive. 
(1) This investigation showed that Lorraine offered all the neces- 
sary facilities for the care and training of our troops. (21) (1) 
As to its suitability for an army acting on the offensive, the Briey iron 

1 Report of the Secretary of War for 1919, on file Historical Branch, General Staff, 
containing the entire letter of instructions to Gen. Pershing. 

' Appendix A. 

« Paragraph 12, Part I, Final Report of Gen. Pershing to the Secretary of War, Septem- 
ber 1, 1919, on file Historical Branch, General Staff. 

9 



10 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

basin west of Metz, the coal region east of Metz, the vital railroad 
communications in this same region, and, finally, the fortress of Metz 
itself, offered important objectives for a strategic offensive launched 
from Lorraine/ (1) (21) (18) 

But the front selected for the American Armj must not only be 
suitable in itself — it must have a suitable and available line of com- 
munications. This line, based upon a sufficient number of French 
ports, must be able to maintain a constant flow of supplies from over- 
sea bases (ports) to the railheads, and must also meet the require- 
ments imposed by the movement of sick, wounded, and salvage from 
front to rear. 

Previous to the arrival of Gen. Pershing in France a (2) military 
railway commission had been sent by the War Department to investi- 
gate rail transportation. This commission was just (3) completing 
its task, and its report stated that the railroads in the north of France 
were already overburdened by the traffic imposed by the French and 
English Armies, and that the channel ports of France, which were 
the British bases, were used to their utmost capacity. (4) 

STUDY OF PORT CONDITIONS. 

While en route to France, Gen. Pershing had appointed a Board on 
Ports,** which upon arrival investigated port conditions in France. 
This board fully agreed with the Military Railway Commission, and 
recommended that the American Government gradually take over for 
permanent use the ports of St. Nazaire, La Pallice, and Bassens, and 
for emergency use, Nantes, Bordeaux, and Pauillac. (5) (21) 

French ports on the Mediterranean were not considered suitable at 
this time, owing to their greater distance and the large losses by sub- 
marine. (2) Marseille and Toulon were congested by the Salonika 
movements. 

It will thus be seen that the United States was limited in the selec- 
tion of ports in France to those on the Atlantic, and was unable to 
make use of the railroads in northern France. (18) 

NOTE TO PART I. 

Several months previous to Gen. Pershing's arrival in France an 
American military commission had been attached to the American 
embassy at Paris, and the correspondence of this commission refers 
to the earliest study made to locate a suitable front and line of 
communications for the American Expeditionary Forces. The fol- 
lowing are extracts from this correspondence: 

* Page 6, Chapter I, Report of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, General Headquarters, 
to the commanding general. Expeditionary Forces, on file Historical Branch, General 
Staff. 

* Appendix B. 



OKGANIZATIOli^' OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 11 

[Memorandum for Chief of Staff, dated May 19, 1917, from Chief, War College Division, 

General Staff.] 

This memorandum states that on May 14 a cable was sent to Maj. James A. 
Logan, jr., at Paris, as follows : " Consult with French authorities relative to 
points of debarkation and establishment of bases, camps, line of communica- 
tions, American forces. Inspect English and other bases and report results and 
recommendations without delay." 

In his cable reply Maj. Logan states that French General StafE is preparing 
complete study of all suitable ports, which information will be submitted to 
War Council. 

In a cable from Paris to the War Department, dated May 18, 
Maj. Logan states: 

French contemplate placing principal American advance center of instruction 
in Belfort zone in camp already partially installed for reception troops. Other 
centers of instruction echeloned at different- existing camps between Belfort and 
Bordeaux. * * * French Genpral Staff study contemplating American line of 
communications from Bordeaux to Belfort, utilizing, if necessary, three lines 
of railroad which are at present least congested. * * * French General 
Staft notified that all ports from Belgium, including Cherbourg, at disposal of 
British and Belgian troops. These ports and connecting railroads working at 
about full capacity. Brest considered very favorable by our naval representa- 
tive here, but French object on account of congested railroads this point and 
the fact that some railroads cross laterally all their own existing line of com- 
munications. * * * Marseille and Toulon good ports ; but I am informed 
by the French General Staff that these are very congested, due to the Salonika 
movements, and in addition hardly suitable on account of longer distance from 
United States and greater submarine danger. 

This correspondence on file with War College Division, General 
Staff. 

Chapter I, Report of the Fourth Section General Staff, General 
Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, gives a review of 
the transportation conditions that existed in France upon arrival of 
the commanding general, American Expeditionary Forces. 

II.— THE LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS SELECTED. 

The problem of the selection of a front and a line of communica- 
tions which confronted Gen. Pershing was thus reduced to the fol- 
lowing : 

(A) Selection of a front — 

(a) Suitable in size for an army of several million 

troops. 
(h) Located where conditions would be favorable to 
the exercise of American command. 

(c) Located in a region favorable to an offensive. 

(d) Located in a region with billeting facilities and 

favorable for training. 



12 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

(B) Selection of a line of communications — 

(a) With railroads sufficient to reach the entire 

length of front. 

(b) With trunk lines from ports upon which Ameri- 

can traffic would be superimposed upon that 
of the French and passing through localities 
suitable for the location of depots. 

(c) Available and suitable ports. 

There was also presented the problem of flexibility in the line of 
communications ° adopted. If the American forces were called upon 
to operate along a portion of the front, other than the one selected, 
our means of supply must be able to reach these forces. (18) 
FINAL DECISIONS. 

It is both interesting and pertinent at this point to quote from a 
memorandum (6) prepared during May, 1919, by Maj. Gen. J. G. 
Harbord, who was Chief of Staff, General Headquarters, at the time 
a line of communications was selected. Relative to conditions, as 
Gen. Pershing found them in France upon his arrival. Gen. Harbord 
states, as follows: 

The channel ports and the railroads of northern France were congested by 
British and French traffic. The Mediterranean ports were 900 miles further 
from our shores than the other ports of France and submarine activity \va» 
greater and under less control in the Mediterranean than in the open Atlantic. 
This limited our selection to the Atlantic ports south of Brest, which port 
itself was unsuited for the discharge of supplies and at that time was reserved 
for naval use. * * * From the ports of western France there were available 
railroad lines to the northeast, including the double-track lines from Bordeaux 
and St. Nazaire forming a junction near Bourges, thence running east and 
north toward Dijon with radiations toward Epinal and Nancy. It was esti- 
mated that these lines, assisted by collateral lines which were available, could 
handle a traffic for American use of 50,000 tons per day. (21) These considera- 
tions, with the probability that pressure from the French would dictate the 
employment of our forces well toward the east, led to the selection of the ports 
of St. Nazaire, La Pallice, and Bassens for permanent use, with Nantes, Bor- 
deaux, and Pauillac for emergency use. * * * The probability that our 
forces would be employed well toward the eastern end of the western front 
indicated the line of communications from the Atlantic to our front of perhaps 
an average length of 500 miles. * * * ^he immediate location of the in- 
termediate and advance storage depended upon the courtesy of the French. 
The whole country w-as more or less given to installations for their own armies^ 
The great majority of all available institutions were in use by the French or 
British, and the facilities which adequately served the population in time of 
peace were totally inadequate to the added strain imposed by our army of 
from two to four million men. * * * Certain railroad lines were not avail- 

« See letter from the commanding general, American Expeditionary Forces, to the com- 
manding general, Service of Supply, dated 23 May, 1918, quoted on pp. 10-11 in the 
Report of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G— 4, General Headquarters, to the commandingL 
general, American Expeditionary Forces, filed in the Historical Branch, General Staff. 



OEGA]SriZATIO]Sr OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 13 

able to us; certain lines running parallel to the front must not be crossed by 
more than a certain number of trains each 24 hours because needed for the 
rapid movement of troops from flank to flank. 

The solution of this problem is contained in confidential cable No. 
24, received July 2, 1917, by The Adjutant General, from Gen. 
Pershing. (7) This cable gives in outline the decision as to the 
front, the line of communications, and oversea bases. 

The cable states that the only ports then available were those on 
the Loire and Gironde Rivers, and La Pallice, and La Rochelle. The 
main railroad line running northeast from these ports passed through 
districts favorable for the location of supply depots embraced by 
Orleans, Bourges, Montargis and Nevers. The general area selected 
for training was included by Neufchateau, Nancy and Epinal. The 
First Division would be billeted in the vicinity of Gondrecourt 
(Meuse) and its artillery would go to Valdahon (Doubs). The cable 
stated further that the use of the ports mentioned would avoid in- 
terference with the British bases, and the rail routes indicated 
avoided routes used by French and British armies. The location 
•of proposed depots was such as to facilitate supply, and the area to be 
used for billeting and training was unoccupied and included villages 
with ample billets. The cable stated, finally, that American troops 
would probably enter the lines north of Nancy.'' (21) 

III— THE GEOGRAPHICAL DIVISION OF FRANCE FOR 
FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES. 

For their administrative purposes, the French divided the coun- 
try primarily into two zones — the Zone of the Interior (Zone de 
I'Interieur) , and Zone of the Armies (Zone des Armees). The 
former was under the direction of the Council of Ministers, and the 
latter under military control. The Zone of the Armies was fur- 
ther divided into two parts, Army Advance Zone (Zone de I'Avant) 
and the Army Service Zone (Zone d'Etapes). (18) 

ZONE SYSTEM. 

When the American military administrative system was created 
in France and superimposed upon the French, we followed to a 
great degree the French system. The French had a supply and 
transportation organization for the Zone of the Armies distinct from 
that of the Zone of the Interior. This system we adopted by creat- 
ing regulating stations, having control of distribution of all supplies 
to the troops in the advance, acting under direction of General Head- 
quarters. The responsibility of the Services of Supply ceased when 

' Also report of Gen. Pershing to the Secretary of War, November 20, 1918, quoted In 
JuU in Report of Secretary of War, 1918. 



14 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

the advance supply depots were filled, and troops from the interior 
reached these regulating stations. 

On October 1, 1918, there was transmitted by General Headquar- 
ters to Headquarters, Services of Supply, a draft of a proposed gen- 
eral order modifying General Orders, Nos. 31 and 44, General Head- 
quarters, Expeditionary Forces, series 1918. It is desirable to refer 
to the main features of these proposed general orders, as they repre- 
sented the opinion of General Headquarters in a matter of reorgani- 
zation based upon actual experience.^ The main features were : (18) 

It divided territorially the American Expeditionary Forces into 
two general zones — a zone of supply, and a zone of the armies. The 
zone of supply would contain the primary services of supply and, 
territorially, would comprise the irrtermediate and base sections as 
they then existed. The zone of the armies would coincide with 
the French zone of the armies. It was proposed to subdivide the 
zone of the armies into an army combat zone, the limits of which 
would be subject to readjustment from time to time, and an Army 
service zone which would contain such agencies and establishments 
as were necessary to tlie immediate and direct service of combat 
troops. A director of the Army service zone was created who was 
vested with the command of all service troops in the Army service 
zone, and he served directly under the Army commander. 

Whether or not this proposed reorganization was in the interest 
of good administration it is impossible to determine, as the armistice 
of November 11 terminated further consideration of the question. 
It is well to consider in this connection that there was a constant 
pressure from the French Government to influence us to adopt their 
military administrative system, and to create zones and geographical 
divisions corresponding to theirs. Our administrative sections, at 
the request of the French, were drawn to conform generally to the 
lines of French military regions. In any study of the Services of 
Supply it should be kept constantly in mind, when considering our 
system created in France, that the French Government was always 
very much concerned that we conform to their already established 
system, and this we usually did, and thereby prevented many compli- 
cations. Our supply system in France had to be superimposed upon 
that of the French, and with the least derangement of the French 
system. 

8 Two boards of officers were appointed in the American Expeditionary Forces to con- 
sider questions of reorganization of the American Expeditionary Forces. One board was 
appointed at General Headquarters on March 14, 1919. Its report is on file with the rec- 
ords of General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces. The second board was 
appointed per S. O. No. 141. Service of Supply, May 1, 1919. The report is on file In the 
Historical Branch, General Staff. 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 15 

IV.— ORGANIZATION OF THE LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS 
(SERVICES OF SUPPLY). 

(A) Relation of the Services of Supply to the War Department. 

(B) Relation of the Services of Supply to General Headquarters. 

(C) The interior development of the Services of Supply. 

A. Relation of the Services of Supply to the War Department. — 
Until August 6, 1918, there were no direct relations between the 
Services of Supply and the War Department. On that date, how- 
ever, the commanding general, Expeditionary Forces, authorized the 
commanding general, Services of Supply, to communicate direct 
with the War Department on all questions of supply and on mat- 
ters relating to Services of Supply troops, provided no matters of 
policy were involved.® (21) 

B. Relation of the Services of Supply to General Headquarters. — 
General Orders, No. 8, General Headquarters, Expeditionary Forces, 
July 5, 1917, created the Line of Communications of the American 
Expeditionary Forces, placing the commanding general of the Line 
of Communications in a relation to the commanding general, Ameri- 
can Expeditionary Forces, similar to that of the chiefs of services. 
This organization imposed upon the commanding general. Expedi- 
tionary Forces, the duty of coordinating directly all the services 
and the Line of Communications; but as the American Expedi- 
tionary Forces increased in size it became evident that the General 
Headquarters thereof must free itself from a portion of these ad- 
ministrative duties/" 

ORGANIZATION OF SUPPLY SYSTEM. 

On February 16, 1918, General Orders, No. 31, General Headquar- 
ters, Expeditionary Forces,^^ were issued which changed the designa- 
tion of the Line of Communications to Services of Supply, and 
charged the commanding general of these services with the coordina- 
tion of all services and departments except the Adjutant General, 
Inspector General, and Judge Advocate, To facilitate this coordina- 
tion, all service headquarters, excepting those particularly mentioned 
above, were moved to Tours, where the headquarters of the Services 

» General Order No. 130, General Headquarters, Aug. 6, 1918. Also cable No. 1,562 
from Pershing to The Adjutant General, Aug. 6, 191S. On file Historical Branch, Gen- 
eral Staff. 

>" A board of officers was appointed per letter Chief of Staff, General Headquarters, Feb. 
8, 1918, to investigate and report upon what changes should, be made in the organi- 
zation of the American Expeditionary Forces. Report of board on file in Historical 
Branch, General Staff. 

i» Two General Orders No. 31, General Headquarters, 1918, were issued, both dated Feb. 
16. The first changed the designation of the Line of Communications to the Service 
of the Rear. The second General Order No. 31, or corrected copy, was issued one month 
later but bore the same date (Feb. 16) and this second order designated the old Line of 
Communications as the Services of Supply. 



16 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

of Supply were located. The chiefs of the administrative and tech- 
nical staff services were directed by this order to exercise all of 
their functions in the matter of procurement, supplies, transporta- 
tion, and construction under the direction of the commanding gen- 
eral, Services of Supply. Each chief of service was authorized to 
designate an officer of his service to represent him with each section 
of the General Staff, at General Headquarters. A chief of utilities 
was created who, under the commanding general. Services of Sup- 
ply, coordinated the Transportation Department, the Motor Trans- 
port Service, and the Director of Construction and Forestry. This 
Service of Utilities was abolished by General Orders, No. 114, Gen- 
eral Headquarters, Expeditionary Forces, July 11, 1918. The Di- 
rector of Construction and Forestry was placed under the Chief of 
Engineers, and the Motor Transport Corps was created a separate 
service. 

General Orders, No. 44, General Headquarters, March 23, 1918, 
enunciated very fully the duties under General Orders, No. 31 of the 
commanding general. Services of Supply, and those of the chiefs of 
services. The commanding general. Services of Supply, was re- 
sponsible for the procurement of all supplies both from the United 
States and from European sources. He was charged with the dis- 
tribution of these supplies to the various depots ; with the unloading 
of the troops and freight, and their transportation ; the construction, 
maintenance, and operation of railroads. In these duties he was 
assisted by a technical staff consisting of the chiefs of the several 
supply and technical services. Each chief of service was directed to 
exercise a close personal control over all establishments of his de- 
partment throughout the theater of operation, and he was responsible 
that the necessary supplies were delivered and maintained in depots. 
He was charged with the duty of seeing that the supplies pertaining 
to his service were replaced. 

Commanding officers of supply depots were responsible that the 
supplies shipped by them were delivered, either to the consignee or, 
if destined for a zone served by a regulating station,^^ to the regulat- 
ing officer. Regulating officers were responsible for the proper trans- 
portation and distribution of supplies in their zone. The responsi- 
bility of the commanding general. Services of Supply, in the matter 
of supplies ^^ ceased when shipments were delivered at advance 
depots. (18) 

" " A regulating station is a large railway yard where cars from the supply depots and 
from the rear are received and made up into trains for the divisions." General Orders 
No. 44, General Headquarters, Expeditionary Forces, on file Historical Branch, General 
Staff. 

" Chapter III, Report of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, General Headquarters, to the 
commanding general. Expeditionary Forces, contains detailed statement of the functions 
of base, intermediate, and advance storage ; regulating stations. Army depots, and rail 
heads. On file Historical Branch, General Staff. 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 17 

Previous to August 6, 1918, the General Stajff, General Head- 
quarters, Expeditionary Forces, was charged with all matters of 
supply and all cables relating to this subject were sent from General 
Headquarters. A similar course was followed in regard to all cable- 
grams relating to troop arrivals and replacements. However, on 
that date, General Orders, No. 130, General Headquarters, Expedi- 
tionary Forces, was issued, which charged the commanding general, 
Services of Supply, with all questions of supply under approved 
policies. This order directed that all cables to the War Department 
relating to supply matters not involving policy should be sent di- 
rectly by the commanding general, Services of Supply, and charged 
him with many details previously handled by General Headquarters. 

The above constituted the relation between General Headquarters 
and the Services of Supply as they existed on November 11, 1918. 

C. The interior development op the Services of Sv/pply.^^ — A de- 
scription of the Services of Supply as they existed on November 11, 
1918, would give only a very imperfect conception. The Services 
of Supply, as they existed on the date of the armistice, were a devel- 
opment, always in process of evolution; the direction of this evo- 
lution being toward decentralization. This decentralization appeared 
in the form of creating new and independent services for activities 
that before the war did not exist in our Army, or that were pre- 
viously dependent upon or formed a pari of the other services. 
Important instances are: The creation of the Motor Transport 
Corps, previously a part of the Quartermaster Corps; the Air Ser- 
vice, broken from the Signal Corps; also the creation of the Army 
Service Corps and the Renting, Requisition and Claim Service. 
There was only one effort to centralize activities. This consisted in 
combining the Transportation Corps, Construction and Forestry, and 
the Motor Transport Service under one head, directed by the Chief 
of Utilities. Th*^ Service of Utilities was, however, abolished after 
a short trial. 

The following is a resume of the salient facts in the interior de- 
velopment of the Services of Supply, arranged chronologically : 

DEVELOPMENT OF SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

When the first American convoy landed at St. Nazaire the com- 
manding general. Expeditionary Forces, by verbal order, designated 
that port as " Base Port No. 1," operating directly under his author- 
ity. On July 4, 1917, an advance section was created with head- 

>* Paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 32, and 33, Report of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, 
General Headquarters, to the commanding general, Expeditionary Forces, on file Historical 
Branch, General Staff, quotes two important letters from the commanding general. Ex- 
peditionary Forces, to the commanding general, Services of Supply, stating the policy of 
the development of the Services of Supply. 

178841°— 20 2 



18 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

quarters at Nevers, functioning also directly under the commanding 
general, Expeditionary Forces. The next step is found in General 
Orders, No. 8, General Headquarters, July 5, which designated a com- 
manding general. Line of Communications, with territorial com- 
mand, charged with supply, sanitary and telegraph service, and the 
facilities relating thereto. He was also charged with all construc- 
tion work in the Line of Communications. A Transportation De- 
partment was created to operate, maintain, and construct all railways 
and canals under American control, also to construct and maintain 
roads, wharves, shops, and other buildings for railroad purposes; 
however, all construction work was continued under the commanding 
general, Line of Communications, as the Transportation Depart- 
ment at that time had no labor. 
LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS. 

On August 13, 1917, General Orders, No. 20, General Headquarters, 
Expeditionarj'^ Forces, defined the geographical limits of the Line of 
Communications as extending from the sea to points where delivery 
of supplies is made to the field transportation of the combat field 
forces, less such area as might from time to time be excepted. Paris 
was designated as the headquarters of the Line of Communications. 
This order designated the following railroad lines for American use : 
{a) The line of St. Nazaire-Nantes-Angers-Tours-Bourges-Ne- 
vers-Dijon-Is-sur-Tille (regulating station), and points to the front. 
(h) The line Bordeaux-Perigueux, Limoges-Bourges-Nevers- 
Dijon-Is-sur-Tille (regulating station), and points to the front. 

(c) The railroad lines connected with the lines (a) and (h) from 
any ports at which our troops or materials may be landed, and all 
railway connections with the various depots and camps established in 
the vicinity of the same lines of railroad." 
SERVICE OF MILITARY RAILWAYS. 

The Service of Military Railways was created, charged with the 
operation, maintenance, and construction of such railways as might 
be turned over to our forces while in France, and with the supervision 
of all movement of troops and supplies over lines operated by the 
French authorities. This supervision included all railways, both 
permanent and temporary, except those in the "Zone des Armees." 
GENERAL PURCHASING BOARD. 

General Orders, No. 23, General Headquarters, Expeditionary 
Forces, August 20, 1917, created a General Purchasing Board, estab- 
lished at Paris, with a General Purchasing Agent at its head. Each 
supply service had a representative on this board for the purpose 
of making such purchases in Europe as the service required. The 

» Note to Part IV. 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 19 

General Purchasing Agent coordinated and supervised the purchases, 
thereby preventing competition. 

TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT. 

General Orders, No. 37, General Headquarters, September 14, 1917, 
established a Transportation Department as one of the separate tech- 
nical services of the Expeditionary Forces, providing for a Director 
General of Transportation and giving a general outline of organiza- 
tion. 

REMOUNT SERVICE. 

The Remount Service was organized by General Orders, No. 39, 
General Headquarters, Expeditionary Forces, September 18, 1917, 
and was attached to the Quartermaster Corps. General Orders, No. 
122, General Headquarters, July 26, 1918, reorganized this service 
and created a Chief of the Veterinary Service, who operated under 
the Eemount Service. On August 24, 1918. however. General Orders, 
No. 139, General Headquarters, placed the Veterinary Service under 
the Chief Surgeon, Expeditionary Forces. 

MOTOR TRANSPORT SERVICE. 

On December 8, 1917, General Orders, No. 70, General Headquar- 
ters, Expeditionary Forces, created the Motor Transport Service as 
a branch of the Quartermaster Corps. 

ARMY TRANSPORT SERVICE. 

The Army Transport Service was transferred from the Quarter- 
master Corps to the Transportation Department on December 18, 
1917, by General Orders, No, 78, Headquarters, Expeditionary Forces. 

GENERAL PURCHASING AGENT. 

On January 13, 1918, the headquarters of the Line of Commu- 
nications were moved from Paris to Tours. On March 4, 1918, 
General Orders, No. 5, Service of the Eear, charged the General 
Purchasing Agent with procuring civilian labor in Europe. He was 
directed to organize a Labor Bureau, which bureau was later trans- 
ferred to the Army Service Corps, created by General Orders, No. 38, 
Headquarters, Services of Supply, 1918. The city of Paris and 
the Arrondissement of Tours were exempted from the jurisdiction 
of the intermediate section on March 20 by General Orders, No. 2, 
Headquarters, Services of Supply, 1918. 

RENTS, REQUISITIONS, AND CLAIMS SERVICE. 

A Eenting, Requisitions, and Claims Service, functioning under 
the commanding general. Services of Supply, was created by Gen- 
eral Orders, No. 50, General Headquarters, Expeditionary Forces, 
March 30, 1918. This service was charged with the renting and 
requisitioning, of land and facilities in France, with billeting, and 



20 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

with the settlement of certain claims. On July 11, 1918 (General 
Orders, No. 114, General Headquarters), the Service of Utilities was 
abolished. 

ARMY SERVICE CORPS. 

The Army Service Corps was created August 22, 1918, by Gen- 
eral Orders, No. 34, Headquarters, Services of Supply. 
TERRITORIAL SECTIONS. 

Territorial administrative sections were created and adjusted from 
time to time as the necessity demanded.^*^ These geographical sec- 
tions may be roughly divided into two classes — those built around 
ports (or base sections), and the interior sections. The interior 
sections included the advance and intermediate sections. 

ADVANCE SECTION. 

The Advance Section was organized to extend the service of terri- 
torial command of the commanding general, Service of Supply, up 
to the point where delivery of supplies was made to the field trans- 
portation of combat forces. It should be noted, however, that when 
supplies from intermediate and base depots reached regulating 
stations further distribution was under the regulating officer, an 
agent of General Headquarters. The authority of the section com- 
mander would cease where it came into contact with that of the com- 
manders in the field. The Advance Section included the two impor- 
tant regulating sections, LifFol-le-Grand (Vosges), and Is-sur-Tille 
(Cote d'Or) ;^^ also the following activities: 

x\ir Service : 6 depots, 27 airdromes, 2 schools. 

Quartermaster: 3 depots, 7 remount depots, 10 veterinary 
hospitals. 

Ordnance: 9 supply depots. 

Medical : 63 hospitals. 

Motor Transport Corps: 4 overhaul parks, 1 depot, 1 recep- 
tion park, 2 service parks, 21 centers. 

Engineers : 1 depot, 1 light railway shop, 4 forestry districts. 

Chemical Warfare Service: 1 depot. 

Signal : 1 depot, telegraph and telephone lines. 

INTERMEDIATE SECTION. 

Tlic Intermediate Section was the largest section in France. It 
included the great intermediate storage depot at Gievres (Loir-et- 
Cher)j where a large part of the supplies of the Expeditionary 

18 (21) Part I, paragraphs 15-16, and Part III, paragraph 1 of Final Report of Gen. 
Pershing to Secretary of War, Sept. 1, 1919, on file Historical Branch, General Staff. 

»7 These two regulating stations were the only ones actually constructed by us. The fol- 
lowing French regulating stations were used by us at various times: Creil (Oise), Mantes 
(Selne-ot-Oise), Le Bourget (Seine), Noisy-lc-Sec (Seine), St. Dizier (Hautc-Marne), Gray 
(Haute-Sa6ne), Connantre (Marnc), Dunkerque (Nord). For a complete description of 
the functions of regulating stations see (18) Chapter III, also (21) Part III, par. 2-6. 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 21 

Forces was stored. There was also another large intermediate 
storage depot under construction at Montierchaume (Indre)/® but 
this depot was only 50 per cent complete at the time of the armistice. 
Mehun-sur-Yevre (Cher) was an important point where the ordnance 
repair shops and the intermediate Ordnance Depot No. 4 were located. 
The first replacement depot was located at St. Aignan (Loir-et- 
Cher).^^ At Blois there was a depot for the classification and distri- 
bution of casual officers and soldiers arriving from the United States. 
Officers found physically or otherwise unfit for duty with combat 
troops were classified here.^*' The Intermediate Section was the 
main section for the training activities of the Air Service, which 
established at Issoudun (Indre) the Third Aviation Instruction 
Center, where the majority of the American pilots received advance 
training. The Air Service Production Center No. 2, the Supply 
Depot No. 3, and an acceptance park were located at Romorantin 
(Loir-et-Cher), one of the largest American aviation projects in 
France. The Seventh Aviation Instruction Center was at Clermont- 
Ferrand (Puy-de-D6me), which was also a center for the training 
of mobile heavy artillery. Important hospital centers were located 
in this section, the largest of these being at Mars and Mesves 
(Nievre), Allerey (Saone-et-Loire), Chateauroux (Indre), and 
Orleans. The headquarters of the section, Nevers, was the center 
for several hospital trains, the location of an important railroad 
center and of intermediate Quartermaster Depot No. 1, also a loco- 
motive repair shop of the American Expeditionary Forces. The 
Motor Transport repair shops were located at Verneuil (Nievre), 30 
miles east of Nevers. The Central Records Office of the Expedi- 
tionary Forces was located at Bourges (Cher).'-'^ 

BASE SECTION NO. 1. 

The sections built around ports were as follows: Base Section No. 
1, with headquarters at St. Nazaire, which developed into the greatest 
freight port of the Expeditionary Forces. The storage depot at 
Montoir was built near St. Nazaire. Another important port of this 
base section was Nantes, on the Loire River. Angers (Maine-et- 
Loire), Savenay (Loire-Inferieure) , Meucon and Coetquidan (Mor- 
bihan), and Saumur were important installations of American activ- 
ity within this section. At Angers was located the principal training 
base for engineer officers. Base Hospital No. 27 was also located 

"See (IS) pages 10, 11, 12, for a statement of the functions of Gi&vres and Montier- 
chaume. 

" See monograpli on Replacements, Historical Branch. There is on file in the Histori- 
cal Branch a complete detailed report on the Replacement System prepared by the D. C. 
of S., Services of Supply. 

=" See (3) pages 74-91 for a description of the Reclassiflcation System. See also (21) 
I'art III, par. 10. , 

'^Central R'ecords Office operated directly under the Adjutant General, General Head- 
quarters. 



22 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

at Angers, which was in addition a replacement depot for transporta- 
tion troops. Meucon was an artillery training camp and the loca- 
tion of an aerial observation school. Savenay (25 kilometers east 
of St. Nazaire) was an important hospital center of particular value 
as an evacuation point for sick and wounded. Coetquidan was an 
artillery training camp and an aerial observation school. Saumur 
was an important railroad junction and the location of a school of 
instruction for field artillery officers. 

BASE SECTION NO. 2. 

Base Section No. 2 included the ports on the Kiver Gironde and 
the port of La Pallice (Charente-Inferieure). Later, La Pallice 
became part of Base Section No. 7. The headquarters was at Bor- 
deaux, which was a terminus of one of the main lines of communi- 
cation. There were assigned to the Americans and constructed by 
them at Bassens (Gironde) large dock facilities. Grouped around 
these were classification and storage warehouses. There was a large 
depot at St. Sulpice (Gironde) and a small depot was established 
at Coutras (Gironde). Ammunition storage facilities were con- 
structed at St. Loubes (Gironde) and artillery training camps were 
at Souge and Le Courneau (Gironde) ; remount stations were at 
Carbon-Blanc and Merignac (Gironde), Bayonne, Biarritz, and 
Hendaye (Basses Pyrenees) ; a stevedore camp at Bassens; rest and 
embarkation camps at Grange-Neuve and Genicart (Gironde). 
Thirteen base hospitals and 13 sawmills were located within this 
section. 

BASE SECTION NO. 3. 

Base Section No. 3 was established primarily for the care of Ameri- 
can troops passing through England to France. Rest camps for 
American troops were established along the route, Liverpool- 
Southampton. A large number of American air personnel were 
trained in this section and a number of base hospitals constructed. 
The headquarters were located at London. 

BASE SECTION NO. 4. 

Base Section No. 4 was established as an agency for receiving 
American troops and supplies arriving in France from England. 
The important points of American activities were Le Havre and 
Rouen (Seine Inferieure), Calais and Boulogne (Pas-de-Calais). 

BASE SECTION NO. 5. 

Base Section No. 6 was built around the port of Brest. Outside 
of this port was a debarkation port at Cherbourg (Manche), a loco- 
motive terminal and repair shop at Rennes (Ille-et-Vilaine), and a 
coal port at Granville (Manche). The port of Brest was the most 
^mDortant port of debarkation for personnel in France, as it was 



ORGANIZATION" OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 23 

the only deep-water port available to the American forces. Head- 
quarters were located at Brest. 

BASE SECTION NO. 6. 

Base Section No. 6 was established June 28, 1918, with headquar- 
ters at Marseille. This port was not used previously by the Expedi- 
tionary Forces on account of excessive submarine danger in the 
Mediterranean. No American troops were brought to France 
through this port and it was used only for freight. It was later 
used, however, as an embarking port for troops returning to the 
United States. A Motor Transport bark and a labor camp were 
maintained at Marseille and a storage depot was under construc- 
tion at Miramas (Bouches-du-Ehone). 

BASE SECTION NO. 7. 

The first headquarters of this section were at La Pallice (Charente- 
Inferieure), but later moved to La Eochelle. At this point was 
received a large part of the coal of the Expeditionary Forces and 
here was the principal depot for the storage of oil and gasoline. A 
remount depot and car erection center were within this section. 
Important American activities were: La Eochelle, location of Camp 
Pullman, a car erection plant; La Pallice, port of entry and loca- 
tion of oil and gasoline storage; Aigrefeuille (Charente-Inferieure), 
the location of storage and classification yards; Eocliefort (Charente- 
Inferieure), port of entry for coal and general cargo; Tonnay- 
Charente and Marens (Charente-Inferieure), Talmont (Charente- 
Inferieure), an approved site for a deep-water port; Monta<>'r»o 
(Charente-Inferieure), a cement plant. 

BASE SECTION NO. 8. 

Base Section No. 8 consisted geographically of all Italy, with head- 
quarters at Padua. This section was established to provide control 
over the various American activities in Italy. These activities con- 
sisted of a regiment of Infantry, aviation school at Foggia, hospital 
and ambulance units. Motor Transport Corps companies, and a de- 
tachment of aviators in training and on combat duty with the Italian 
Army. A quartermaster depot was located at Alessandria. 

BASE SECTION NO. 9. 

Base Section No. 9 was established to meet the requiremexits of the 
American Army of Occupation on the Ehine. The plan contemplated 
using the Ehine and Scheldt as a line of communications with Eot- 
terdam and Antwerp as ports for the handling of suprlies. Head- 
quarters were at Antwerp.^^ 

=" For details concerning the sections, see the history of every section of the Services of 
■Supply, on file in- the Historical Branch, General Staff. 



24 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

SECTION COMMANDERS. 

The commanders of sections were usually generally officers ap- 
pointed by the commanding general, Services of Supply. The section 
commander bore the same relation to the representative of the vari- 
ous services in his section as the conunanding general, Services of 
Supply, bore to the chiefs of the services at Tours. 

Section commanders were responsible for discipline, supply, and 
sanitation. From time to time questions arose in sections between 
the commanders and the representatives of services. These ques- 
tions usually had reference to various projects carried on by the 
services in the section. Questions also arose regarding personnel 
pertaining to the various services serving in the section. Chiefs of 
services at Tours considered that their representatives in sections 
were the proper channel through which to give instructions. Sec- 
tion commanders considered that they, as the direct representatives 
of the commanding general, Services of Supply, were the proper 
channel. The approved policy covering these difficulties was that 
the section commander, in addition to his responsibility for atten- 
tion to duty, discipline, supply, and sanitation, of all personnel in 
his section, was the proper channel for all communications between 
chiefs of services and their representatives in the section, excepting 
those of a purely routine and technical class. On the other hand, 
section commanders were not authorized to change projects which 
had been approved at Headquarters, Services of Supply, nor were 
they authorized to give priority in large matters. Section com- 
manders were informed by Headquarters, Services of Supply, of 
all policies, and acting upon these policies they commanded the sec- 
tions. The tendency of growth was toward increasing the authority 
of section commanders, transmitting to them policies, and holding 
them responsible for carrying them out. The Services of Supply 
was so large territorially, contained such a large personnel, and 
involved so many different activities, that decentralization was neces- 
sary. Section commanders pooled all motor transportation in their 
sections, and controlled the distribution of all labor, including cas- 
uals, combat and non-combat. When questions arose in sections re- 
lating to large questions of priority, they were referred to Head- 
quarters, Services of Supply, where, after consultation with the chief 
of services involved, a decision was made. 

STRENGTH OF SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

As an indication of the magnitude of its activities in regard to 
the number of personnel stationed in the Services of Supply, the 
following table shows the number of troops in the various sections 
on November 11. 1918 : (3) 



ORGANIZATION^ OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 



25 





Officers. 


Men. 


Nurses. 


Total. 


Advance Section 


4,924 

6,365 

1,936 

4,628 

3,801 

1,505 

219 

718 

380 

375 

2,379 


101,271 
117,214 
17,639 
93,119 
90,301 
27,580 
3,944 
15,211 
8,870 
11,. 559 
16,544 


1,728 

1,938 

584 

502 

671 


107,923 


Intermediate Section 


12.5,517 


Paris 


20,159 


Base Section No. 1 


98, 249 


Base Section No. 2 


94,773 




29,085 






4,163 






15,929 


Base Section No. 6. . 




9,250 






11,934 


Headquarters. S, 0. S 


134 


19,057 




5, 451 


Casual ofTicers' depot 


3,029 
334 


94,886 
4,772 


29 


97,944 
5, 106 








Total 


30,593 


602,910 


5, 586 


644,540 







There were also 23,772 civilians employed in the Services of Supply 
and carried on the strength returns of the American Expeditionary 
Forces, making a grand total on this date of 668,312, 

NOTE TO PART IV. 

The railroads mentioned in General Orders, No. 20, General Head- 
quarters, 1917, were known as the " first line." 

The regulating station Liffol-le-Grand was the objective of the 
second line, which left the first at St. Germain-du-Puy (several 
miles east of Bourges) and followed the Est Kailway to its objective 
point by way of Cosne, Etais, Poingon, Chatillon-sur-Seine, and 
Chaumont. 

The third line left the first at Tours and ran over the Paris- 
Orleans system by way of Blois and Orleans, thence over the Est 
Railway, through Mont'argis, Sens, and Troyes to Chaumont, where 
it joined the second line to Liffol-le-Grand. 

The fourth line left the third at Orleans and ran over the Est 
Eailway by way of Malesherbes and Romilly to Troyes, where it 
joined the third line. 



v.— ORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS, SERVICES OF 

SUPPLY. 

THE COMMANDING GENERAL, SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

As previously stated, the functions of the commanding general. 
Services of Supply, were finally defined by General Orders, No. 31, 
General Headquarters, February 16, 1918; General Orders, No. 44, 
General Headquarters,^^ March 23, 1918. 

General Orders, No. 31, General Headquarters, created five sections 
of the General Staff, assigned to each its functions, and directed 
that subordinate commands should conform in principle to General 
Staff organization. (21) This permitted sufficient elasticity in the 
organization, of the General Staff at Headquarters, Services of Sup- 

23 Appendixes F, G. H, I, J. 



26 ORGANIZATIOISr OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

ply, and authorized such changes and reorganization as were from 
time to time found necessary. (18) General Orders. No. 1, Head- 
quarters, Service of the Rear, February 16, 1918, organized the 
General Staff, Headquarters, Services of Supply, which was then 
known as the Service of the Rear. Special functions and duties not 
foreseen at the time General Orders, No. 31, were published were later 
assigned to the most suitable General Staff section, when the neces- 
sity arose. The original General Staff of the Services of the Rear 
consisted of a first, second, third, and fourth sections (G-1, 2, 3, and 
4). No fifth section (G-5) was ever established, as training and in- 
struction were supervised directly by General Headquarters. The 
Operations Section (G-3) was established and functioned until July 
12, 1918, when it was absorbed by G-4. 

CHIEF OF STAFF AND DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF. 

There was a Chief of Staff and a deputy chief of staff. The duties 
of the former corresponded to those usually exercised by that office. 
The deputy chief of staff was at first the channel through which 
papers passed intended for the Chief of Staff, and final action of the 
commanding general, Services of Supply, but as these papers in- 
creased in volume this sj-stem was changed and the deputy chief of 
staff was engaged chiefly in questions of classification and assign- 
ment of personnel with special reference to reclassified personnel 
from Blois.-* 

G-1, SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

G-1 was chiefly concerned with : 

(a) Supervision and direction of the replacing of troops 
through depot divisions, regional replacement battal- 
ions, and other agencies designated to handle this class 
of personnel. 

(h) Disposition of casual officers and soldiers. 

(c) Determining the number and kind of Services of Supply 

troops needed from the United States within the num- 
ber allotted by higher authority and determining the 
priority in which said troops should be sent. 

(d) Preparation of tonnage statistics and designation of 

priority for all tonnage from the United States. 

(e) Matters pertaining to the supplies and equiiJment of 

Services of Supply troops. 

(/) General control of leave areas, athletics, and entertain- 
ment. 

(g) Preparation of graphics and charts showing Services of 
Supply activities in operation. 



** For a description of the reclassification system, casual officers' depot at Blois, see re- 
port of commanding general, Services of Supply, to commanding general, General Head- 
quarters, on file Historical Branch, General Staff. 



OKGANIZATIOlSr OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 27 

In addition to the above, general supervision was maintained over 
all welfare activities and militarized societies. 

ITpon the signing of the armistice all matters in connection with 
the embarkation of troops for repatriation were placed under G-1 
and an embarkation section was formed in that section to handle 
them. 

A detailed discussion of the functions of this section is contained 
in the report of the commanding general, Services of Supply, to 
the commanding general, Expeditionary Forces. (3) (8) 

<J-2, SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

The function of G-2 (Intelligence) (3) (9) in the Services of 
:Supply was to create a system of counterespionage as follows : 
(a) To prevent enemy agents from entering France. 
(6) To control the movements of civilians in such a manner 
as to prevent enemy agents from circulating along the 
American Army's line of communications. 

(c) To detect enemy agents who might have succeeded in 

entering France. 

(d) To prevent the transmission of information by enemy 

agents across the frontier. 

^G-4, SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

G^ Headquarters, Services of Supply, were concerned with sup- 
plies, construction, hospitalization, transportation, labor, salvage, 
troop movements, grave registration, fire prevention, garden service, 
and billeting. This section maintained representatives at base ports 
and in training areas to expedite the arrival of supplies and equip- 
ment. (3) (10) 

In charge of each section of the General Staff was an assistant 
-chief of staff. A deputy assistant chief of staff was designated to 
-act in the absence of the assistant chief of staff, 

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF, HEADQUARTERS, SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

The administrative staff at headquarters. Services of Supply, con- 
sisted of an adjutant general, inspector general, and judge advocate. 

ADJUTANT GENERAL, SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

The Adjutant General's Department was subdivided as follows: 
Statistical Division. — This division embraced the following sub- 
'Sections : 

(«) Personnel section: This subsection kept complete record of 
personnel at headquarters, line of communications. On December 3, 
1918, statistical subsections were established at each of the technical 
and supply services. The personnel section compiled, published and 
distributed various lists and directories. 



28 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 





































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ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 29 

(6) Troop-movement section: Furnished information covering lo- 
cation of organizations in the Services of Supply with their shipping, 
telegraphic, and postal addresses. A semimonthly station list of 
the troops in the Services of Supply was compiled and published. 

(c) Keturns section: Organized to compile and consolidate 
monthly returns of all troops in the Services of Supply. 

{d) Tours section: A statistical section charged with keeping a 
card file of every enlisted man in Tours. 

(e) Officers' qualification card section: This branch provided and 
procured officers on requisition for special services, selected through 
information covered by their qualification card. 

(/) Soldiers' qualification card section : From the soldiers' qualifi- 
cation cards men were selected with special civil vocational qualifi- 
■cations for assignment where their special qualifications could be 
used to the best interests of the service. These cards were also used 
to select men with particular military qualifications as a result of 
specialized training at Army training schools. 

Records Division. — This division had charge of Adjutant General 
records. 

Cable and Code Division. — All cablegrams were indexed and filed 
in the form of a permanent record. On August 6, 1918, the com- 
manding general. Services of Supply, was authorized to send cables 
direct to the War Department where they involved matters other 
than questions of policy. 

Orders Division. — Organized to prepare general orders, special 
orders, and bulletins issued from Headquarters, Services of Supply. 

Personnel Division. — Formed to carry on correspondence pertain- 
ing to individual officers and soldiers of the Services of Supply. 

Chief Cleric's Division. — Organized to receive mail. 

Identification Cards and Information Division. — Organized to 
issue identification cards to officers and to report and index same. 

Mailing and Courier Division. — Charged with the duty of ad- 
dressing and forwarding all official mail. 

Headquarters., Printing Division. — Organized a plant for printing 
at Headquarters, Services of Supply. 

Supply Division. — (Blank forms and Adjutant General's Office 
property.) Furnished the necessary supply of blank forms of the 
Adjutant General's Office for the Services of Supply. This division 
supplied officers and men with such post cards as were authorized. 

Censor Division. — Organized to censor mail. 

Miscellaneous Division. — To this division was referred, in addi- 
tion to miscellaneous matter, all translating done in headquar- 
ters. (3) 



30 



ORGAN^IZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 



INSPECTOR GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT. 

This department performed the usual duties assigned to the 
Inspector General. (3) 

Organization chart, Inspector General's Department, Services of Supply. 





INSPECTOR GENERAL. 


































Inspection S. 0. S. Units. 






Embarkation inspection. 




Verification of money 
accounts. 




















Inspectors in base, intermedi- 
ate, and advance sections. 





JUDGE ADVOCATE'S DEPARTMENT. 

General court-martial jurisdiction was granted the commanding 
general, Services of Supply, by the President under the special pro- 
visions of the eighth article of \\'ar on September 4, 1917. It was also 
granted to the commanding generals of Base Sections Nos. 1, 2, and 5, 
the advance section and intermediate section, on April 7, 1918, to the 
commanding general, District of Paris, on December 23, 1918, and to 
the commanding general, Base Section No. 8, on November 8, 1918. 
The general plan of organization in the Services of Supply called for 
a judge advocate and an assistant judge advocate for each section. 
Trial judge advocates were secured from line officers. Acting judge 
advocates were stationed in all sections. 

The following special matters outside of the duties actually per- 
taining to his department were referred to the judge advocate: (3) 
(a) Eecomniendations concerning the immunity of members 
of the American Expeditionary Forces from French 
criminal jurisdiction. 
{h) Immunity of members of the American Expeditionary 

Forces and its agents from French civil jurisdiction. 
(c) The establishment of the Rents. Requisitions, and Claims 
Service. 

ALLIED MILITARY MISSIONS AT HEADQUARTERS, SERVICES OF 
SUPPLY. 

Two militar}' missions were established at Headquarters, Services 
of Supply, French and British. The French mission was originally 
under the direction of the Orsane Central des Relations Franco- 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 



31. 



Americaines. Questions of a purely military nature were, however, 
referred by the mission directly to the French general staff,^^ 

Organization chart, Judge Advocate's DcjMrtnifMt, Services of Supply. 



JUDGE ADVOCATE. 



Assistant judge ad\'ocato 
and executive officer. 



Reviewing board, court 
martial cases. 



Trial judge advocate. 



War Risk 

Insurance 

Section. 



Admiralty 
Section. 



Interpretation, 
statutory and 
military law. 



International 

and Frencli 

law. 



Railway 

Transportation 

Section. 



French liaison 
oflicer. 



French officers, constituting a part of the personnel of the mis- 
sion, were attached to the various technical and supply services at 
Tours and to headquarters of the various sections to facilitate the 
settlement of Franco-American matters. 

The British mission at Headquarters, Services of Supply, repre- 
sented the^^ British Quartermaster General. It rendered valuable 
service by assisting the various supply services to obtain supplies 
and labor in Great Britain, 

VI.— MILITARY BOARD OF ALLIED SUPPLY. 



On April 19, 1918, Gen. Pershing addressed a letter to M. Cle- 
menceau suggesting that there be vested in a central authority the 

=s There is on file in the Historical Branch, General Staflf, a report by the French mission 
at Tours, dated April 16, 1919, prepared at the request of Headqutirters, Services of Sup- 
ply, giving a summary of their duties aoA a r(5sum6 of important questions settled through 
them. 

«« See memorandum on file in Historical Branch, General Staff, prepared by British mis- 
sion. Headquarters, Services of Supply, giving a rfisum^ of duties. 



32 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

power to study questions of supply and adopt measures for the co- 
ordination of allied resources and utilities. On the same date he 
sent a cable to The Adjutant General relative to his suggestion. On 
May 3, Gen. Pershing addressed a second letter to the French Pre- 
mier on the above subject. 

On May 6, 1918, a conference was held in Paris to consider the 
unification of the supply service of the Allies. Representatives were 
present from France, Great Britain, Italy, and the United States, 
At this conference the coordination of the Allies' supply activities 
was approved in principle, but certain opposition developed as to 
matters of detail. On May 14 a second conference was held at Paris. 
British representatives did not appear, but filed a statement of their 
attitude. As a result of this conference the French and Americans 
entered into an agreement that provided for an interallied board 
whose decisions, if unanimous, would have force of law, provided 
(a) they concerned matters clearly defined; (6) each member had 
previously received from his government special power to agree to 
them. 

The constitution of the Military Board of Allied Supply, after- 
wards ratified by the French, English, Belgian, Italian, and Ameri- 
can Governments, was as follows: (11) 

It is hereby aiiret^d amous the allied goverunieuts subscribing hereto : 

(1) That the principle of unifioatiou of military supplies and utllitios for 
the use of the allied armies is adopted. 

(2) That in order to apply this principle and as far as possble coordinate 
the use of utilities and the distribution of supplies among the allied armies, a 
board consisting of representatives of each of the allied armies is to be con- 
stituted at once. 

(3) That the unanimous decision of the board regarding the allotment of 
material and supplies shall have the force of orders and be carried out by 
the respective supply agencies. 

(4) That further details of the organization by whidi the above plan is to 
be carried out shall be left to the board, subject to such approval by the re- 
spective governments as may at any time seem advisable. 

We agree to the above and wish it to be submitted to the British and Italian 
Governments. ( 11 ) 

The field of activity of the board was the rear of the British 
Army in France, the rear of the American Army in France, and 
the rear of the French Army only in the zone of the advance. The 
French zone of the interior, as distinguished from the French rear 
in the zone of the advance, was under French governmental civil 
authority. The headquarters of the Military Board of Allied Sup- 
ply was established at Coubert (Seine-et-Marne), 

The following General Orders authorized American representa- 
tion on the allied board: (11) 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 33 

" Geneual Heauquauteks, 
American ExrEuinoNARY Forces, 
•General Orders,^ France, June 20, 11)18. 

No. 100. I 



Sec. 3, Par. 1. In order to unify, as far as possible, the supply of the allied 
forces, the principle of closer cooperation in the distribution of supplies in 
common use among the armies has been unanimously adopted by the allied 
governments. For the purpose of putting this principle into operation, the 
appointment of a Military Board of Allied Supply, consisting of one repre- 
sentative of each of the allied armies, has been agreed ui)on. In its capacity 
as the representative body of the several supply departments of the respective 
armies, this board is expected to study questions of supply, and adopt all proper 
measures for the coordination of allied resources and utilities. 

Par. 2. The services of the Board of Allied Supply thus created will be 
fully utilized by officers of the various supply departments of the American 
Expeditionary Forces, who are enjoined to seelv through this agency the 
equitable allotment of such supplies, and, in cooperating with corresponding 
supply officers of the allied armies, to take the most liberal attitude, to the 
end that every economy in the management and unification of allied supply 
systems may be accomplished. 

Par. 3. Col. Charles G. Dawes, E. C, N. A., is designated as the representa- 
tive of the American Expeditionary Forces on the Military Board of Allied 
Supply. 

• •••••» 

By command of Gen. Pershing. 

James W. McAndrew, 

Chief of Staff, 

The following communication from Gen. Pershing to Col. Charles 
G. Dawes, American representative on the Military Board of Allied 
Supply, relates to American participation on this board: (11) 

From : Commander in Chief. 

To: Col. Charles G. Dawes, American Expeditionary Forces representative, 

Military Board of Allied Supply. 
Subject : Establishment of staff, etc. 

1. As the American member of the Military Board of tlie Allied Supply, you 
are authorized to establish a permanent stafC at the headquarters of the board, 
to enable you to carry out tlie instructions contained in Section III, G. O. 100 
c. s., these headquarters. This stalf will consist of one or more representatives 
to be designated by the Commander in Chief and by the commanding general. 
Services of Supply, and such other personnel as you may consider necessary. 

2. You are authorized to direct such travel by members of your staff as may 
be necessary in the performance of their duties, using this letter as your 
authority for issuing the necessary orders. 

3. Under the provisions of Section III, General Orders, No. 100 c. s., these 
neadquarters, which authorizes the Military Board of Allied Supply to make 
decisions, it has been directed that such decisions as you make with reference 
to supplies be comumnicated to general headquarters for execution. 

178841°— 20 3 



34 organizatiojS" of the services of supplt 

4. Such information as may be required from time to time by the board will 
be furnished by the supply departments or other agencies of the American 
Expeditionary Forces, upon your request. 

5. The mail address of the permanent headquarters of the board is " Section 
Franklin, Secteur Postal 141, via American Post Othce 702." The telephone 
and telegraphic address is " Franklin." 

By direction LeRoy Eltinge, 

Deputtj Chief of Staff. 

The following is a general summary of the principal activities of 
the Military Board of Allied Supply : (11) 

(1) To enable the empty -warehouse capacity of all the Allies to 
be used in common, should it be found necessary, there was prepared 
by this board a map showing the complete installations in rear of 
the three armies with details as to capacity. 

(2) When the shortage in motor transport in the allied armies 
became acute, necessitating interallied use of the motor transport 
of any army, the board studied the question of a mobile motor- 
transportation reserve for the use of the marshal, commander in 
chief. The original plan was to create a potential motor reserve 
of 24,000 truclcs. At the date of the armistice this potential reserve 
consisted of an equivalent of 11,000 3-ton automobile trucks. 

(3) To enable such motor transport reserve to function, a special 
stud}' of the question of the circulation of traffic in rear of the allied 
armies was considered. Interallied regulations governing road traffic 
in the zone of operations, governing troop movements, and the haul- 
ing of material by mechanical transport, were prepared. These 
regulations were approved by the general in command of each allied 
army and by ^Marshal Foch. 

(•4) The board established a school at Eozoy (Seine-et-Marne) 
for the instruction of motor transport and staff officers in comiection 
with the interallied regulations governing motor transport in the 
rear of the allied armies. 

(5) To form a link between the railhead and the motor transport 
and to release the motor transport for other uses, there was organized 
an interallied reserve of narrow-gauge railway (CO c. m.) materiel. 
For the training of officers in the use of this reserve, a school was 
established at Xangis (Seine-et-Marne). 

(6) Through the efforts of the board the ammunition at the front 
was pooled by the French and American Armies. 

(7) The board established a school for railroad regulating officers 
of the allied armies at St. Dizier. 

(8) It provided regulations for the distribution of gasoline in the 
zone of the armies and the pooling of gasoline cans. 

(9) ^Mien the shortage in forage became acute, particularly in 
the supply of hay, a composite study was made of the forage situation 



OEGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 35 

in all the allied armies, as a result of which a uniform foraffe ration 
for these armies was adopted. 

(10) To enable communication to be maintained by the headquar- 
ters of the marshal, commander in chief, and the various general 
headquarters durinc; the contemplated advances, there was provided 
by the board an allied agreement providing for interallied construc- 
tion and maintenance of second-line telephone and telegraph system. 
With the signing of the armistice this agreement provided the 
channel by which telephonic and telegraphic communication was 
secured in the occupied territories. 

(11) The board investigated the labor situation in France and 
the allied armies, and demonstrated the impracticability of pooling 
the same. 

(12) Had the war continued it was foreseen that a transport crisis 
would develop. The board therefore prepared a stud}- setting forth 
the ration and other demands of the various armies which would have 
enabled a reduction in tonnage to the absolute minimum to be made. 

(18) Advantage was taken of the existence of this board at the 
date of the armistice to secure from each of the allied armies a 
statistical statement of all troops, supplies, and means of transport 
existent as of date October 31, 1918. 

(14) The last work of this interallied board was the securing of 
a coordinate statement and comparative study of the supply systems 
of the allied armies in France for future military study in the va- 
rious arm.ies. 

As a general principle, the Military Board of Allied Supply han- 
dled policies of supply whenever there was an existing or prospective 
shortage of any type of supply in any of the allied armies. 

VII.— THE GENERAL PURCHASING BOARD AND THE 
GENERAL PURCHASING AGENT. 

The General Purchasing Board was created by General Orders, 
No. 23, General Headquarters, Expeditionary Forces, August 20, 
1917, and consisted of representatives of the following services, pre- 
sided over by the general purchasing agent : 

Quartermaster Corps. 

Medical Corps.. 

Engineer Corps. 

Air Service. 

Signal Corps. 

Ordnance Department. 

Chemical Warfare Service. 

Motor Transport Corps. 



36 



ORGAlSriZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 



Each of these services disbursed its own appropriations, and it 
was the service representatives on the board who actually accom- 
plished the purchasing. The general purchasing agent possessed no 
authority to make purchases under the law, but exercised control 
and veto of purchase. All orders for purchases were submitted for 
the general purchasing agent's approval. 



Organization chart of Department of General Purchasing Agent. 



GENERAL PURCHASING AGENT. 



GENERAL PURCHASING BOARD. 



Q.M. C. 

Purchasing 

Agent. 



Engineer 

Purcnasing 

Agent. 



Ordnance 

Purchasing 

Agent. 



Signal Corps 

Purchasing 

Agent. 



Air Sendee 

Purchasing 

Agent. 



Medical 

Purchasing 

Agent. 



M. T. C. 

Purchasing 

Agent. 



C. W. S. 

Purchasing 

Agent. 



Navy 

Purchasing 

Agent. 



Red Cross 

Purcliasing 

Agent. 



Y. M. C. A. ' Foreign 

P urchas i ng P urchasing 

Agent, j Agents. 



Liaison for 

purchase in 

France. 



Bureau of 
Foreign 
Agencies. 



Statistical 
Bureau. 



^^^^^ i Supply 
category. forecasts. 



Bureau of 

j Purchase 
1 Program and 
I Classification. 



Technical 
Board. 



Reciprocal 
Supply. 



Control 
Bureau. 



Financial I 
Requisition 
Officer. 



Bureau of 
Accounts. 



Wood Control. 
Metal Control. 



Representatives of the General Purchasing Board were main- 
tained in France, Great Britain, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Switzer- 
land, and through these agents passed all orders for purchases in 



ORGANIZATION^ OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 37 

tlieir respective territories. They were expected to locate available 
supplies and report same to the board. These agents worked in 
close cooperation with the purchasing officers of allied countries, with 
our diplomatic agents and with the representatives of the War 
Trade Board. Purchases were made by the General Purchasing 
Board only on order from the chiefs of the various services. In 
allied countries, the local purchasing agent worked through the Gov- 
ernment representative; in neutral countries, purchases were made 
from individuals and firms. 

When two or more services desired the same class of article only 
one service was authorized to make the purchase, after which the 
articles were equitably distributed. Approximately 10,000,000 ship 
tons 2" of supplies were purchased in Europe through the General 
Purchasing Board, from June, 1917, to November 11, 1918. 

Minor activities of the general purchasing agent were varied. A 
statistical bureau was established which collected and compiled data 
relating to material procurable in Europe. Supply forecasts of the 
Expeditionary Forces were prepared which consisted of estimates of 
future requirements. There was a control bureau through which 
passed for approval orders and requisitions upon allied governments, 
the object of which was to prevent competition. Wood and metal 
bureaus were organized to allocate and control the above material. 
Civilian labor was first obtained by the general purchasing agent, 
who, for this purpose, organized a labor bureau,-* wliich was later 
transferred to the Army Service Corps.-" (17) 

VIII.— ARMY SERVICE CORPS, AMERICAN EXPEDI- 
TIONARY FORCES. 

PURPOSE OF ARMY SERVICE CORPS. 

The Army Service Corps furnished personnel for a number of 
special and widely diversified activities which grew up in the Expe- 
ditionary Forces that were vitally necessary but did not pertain to 
any of the established staff corps and had not reached the size and 
importance of a corps and never did. " The officers and men on duty 
with these services were on a detached service status, constituting a 
material loss to their organizations, and they Avere often composed 
of personnel suitable for service at the front. The officers and men 
of these detachments suffered a distinct loss of morale because their 
promotion and recognition of service were undul}^ delaj-ed. It was 

2' A ship ton Is 40 cubic feet. 

=* Page 31 and paragraphs 86 and 87, Report of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, Gen- 
eral Headquarters to the commanding general, Expeditionary Forces, on jQle Historical 
Branch, General Staflf. 

=* Paragraph 7, Part III, Final Report of General Pershing to the Secretary of War, 
September 1, 1919, on file Historical Branch, General Staff. 



38 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

an administrative necessit}^ to group these in one service." (3) The 
outstanding facts about it were : 

SEm^CES FURNISHED WITH OFFICERS AND MEN. 

Headquarters Battalion, Services of Supply. 

Headquarters detachment, rents, requisitions, and claims. 

Headquarters detachment, central prisoner of war inclosure. 

Rents, Requisitions, and Claims Service companies. 

Cement mills companies. 

Administrative labor companies. 

Labor Bureau. 

War Risk Insurance Bureau. 

Guard companies. 

Mails Division. 

Leave Area Bureau. 

Bordeaux embarkation detachment. 

Intermediate section headquarters detachment. 

Depot labor companies. 

Garden service companies. 

Headquarters printing company, Services of Supply. 

Salvage and laundry units. 

Organized August 22, 1918, by General Orders, Xo. 38, Head- 
quarters, Services of Supply. 

Initial strength, 233 officers and 4,577 enlisted men. 

Authorized strength, 1,500 officers and 100,000 enlisted men. 

Strength November 11, 929 officers and 19,494 enlisted men. 

Maximum strength, 1,170 officers and 25,943 men, March 20, 
1919. 

ORGANIZATION. 

The need of some organization to furnish these special activities 
with personnel became so pressing in ^lay, 1918, that it was brought 
to the attention of the commanding general, Expeditionary Forces, 
by the commanding general, Services of Supply. On May 25, 1918, 
the commanding general, Expeditionary Forces, made a dual proposal 
to the War Department to accomplish the desired result. He urged 
that all officers of such miscellaneous services as tlie Provost Mar- 
shal's Department, the Post Office, the War Risk Bureau, and the 
like be commissioned in the National Army, and not in any partic- 
ular branch of the line nor in any staff ^° corps. He asked also that a 
new service of enlisted men only, to be known as the Army Service 
Corps, be created. The outcome of this was an interchange of 

** Cable 1189, commandiug general, Americau Expeditionary Forces, to Adjutant Gen- 
eral. Subparagraphs I-D and E. 



ORGAlS"^IZATIO]Sr OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 39 

cables which culminated in the authorization of the corps by cable ^^ 
July 23, 1918. The War Department, replying to the initial cable, 
suggested the impracticability of issuing commissions at large, and 
then the commanding general, Expeditionary Forces, asked that the 
corps be authorized, with 4,000 officers and 100,000 enlisted men; 
the officers to be in the ratio of 1 major to 4 captains to 6 first lieu- 
tenants to 6 second lieutenants, and the enlisted men of such grades 
provided by law for the Army at large as might be ordered by the 
commanding general, Expeditionary Forces, in addition to organi- 
zations transferred to the corps. The request for 100,000 enlisted 
men. as above outlined, was approved, but the number of officers was 
reduced to 1,500 in the ratio of 1 major to 2 captains to 5 first lieu- 
tenants to 5 second lieutenants. 

Pursuant to authority in the cable authorizing the corps, the Army 
Service Corps was ordered in General Orders, No. 38, Headquarters, 
Services of Supply, August 22, 1918. (11) In this general order 
creating the corps certain of the organizations mentioned above were 
transferred to it and provision was made whereby the others were 
added later. The duties of the corps were defined as follows: 

(a) The function of the Army Service Corps is to furnish the several de- 
tachments of the Services of Supply such commissioned, enlisted, and civilian 
personnel required, in addition to that otherwise provided, for general and 
specific administration and labor purposes. 

(&) The duties of the Army Service Corps are to submit requisitions for 
the authorized commissioned and enlisted personnel of units under its control. 
To procure civilian employees and laborers. To organize the personnel in ac- 
cordance with approved tables of organization. To keep the necessary records 
of personnel. To regulate the employment of civilian laborers employed by 
all branches of the Expeditionary Forces and contractors therefor. To per- 
form such other duties necessary incident to the effective discharge of those 
specified above. To obtain records and minister to the personnel under its 
jurisdiction. 

(c) The Army Service Corps organizations for administration and disci- 
pline are under the control of the commanding general of the section in which 
they are located ; the chief of the technical service to which they are furnished, 
or his representative, assigns and directs their work. It is the duty of the Army 
Service Corps to maintain its organizations in condition to perform efficiently 
the duties required of them by the services to which they are assigned. 

INTERNAL ORGANIZATION. 

The internal organization was in two groups. The first was the 
Labor Bureau, with its several divisions, under a bureau chief, who 
was also deputy director of the corps. This bureau antedated the 
Army Service Corps a little over five months, and its incorporation 
into the corps made very little difference in its work. The other 

« Cable 1598, Adjutant General to commanding general, American Expeditionary 
Forces, paragraphs 1-C and 1-D. Cable 1426, Commanding General, American Expedi- 
tionary Forces, to Adjutant General, subparagraphs 1-D, B, 1-F, and 1-G, on file His- 
torical Branch, General StafiE. 



40 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

group, under an executive officer, maintained relations with all the 
other services using the personnel of the corps. An examination 
of the accompanying organization chart will show there was no 
coordinating officer of these two departments except the director 
of the Army Service Corps himself, and that the routine distribu- 
tion of papers and correspondence had to be done in the director's 
own office. 

THE LABOR BUREAU. 

At the very outset of the American Expeditionary Forces it was 
evident that much of the labor necessary for the American forces 
would have to be done by European civilians. At first this labor 
was procured locally by the American commander concerned through 
the nearest French regional commander. Needless to say that this 
labor was entirely French. But it became apparent soon that other 
labor would have to be found and that all this civilian labor would 
have to be organized before it could be handled efficiently. To this 
end, by General Orders, No. 5, Services of the Rear, March 4, 1918, 
the general purchasing agent was charged with the procurement of 
civilian manual labor in Europe, other than labor procurable locally 
through the French regional commanders, and he thereupon or- 
ganized the Labor Bureau in the form that obtained throughout its 
career. 

Properly to organize the supply of labor, the following divisions 
were created : Procurement and transportation, medical, administra- 
tive labor companies and labor depots, contract and foreign relations^ 
accounts and records, women's, and medical. 

Including those who had been in the employ of the United States 
and those actually in the employ, the Labor Bureau had procured, 
up to November 11, 1918, 82,700 workers. Those actually in em- 
ploy on the day of the armistice were as follows : 

Men 30, 800 

Women 11.004 

Total employed November 11, 1918 41, 804 

French (women) 11,004 

French and mixed (men) 17,104 

Chinese 7, 476 

Italians 3, 297 

Spanish 898 

Moroccans 683 

Annamites 461 

Tunisians 350 

Algerians 286 

Portuguese 245 

Total 41,804 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 41 

The task of the Labor Bureau, speaking generally, was to feed, 
house, and care for laborers which it employed from Europe or 
through European agencies. In carrying out this work the first and 
most important division was that of procurement and transportation. 
The duties of this division summarized were : To keep agents in all 
of the principal emploj'^ment agencies and in all countries from which 
suitable labor might be obtained; to seek out reliable French con- 
tractors; to have suitable contracts executed in the hiring of labor; 
to arrange transportation of labor from points of procurement to 
point of final destination and handle all details of such transpor- 
tation. (11) 

The Division of Labor Depots and Administrative Labor Com- 
panies took charge of laborers and organized them properly for mili- 
tary supervision, receiving them from the Procurement Division; 
made arrangement whereby labor was paid in accordance with con- 
tract ; kept the Quartermaster Corps notified of what food, clothing, 
and other supplies would be needed and when and where; created 
depots for the receipt and organization of labor at St. Denis, Nantes, 
Lyon, Marseille, Toulouse, the labor from the north, west, and 
center of France being gathered at St. Denis and that from Lyon, 
Marseille, and from Italy and Spain and Portugal at Toulouse, 
while all from southwestern France assembled at Nantes. (11) 
The commanding officer of the labor depots sorted arriving labor into 
groups by nationalities and trades and sent it out upon requisition. 

The Bureau of Accounts and Records kept account of all expendi- 
tures and receipts of the bureau, filed reports from the various di- 
visions, and tabulated and submitted weekly a summarized statement 
of the reports of the chiefs of divisions. 

By arrangement with the Medical Department, Expeditionary 
Forces, the Medical Division insured medical attention for civilian 
labor, provided sufficient hospital facilities, and took care of sani- 
tation. (11) 

The Division of Contracts and Foreign Relations made all con- 
tracts for labor, delivered copies of the contracts to the proper 
officials, kept a file of all labor requirements for the Expeditionary 
Forces, and notified the other divisions of the same, acted upon 
claims, acted as intermediary with the French and other govern- 
ments in regard to labor, and kept in close touch with the French 
bureaus having to do with employment of labor. (11) 

The Women's Division was just what its name implies, and all 
questions having to do with the administration of this class of labor 
were handled through it. 
SPECIAL SERVICES. 

The executive officer supervised all activities of the corps other 
than the Labor Bureau, and he was the corps adjutant in addition. 



42 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

His department "vvas divided into five parts: Officers' Division, Or- 
ders Division, Division of Statistics and Personnel, Division of 
Records, and the representatives in the base sections. The Officers' 
Division Iiad charge of promotions and replacements and all other 
correspondence relating to officers, and also handled the discharge 
of enlisted men. The Orders Division was just what its name im- 
plies and the same was true of the Divisions of Records and of 
Statistics and Personnel. The duties of the representatives in the 
several base sections were to keep generally acquainted with the 
condition and needs of the Army Service Corps organization in 
their own sections and make the necessary reports and recommenda- 
tions to the Army Service Corps headquarters. (11) 

PERSONNEL. 

The personnel of the Army Service Corps was in two general 
groups, military and civilian, the civilian being much the larger. 
This personnel was drawn from three sources, drafts from the United 
States and replacements from the Expeditionary Forces for the 
military, and the labor market of Europe, Asia, and Africa, for the 
civilians. Because of the very nature of the corps, the growth of 
personnel was fitful. Calls on the corps were not uniform and the 
supply from the United States and from replacement depended upon 
so many things over which the corps had no control that at no time 
was it possible to make any arrangement for a fair relation of the 
supply to the demand. The military personnel from the United 
States was recruited as needed to supply particular demands. That 
from replacement, both officers and men, was made up of class B 
and C men. The supply from America was satisfactory generally, 
but it was felt, especially in the case of class B men, that personnel 
from replacement was not to be depended upon as a constant source 
of suppl}' because of the liability of class B men to recall to com- 
batant service as they regained their physical vigor. Had the war 
continued, men from the second draft in the United States would 
have been available and these men, especially those between 31 and 
45 years old, would have given the Army Service Corps a personnel 
that it would have been reasonably sure of retaining. 

The supply of civilian labor was fairly constant and generally in 
something like sufficient quantity. France alone could not have 
furnished all that was needed. The labor troops spared from Italy 
and the civilians recruited in Spain and Portugal and those recruited 
through the French in China, French Indo-China and in Northern 
Africa prevented anything like a serious shortage. Nevertheless, it 
was not possible, at the time of the armistice, to tell how well the 
supply would have kept pace with the demand if the war had lasted 
six months lonffer. 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 



43 



The requirements made by the European, Asiatic, and African 
people upon the United States were many and very specitic. The 
rate of pay, the kind of clothing, and the kind of rations, which 
varied with the countries drawn from, were set forth in detail in 
the agreements and had to be adhered to strictly. (11) 

In France labor was recruited through the government agencies 
and through well-known and reliable contractors. Often, however, 
contractors could not find the labor to do the work they had under- 
taken and at such times it was necessary for the Labor Bureau to 
come to their rescue and furnish the workmen required. 

Organization chart, Army Service Corps, A. E. F. 



DIRECTOR. 



Executive Officer. 



Orders 
Division. 



Officers' 
Division. 



Base Section 
Representatives. 



Statistics and 
personnel. 



Records 
Division. 



Chief Labor Bureau. 



Medical. 



Procurement 

and 

Transportation. 



Administrative 

Labor Companies 

and 

Labor Depots. 



Contracts and 

Foreign 

Relations. 



Women's 
Di\nsion. 



Accounts and 
Records. 



In importing labor from Spain and Portugal care had to be taken 
to prevent persons of pro-German leanings from entering American 
service. In these two countries much difficulty was encountered in 
recruiting. This was due partly to apathy for the allied cause in 
Spain and to the desire oi' both countries to keep their laborers at home. 
Italy had a large number of refugees and the flow of this personnel 
was constant. The North African labor was good and that from 
China, especially from Annam, was efficient on lighter work but not 
adapted to heavy construction. 



4-i OKGAXIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

Female labor came from France and Great Britain. Very little 
attempt was made to organize that obtained in France, but the Brit- 
ish women were militarized and came over in regularly organized 
units. Thej' were a part of the AA' omen's Army Auxiliary Corps^ 
commonly known as '' W. A. A. C's.'- The British women were 
especially efficient, nearly 200 of them being used in clerical work, 
headquarters. Services of Supply, and about 300 in the Central Rec- 
ords office at Bourges. 

IX.— CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE, AMERICAN EXPEDI- 
TIONARY FORCES. 

The Chemical Warfare Service in the Expeditionary Forces had to 
do with gas warfare, both offensive and defensive. 

Authorized strength, l,ol5 otBcers. 17.205 enlisted men. (3) 
Strength at armistice, 1,114 officers, 12,414 enlisted men. 
Supplies on hand November 11. 191S : 

Box respirators 1. 850, 000 

Protective gloves pairs 184, 794 

M-2 masks 75, 623 

Canisters 903, 345 

Sag paste tubes__ 2, 228. 092 

Chloride of lime tons— 1, 39G 

Liveus projectors 4, 095 

Liveus drums, tilleil 36,468 

Stokes mortar bombs, smoke 5,022 

Stokes mortar bombs, filled 39, 105 

ORGANIZATION. 

The preliminary' organization of a Gas Service was provided in 
General Orders, Xo. S, General Headquarters. Expeditionary Forces, 
1917. The Chief of Gas Service was charged with the conduct of the 
entire Gas and Flame Service- The Corps of Engineers, under this 
order, was to supply personnel and materiel for gas offense, and 
Medical Corps for gas defense. All gas. shell, and similar material 
was to be supplied by the Ordnance Department. (3) 

The Gas Ser^dce was definitely authorized by General Orders. 
Xo. 31, Headquarters, Expeditionary Forces, 1917. Its duties under 
this order were the organization of personnel, supply of materiel, and 
the conduct of offensive and defensive measures. The headquarters 
of the service were organized to include the following sections: Ad- 
ministrative, Intelligence. Offensive. Defensive. Supply, Ordnance, 
Medical Director, and Laboratory. The Tables of Organization for 
the Gas Regiment call for one headquarters company, two Stokes com- 
panies, four cylinder and Livens companies. Personnel was proposed 
for army, corps, and division headquarters, and line of communica- 
tion, including depots, filling stations, and training units. 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 45 

When the Services of Supply were established, Gas Service head- 
quarters were transferred to Tours, but a representative of the Chief 
of Gas Service was left at general headquarters. This time the service 
was reorganized into three main divisions — Military, Technical, and 
Production and Supply. The Military Division was to take care of 
all problems of gas offense and defense, and procured and dissemi- 
nated gas intelligence. The Technical Division was to do all labora- 
tory and field experimenting. The Procurement and Supply Division 
was to furnish all supplies for the service. The Offense and Defense 
branches of the Military Division were made separate divisions on 
May 1, 1918, and the Intelligence Branch was made a part of the 
Technical Division. By General Orders, No. 62, War Department, 
June 28, 1918, the Chemical Warfare Service was authorized, and in 
carrying out the details of this organization administrative divisions 
were created and their duties defined as follow^s: (19) 

Defense Division was responsible for training all troops and de- 
fensive measures against gas. Its duties included the selection, in- 
struction, and supervision of all gas officers in the field, the super- 
vision of all gas-defense schools, and the training of isolated units 
in gas defense. 

0-ffense Division was responsible for all offensive operation, includ- 
ing not only the operation of gas troops, but also the use of chemical 
warfare materials by the artillery and infantry, etc. It determined 
the gas, smoke, and incendiary materials in artillery shells, projector 
drums, trench mortars, bombs, and infantry grenades. 

Production and Supply Division was responsible for procuring all 
supplies needed by the Chemical Warfare Service in the American 
Expeditionary Forces and for maintaining sufficient stocks. 

Technical Division maintained supervision over the Chemical 
Warfare Service laboratory and the experimental field. 

Intelligence Division procured and disseminated all gas intelli- 
gence received from the front and scientific data from the Chemical 
Warfare Service laboratory and the experimental field from the 
United States and from the Allies. 

Personnel Office was responsible for procurement and distribution 
of Chemical Warfare Service personnel, established and controlled 
Chemical Warfare Service camps, and operated and controlled 
Chemical Warfare Service schools for training newly arrived per- 
sonnel. 

Medical director was the advisor to the Chief of Chemical War- 
fare Service on all medical questions connected with Chemical War- 
fare, and studied diagnoses and treatment of gas casualties, and 
issued pamphlets on these subjects for distribution to medical offi- 
cers. (19) 



46 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

PERSONNEL. 

The personnel of the Chemical "Warfare Service had a wide ranire 
as to scientific education, technical training, and mechanical skill. 
Many of the officers and men were experts in their several lines, 
others were of mediocre ability, and the rest vrere Tvithont any special 
training or skill whatever. The majority of both officers and men 
coming from civil life had had no military training, and none of 
them had ever applied their scientific and technical skill to the needs 
of vrarfare.'"- 

To furnish this training, an officers' school was established at Han- 
Ion Field near Chaimiont in the fall of 1918. At this school the 
officers were given an intensive military course which covered briefly 
a wide range of military subjects. Upon completion of this course 
the officers were sent to the Gas Defense School and then were given 
a week's training in the offensive use of gas. 

At the Army school and at the two corps schools, Langres and 
Gondrecourt. officers and noncommissioned officers from combat 
and pioneer units were trained in gas offense and defense and then 
returned to their units as gas officers and gas noncommissioned 
officers. In turn, these men instructed tlie off.cers and men of their 
organizations. Chemical Warfare Service officers and men were 
stationed also at the base ports from September, 1918. on and 
instructed troops as they arrived from the United States. 

The pei-sonnel for the Chemical "Warfare Service was drawn from 
scientific schools of America, from the several learned societies, from 
specialists in the business world, and from the ranks of employees 
of chemical and related concerns. A large part of the enlisted per- 
sonnel was unskilled labor, and as such was draAvn from the draft 
and from the ordinary volunteer lists. 
MATERIAL. 

The Chemical "Warfare Service in France had very little to do 
with the manufacture of gas. It was concerned with the use of 
the finislied product, whether offensive or defensive appliances, al- 
though it did have to look after the making of many masks in 
Europe, the repairing of masks, and the use and care of other 
apparatus. 

The first material need was defensive, especially masks. In 1917 
this presented son\e difficulty, because production of this kind in th(^ 
United States had not progressed beyond the small factory stage, 
and so far the output was negligible. England and France had been 
making masks on a large scale for a long time. In the fall of 1917 

" See page 12. C. W. S. Section, Part I, Appendix A — Report of board convened by 
paragraph 79. S. O. 141. Headqujirters, Services of Supply, May 21, 1919. On file His 
torioal Branch. General Staflf. 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 47 

only 20,000 respirators were received from the United States, so 
an order for 400,000 was placed with the British for delivery be- 
tween December, 1917, and March, 1918. American masks began to 
arrive in quantity in April, 1918. 

In production, the Chemical Warfare Service was in close rela- 
tion with the Ordnance Department. On September 30, 1918, the 
Chemical "Warfare Service material was divided into four classes, 
with the responsibility of the two services shown as follows : ^^ 

Class A included all offense gas supplies not used by gas troops. 
All tracer, illuminating, and signaling shells, and illuminating 
grenades were handled by the Ordnance Department exclusively. 
In the case of other shells and hand grenades the Chemical War- 
fare Service investigated the need for such materials, procured au- 
thorization from the General Staff, approved designs submitted by 
the Ordnance Department, and filled or inspected the grenades pro- 
cured by that department. These were transported and issued b}"- 
the Ordnance Department. 

Class B included all gas supplies issued only to gas troops ; all of 
which was handled by the Chemical Warfare Service. 

Class C included all aviation, smoke, and incendiary materials. 
The Chemical Warfare Service suggested the use, procured the au- 
thority, approved the Ordnance Department designs, and filled and 
inspected these materials, and the rest of the work for this class was 
placed in the hands of the Ordnance Department. 

Class D included all defensive gas material issued to troops and 
was handled entirely by the Chemical Warfare Service. 

In November, 1917, authority was given to fill 10 per cent of all 
shells with gas. On June 24, 1918, the program was increased to 
include 15 per cent of all artillery projectiles up to and including 9.5 
inches, inclusive. On September 27, 1918, the War Department was 
asked by cable for authority for program beginning November 1, 
1918, which provided that 20 per cent of all projectiles produced be 
filled with gas for all calibers up to and including 9.2 inches. Be- 
ginning January 1, 1919, this was to be increased to 25 per cent and 
the production capacity for gas to be increased 35 per cent. About 
this time also it was decided that programs for gas-filled grenades 
should be handled by the Chemical Warfare Service and that 10 per 
cent of all hand grenades should be filled with gas. 

After the first few months the greater part of the American Ex- 
peditionar}^ Forces gas material came from the United States, al- 
though approximately 2,000 cylinders were filled with gas at Pont- 

s3 Page 13, C. W. S. Section, Part L, Appendix A — Report of board convened by para- 
graph 70, S. O. No. 141, S. O. S., May 21, 1919, on file Historical Branch, General Staff. 



48 



OKGANIZATIOX OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 



de-Claix (Isere). One hundred thousand emerirenoy tikers "were 
made and fitted on canistei's. 200.000 Conuells canisters, and a num- 
ber of other defensive appliances -were produced in Enirhmd. 

FACILITIES. 

The location of the Chemical Warfare Service facilities in France 
were as follows : 

Oas gichooJ. — Hanlon Field, near Chaumont. 

Corps schooJ^. — Gondrecourt (Meuse), Lan^rres (Haute-Marne). 

Ga^ equipment ami iiWing staf'wns. — Is-sur-Tille (Cote-d'Or). St. 
Dizier (Haute-Marne). Dunkerque (Xord). 

Experimental field. — Hanlon Fiehl. near Paris. 

ChernicaJ Warfare Service iahoratort/. — Puteaux, near Paris. 

CTtetnieal Warfare Serriec storai/e depots. — Montoir (Loire- 
Inferieure). St. Sulpice (Gironde). Gievres (Loir-et-Cher). Poingon 
(Seine-Inferieure). Clefc}- (Vosjres). 

Armi/ depots. First Armi/. — Landrecourt (Meuse). Marcq (Ar- 
dennes), Les Monthftirons (Meuse). 

Armi/ depots. Second Amu/. — Leval (Belfort). Belleville 
(Meurthe-et-Moselle), Woinville (Mense), Toul. 

Chemical Warfare Service f acton/. — Pont-de-Claix (Isere). 

Organization chart. Chemical War/art Sen-ict, A. E. F. 



CHIEF, CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE. 



Assistant Chief, C. W. S. 



Adjutant. 



C. W. S. represent- 
ative at G.H.Q. 



Personnel 
Oaicer. 



IntelUfODCS 
Di\-isxoa. 



Liaison 
Services. 



Production and 
Supply Section. 



Medit^l 
Diavlor. 



Tivhnical 
Division. 



r>efons« 
Pivisica. 



Offense 
Division. 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 49 

X.— THE CHIEF ENGINEER, AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY 

FORCES. 

The activities of the Chief Engineer came under two general head- 
ings : First ^ those of a technical nature relating to organization, per- 
sonnel, equipment, training, and distribution of Engineer combat 
units; and, second^ those relating to construction and supply. Con- 
stru'^tion included vrharves, warehouses, depots, shelters for troops, 
and rail facilities. The design of port and rail facilities, however, 
was a function of the Transportation Corps, the Engineers simply 
carrying out the design. Supply included the procurement, storage 
and distribution of tech^iical engineers' supplies for combat troops 
wherever located, and the provision of everything needed in the way 
of materials and machinery for construction in the Services of 
Supply. 

Strength at armistice :'* 

With armies 86, 400 

Construction 43,000 

Forestry 18,500 

Supply 7,600 

Miscellaneous 18,500 

Total 174, 000 

Construction : 

Docks, 15 berths, total length G,360 feet. 

Hospitalization, 280,000 beds. 

Standard-gauge railroad, 1,026 miles. 

Engine terminals, 10. 

Railroad cut-off, 5.9 miles near Nevers. 

Troop shelters, 16,000 barracks. 

Covered storage, 22,415,000 square feet. 

Remount stations, space for 27,700 animals. 

Veterinary hospitals, space for 16,500 animals. 

Cold storage, capacity for 14,200 tons. 

Ice plants, capacity 500 tons a day. 

Bakeries, capacity 1,250,000 tons a day. 
Forestry output: 

Lumber, 218,211,000 feet B. M. 

Standard-gauge ties, 3,051,137. 

Small ties, 954,667. 

Piling, 39,095 pieces. 

Fuel wood, 340,000 cords. 

Miscellaneous round products, 1,926,603 pieces. 



V 



«* Page 2, Engr. Sfection, Part I, Appendix A — Report of board appointed by paragraph 
79, S. O. 141, S. 0. S., May 21, 1919, on file Historical Branch, General Staff. 

178841°— 20 4 



50 



OBGANIZATION OF THE SEEVICES OF STTPPLT. 



S5 



1 -S 



I 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 51 

Engineer supplies procured, 3,314,662 short tons. 

Light railways operated, 1,388.8 miles. \ 

Freight handled on above, 860,652 tons. 

ORGANIZATION. 

Although the activities under the Chief Engineer later became 
well defined between those in the Services of Supply and those in 
combat areas, at first all these activities were administered from 
general headquarters. The large division came in March, 1918, when 
the headquarters, line of communication, which ultimately became 
Services of Supply, were moved from Paris to Tours and the general 
headquarters went from Paris to Chaumont. The first line of w^ork 
to be detached from the Engineers and made a separate service was 
transportation. By General Orders, No. 37, Headquarters, Expedi- 
tionary Forces, 1917, the Transportation Service was put under a 
Director General of Transportation and was made an independent 
technical service of general headquarters. Later Engineer personnel 
was transferred to such other services as the Motor Transport Corps 
and the Chemical Warfare Service, which were made independent 
services. AVhen headquarters were moved to Tours a Service of 
LTtilities was created, and in that service was put the Transportation 
Service, the INIotor Transport Service, the Department of Light 
Railways and Eoads, and the Department of Construction and 
^o^estr5^ Previous to this time light railways and roads had been 
two separate departments under the Director General of Transpor- 
tation. But by July 11, 1918, it was found that the Service of 
LTtilities was not satisfactory, and it was done away with, the Motor 
Transport Corps and the Transportation Corps again becoming 
independent services and the Department of Light Raihvays and 
Roads and the Department of Construction and Forestry remaining 
with the Engineers. This change then left the Engineer organiza- 
tion in the Expeditionarj'^ Forces with four main branches, which 
arrangement continued until some time after the armistice. The 
headquarters of the Chief Engineer Officer were at Tours, the head- 
quarters of the Services of Supply. These four branches were : 

(1) Assistant to Chief Engineer, Expeditionary Forces, at 

general headquarters. 

(2) Department of Construction and Forestry. 

(3) Department of Military Engineering and Military 

Supplies. 

(4) Division of Light Railways and Roads. 

The chief engineer officer maintained an office at general head- 
quarters with an assistant chief engineer officer in charge. This 
assistant at general headquarters was concerned entirely with mat- 
ters pertaining to the Engineer Service in the Zone of the Armies. 



52 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

He had a Supply Section, and also controlled the Geologic, Camou- 
flage, Searchlight, Engineer, Intelligence, Flash and Sound Ranging, 
and Bridge Sections. 

The Division of Military Engineering and Engineer Supplies 
was divided into five sections, as follows : 

(1) Supph' Section. 

(2) Water Supply Section. 

(3) Electric and Mechanical Section. 

(4) Office Service Section. 

(5) Accounts and Contracts Section. 

The main function of this division was procurement, storage, and 
distribution of engineering materiel. Tlie procurement of supplies 
in Europe was done through a representative of the division in the 
office of the general purchasing agent in Paris. This officer had two 
functions. He was the representative of the division and was also 
the engineer purchasing agent of the Expeditionary Forces. The 
other function of this officer had to do strictly with military en- 
gineering. (15) 

The Department of Construction and Forestry was created by 
General Orders, No. 8, Services of the Rear, 1918. It was charged 
with all construction work in the Services of Supply. The depart- 
ment was organized into divisions of Administrations, General Con- 
struction, Construction of Railroads and Docks, and Forestry. The 
several classes of general construction were: Storage, Air Service 
facilities. Ordnance facilities, Veterinary hospitals, refrigerating 
plants, shelter for troops, prisoner-of-war inclosures, Army schools 
and base, camp, convalescent, evacuation, and Red Cross hospitals, 
and the like. Port construction included docks and the warehouses 
thereon, railroad connections and lighters. The phases of railroad 
construction were engineer terminals, regulating stations, multiple 
tracking at congested points, cut-offs, connections with the ports and 
receiving, classification, and departure j'^ards and tracks in storage 
depots. 

The lack of ocean transportation made it necessary to obtain most 
of the lumber and other forestry products from European sources. 
Furthermore, the American Expeditionary Forces had to be self- 
sustaining in this kind of supplies, i. e., it had to arrange for pur- 
chase of the wood on the stump, and then do its own cutting and 
sawing. This forestr}' work was so closely related to nearly all kinds 
of construction that it was made a part of the Construction De- 
partment. 

The Department of Light Railways and Roads, as noted above, 
originally formed two separate departments, under the director gen- 
eral of transportation, Avhich were consolidated when the Service of 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 53 

Utilities was created. It operated entirel}^ in the Zone of the Armies, 
being concerned with the construction of 60-centimeter gauge rail- 
road, the erection and repair of the rolling stock necessary for the 
same and the repair of French roads within its sphere of activities. 
It had nothing to do with the maintenance of roads in the Services 
of Supply, that duty being charged to the Department of Construc- 
tion and Forestry. It had nothing to do with any standard gauge 
road. At the time of the armistice it had 1G5 narrow gauge loco- 
motives and 1,695 cars and operated over a «ystem of 1.388.8 miles 
of track. 

PERSONNEL. 

The commissioned personnel came from the Corps of Engineers 
of the Regular Army and from the vast body of engineering gradu- 
ates in the United States. The several societies of civil, mechanical, 
mining, and structural engineers were largely responsible for the 
designation of the best men in their ranks as available for commis- 
sions. Engineer schools in the United States contributed much to 
the work of training men for commissions. The enlisted personnel 
was recruited in the ordinary way from selective draft and by trans- 
fer from other units. The commissioned personnel Avas already effi- 
cient in the lines of standard engineering and the enlisted personnel 
Avas in a like position. The technical work Avas already familiar to 
men recruited in the technical units and the rest of the duties of 
enlisted men was straight labor which Avas not hard to find. 

The AA'ar in France, lioweA'er, had developed many technical 
specialties such as flash and sound ranging, map-making from aerial 
photographs, camouflage, and the use of searchlight in antiaircraft 
operations Avith AA'hich the American officers and men were in a 
measure unfamiliar. It AA'as through the medium of schools that the 
necessary instruction in these specialties, as Avell as in sound tactical 
principles, was given. In addition to these schools much instruction 
Avas given through assignment to duty Avith British and French 
organizations. A practice was made of sending a certain number of 
neAvly arrived officers to the front on trips of inspection and study 
under allied guidance. Provision was made also for the attendance 
of a small number of American engineers at the British and French 
schools. On October 8, 1917, Engineer Corps and Army schools 
were authorized by General Orders, No. 45, Headquarters, Expedi- 
tionary Forces. Two days later by General Orders. Xo. 46. general 
headquarters, the Engineer School and the Gas School at Langres 
were created. Corps schools Avere autliorized soon after at Gondre- 
court and Chatillon-sur-Seine. (15) While these schools drew their 
instructors and personnel from the Engineer establishment, the con- 
trol of the instruction Avas, by authoritA' of General Orders. No. 130, 



54 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

Headquarters. Expeditionary Forces, 1918, under the general head- 
quarters. The primary function of the corps schools was to fit 
officers of incoming divisions as promptly as possible to train their 
own men. The intention was later to make the mission of the schools 
the production of a high degree of skill among selected officers and 
noncommissioned officers and the instruction of officers in the duties 
of the next higher command. From the earliest days of the schools 
more attention was given to strictly pioneer and combat work and 
less to heavy construction than had been the practice in the British 
schools. This belief of the Americans that open warfare would pre- 
vail ultimately was amply justified in the summer of 1918. Heavy 
construction was taken care of by officers who had specialized in 
that kind of work in civil life. The training of engineer replace- 
ments was done at the School of ^Vngers. Replacements fresh from 
America were handled here and after they had taken the course of 
instruction they were classified, rated, and sent to regiments. (15) 

MATl&RIEL. 

Engineer supplies procured for the Expeditionary Forces opera- 
tion amounted to 3,314,662 tons, the cost involved being approxi- 
mately $450,000,000. As already noted the procurement, storage, 
and distribution of this materiel was a function of the Department 
of Military Engineering and Engineer Supplies. Like every other 
service, supplies for the Engineers were procured through shipment 
from the United States and by purchase in Europe. (15) From the 
United States 1,496,489 tons were received and from Europe, 
1,818,173 tons. Of the Engineer tonnage from the United States 
963,816 were turned over to the Transportation Corps, and the bal- 
ance distributed by the Engineers. Of the supplies procured in 
Europe 1,705,115 tons were bought from the allied governments and 
113,058 in open market or by contract. The supplies bought in 
Europe consisted mainly in wooden barracks, hospitals and other 
buildings, heavy building material which could not be transported 
from America economically, also standing timber. The supplies 
from the United States were of the following general classes : 



General machinery. 
Iron and steel pnxliicts. 
Hardware and hand tools. 
Railway rolling stock. 
Railway motive power. 
Track material and fastenings. 
Automotive transportation. 
Horse-drawu transportation. 
Lumber. 



Building material and supplies. 
Liquids. 

Explosives and accessories. 
Unit accountability. 
Office supplies. 

Floating equipment and accessories. 
Material and tools for locomotive and 
car repair and erection shops. 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 



55 



FACILITIES. 

The principal Engineer facilities and their locations in the Expe- 
ditionary Forces were as follows: 



Laboratories for water supply : 

Paris (Seine). 

St. Nazaire (Loire-Inferieure). 

Bordeaux (Gironde). 

La Roctielle (Charente-Infgrieure) . 

Dijon (Cote-d'Or). 

Neuf chateau ( Vosges) . 

Brest (Finist^re). 

Nevers (Nigvre). 

Le Mans (Sarthe). 

London. 
Camouflage shops : 

Dijon (Cote-d'Or). 

Paris (Seine). 

Nancy (Meurthe-et-Moselle). 

Mobile Sliops with Armies. 
Searchliglit stations : 

Gievres (Loir-et-Clier). 

Colombey- Ics-Belles (Meurthe-et- 
Moselle). 

Pont-sur-Seine (Aube). 

Fort Mont Valerien (Seine-et- 
Oise). 

Langres ( Haute-Marne ) . 

With the Armies. 
Map-making and reproduction plants : 

Langres (Haute-Marne). 

Mobile plants with Armies and 
Corps. 
Light railway activities : 

Abainville (Meuse). 

Toul ( Meurthe-et-Moselle ) . 

Rattentout (Meuse). 

Baccarat (Meurthe-et-Moselle). 

Meuse-Argonne Sector. 
Sand and gravel supply : 

Deposits in Cher River at Vierzon. 

Deposits in Moselle near Nancy. 

La Baule (Loire-Inferieure). 
Engineer schools : 

Langres (Haute-Marne). 



Engineer scliools — Continued. 

Chfi tillon-sur-Seine ( Cote-d'Or ) . 

Gondrecourt ( Meuse ) . 

Angers ( Maine-et-Loire ) . 
Engineer supply depots: 

Langres (Haute-Marne). 

Neuf chateau (Vosges). 

Liffol-le-Grand (Vosges). 

Pacy-sur-Armangon (Yonne). 

Chatillon-sur-Seine (Cote d'Or). 

Demange-aux-Eaux ( Meuse ) . 

Barisey-la-Cote (Meurthe-et-Mo- 
selle). 

Nevers (Ni6vre). 

Etais (Cote-d'Or). 

Clermont - Ferrand ( P u y - d e - 
Dome). 

St. Amand (Cher). 

Le Mans (Sarthe). 

Orly (Seine). 

Gi&vres ( Loir-et-Cher ) . 

Saumur ( Maine-et-Loire ) . 

Nantes ( Loire-Inferieure ) . 

St. Nazaire (Loire-Inf6rieure). 

Bordeaux (Gironde). 

Le Havre (Seine-Inf6rieure). 

Rouen ( Seine-Inf erieure ) . 

Brest (Finist&re). 

Landerneau (Finist^re). 

Marseille (Bouches-du-RhOne). 

Algrefeuille (Loire-Inferieure). 

La Guerche (Cher). 
Cement mills : 

Montagne (Gironde). 

Le Teil (Ard^che). 

Cruas ( Ardeche ) . 

Couvrot (Marue). 

Beaumont (Seine-et-Oise). 

Guerville (Seine-et-Oise). 

La Souys (Gironde). 



Ob ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

XI.— MEDICAL CORPS, AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY 

FORCES. 

Medical Corps units were in France before the arrival of the 
commanding general, Expeditionary Forces, and were among the last 
to leave. The most important figures in connection with the corps 
in Europe follow: 

Maximum strength, January 11, 1919: 17,330 officers, 10,008 
nurses, and 145,386 enlisted men. 

Strength at armistice : 14,499 officers, 8,587 nurses, and 140,98() 
enlisted men. 

Base hospitals, 60. 

Major camp hospitals, 45. 

Hospital centers, 27. 

American Red Cross military hospitals, 7. 

Convalescent hospitals, 2. 

Convalescent camps, 13. 

Medical supply depots, 7. 

Medical laboratories, 6. 

Medical supplies from United States, 108,753 tons. 

Medical supplies from Europe, 99,487 tons. 

Death rate of wounded, 5 per cent. 

Wounded returned to duty, 75 per cent. 

Deaths from diseases, 45 men per 1,000. 

Venereal disease, 35.9 new cases per 1,000.^^ 

Veterinary hospitals, exclusive of those with armies, 21. 

Capacity of above, 27,614 animals. 

ORGANIZATION. 

The first Medical Corps personnel, that of Army Base Hospital 
No. 5, arrived in France ^® May 25, 1917, and went to duty with the 
British Expeditionary Forces at Dannes (Pas-de-Calais) and 
Camiers (Pas-de-Calais). On September 4, during an airplane 
attack on the hospital there, one officer and three enlisted men of this 
unit were killed and three officers and six enlisted men were wounded. 
These were probably the first American casualties in the war. The 
first medical headquarters personnel arrived in Paris June 13, 1917, 
with Gen. Pershing's party. The office of the chief surgeon. Expe- 
ditionary Forces, remained in Paris until September 1, 1917, when 
it was moved to Chaumont with the other departments of general 
headquarters. It was removed to Tours, March 21, 1918. 

The first work of the chief surgeon and his assistants was an in- 
spection to determine the location of hospitals at base ports and 

*2 Source, Bureau of Statistics, G. S. tables compiled from M. C. reports, 
w Page 3, report of Capt. E. 0. Foster as of Nov. 11, 1918, on file Historical Branch, 
General Staff. 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 



57 



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58 OKGANIZATIOiSr OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY, 

along the line of communications. As soon as these locations had 
been determined, in cooperation Avitli the French and the construc- 
tion services of the American Army, building was pushed and many 
of these base hospitals were completed in record time. Wherever 
possible existing buildings or partly constructed buildings were made 
use of. 

The Medical Corps in the Line of Communications was made a 
separate department on July 18, 1917, when the office of Chief Sur- 
geon of Base Groups and Line of Communications was created. 
Until March 21, 1918, this officer had charge of all hospitals, supplies, 
and personnel in his territory. By General Orders, No. 31, Head- 
quarters, Expeditionary Forces, 1918, the duties of the chief surgeon. 
Line of Communications, were merged with those of the chief sur- 
geon. Expeditionary Forces. By July 28, 1917, the divisions of the 
chief surgeon's office were as follows: 

Hospitalization.-^ln charge of the location, construction, and re- 
pair of all hospitals, hospital trains and care of sick and wounded. 

Sanitation and Statistics. — In charge of camps, quarters, disin- 
fection and delousing, collection and evacuation of sick, health of 
commands, report of sick and wounded, statistics, and sanitary 
reports. 

Personnel. — In charge of personnel of Medical, Dental, and Veteri- 
nary Corps, civilian employees and schools of instruction. 

Supplies. — In charge of hospital equipment, medical, dental, and 
veterinary supplies, settlement of accounts and all ambulances and 
motor transportation. 

Records and C orrespondence. — Name describes its duties. 

Gas Service. — This work was early taken over by the Chemical War- 
fare Service and is described in the section devoted to that service. 

This division of duties remained until the office of the chief sur- 
geon was moved from Chaumont to Tours. When this occurred a 
representative of the chief surgeon was assigned to general head- 
quarters with an assistant on duty with each of the several General 
Staff groups. The work of the chief surgeon, after the removal to 
Tours, was divided into the following groups: 

(1) Hospitalization, evacuation, and hospital administration. 

(2) Sanitation, sanitarj'^ inspection, and medical accounting. 

(3) Personnel. 

(4) Medical supplies. 

(6) Finance and accounting. 

(6) Veterinary. 
T\Tien war was declared the Army Nurse Corps contained only 400 
nurses scattered over the United States and its possessions. The 
reserve had been organized under the American Eed Cross. This 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 59 

agency, therefore, under a former superintendent of Army nurses, 
had plans ready and had enrolled several thousand reserve nurses. 
The character, qualifications, and antecedents of each were care- 
fully investigated before enrollment, the result being that the 10,008 
nurses sent to the Expeditionary Forces formed a body of remark- 
ably trained women who gave a service the standard of which was 
exceptionally high. When the first call was made only graduate 
nurses who had registered in accordance with the laws of their re- 
siDGctive States were accepted. Later this requirement was waived 
and graduate nurses were accepted with the understanding that 
they would register within a year after they left active service. Ex- 
perience showed that units definitely organized by a head nurse in 
civil hospitals and colleges, among women accustomed to work 
together, were more efficient. 

MATERIAL. 

There were over 3,000 items in the supply table of the Medical 
Corps. These varied all the way from delicate and expensive scien- 
tific instruments and hospital equipment to soap, gauze, and medi- 
cines. The Expeditionary Forces received 208,240 tons of these sup- 
plies, about 95 per cent coming from the United States and the bal- 
ance from European markets.^" 

The first medical supplies arrived with the first convoy which 
reached St. Nazaire June 26, 1917, and from this time on there was 
a steady flow. 

Storage facilities at ports governed the method of handling medi- 
cines and accessories at each port. At St. Nazaire, Bordeaux, and 
Marseille, where storage facilities were more extensive, medical offi- 
cers were stationed to supervise the segregation of their supplies 
from those of other services. Generally all supplies for the corps 
were loaded into cars and shipped to base storage as rapidly as might 
be where they were divided into two classes. One class was placed 
in storage at the base ports and was known as " controlled stores." 
The other class, consisting of miscellaneous supplies in mixed boxes of 
small volume, was shipped directly to the intermediate depots. The 
base storage depots entered all " controlled stores " on warehouse re- 
ceipts and copies of these receipts were forwarded daily to the Chief 
Surgeon at Tours, where stock records of all storage stations were 
kept. Medical stores were received from time to time at Brest, 
Le Havre, Cherbourg, Les Sables-d'Olonne, La Pallice, La Rochelle, 
and Eochefort, where the Medical Corps had no storage facilities. 
At these ports the supplies were shipped directly to Gievres regard- 
less of class. 

^ Page 116 of "Some Achievements of the Services of Supply" on file Historical 
Branch, General Staff. 



60 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY, 



Purchases in Europe were made by the medical member of the 
General Purchasing Board at Paris under the direction of the 
chief surgeon. Such supplies were shipped at times directly from 
the place of purchase to the hospital or depot requiring them, but 
generally all purchases in England or France were shipped to inter- 
mediate depots and distributed like supplies from the United States. 

The stores for combat troops were controlled by the armies and 
were independent of the chief surgeon, who was concerned only with 
keeping a proper reserve for the armies' needs. 

All requisitions were disposed of according to the quantities re- 
quired. When items were large enough to make carload lots thej'' 
were extracted to "Shipping notices" and sent to base storage depots 
for direct shipment. When less than carload lots or miscellaneous 
items of less than original packages were called for, the requisition 
was forwarded to the nearest issue depot. Eequisitions from small 
hospitals were forwarded to nearest issue depot after modification 
and approval by the chief surgeon. 

The locations of Medical Corps facilities were as follows : 



Base hospitals: 
Vichy (Allier). 
Vicq (Allier). 
Vauclaire ( Dordogne) . 
Boulogne (Pas-de-Calais). 
Tours (Indre-ct-Loire). 
Chateauroux (Indre). 
Nantes ( Loire-Inf 6rieure ) . 
Limoges ( Haute- Vienne ) . 
Dijon (Cote-d'Or). 
Chatelguyon (Puy-de-Dome). 
Beau Desert (Gironde). 
Allerey (Saone-et-Loire). 
Tottenham ( England ) . 
Portsmouth (England). 
Dartford (England). 
Salisbury (England). 
Horsley Park (England). 
Pougues-les-Eaux ( Nifivre ) . 
Toul (Meurthe-et-Moselle). 
Mesves (Ni§vre). 
Langres (Haute-Marne). 
Caen (Calvados). 
Neuf chateau ( Vosges ) . 
Etretat (Seine-Inf6rieure), 
Rouen ( Seine-Inf grieure ) . 
Bordeaux ( Gironde ) . 
Savenay ( Loire-Inf grieure ) . 
Treport ( Seine-Inf grieure ) . 
Dannes (Pas-de-Calais). 
Camiers (Pas-de-Calais). 
Mars (Nievre). 



Base hospitals — Continued. 

Chaumont (Haute-Marne). 

Bazoilles (Vosges). 

Vittel (Vosges). 

Angers ( Maine-et-Loire ) . 

Royat (Puy-de-D6me). 

Contrex^ville (Vosges). 

Hendecou r t ( Pas-de-Calais ) . 

St. Denis (Seine). 

Romorantin ( Loir-et-Cher) . 

Blois (Loir-et-Cher). 

Beaune (Cote-d'Or). 

Riniaucourt ( Haute-Marne ) . 

Paris (Seine). 

Kerhornou (Finistfere). 

Pau (Basses-Pyr6n§es), 

Revigny (Meuse). 

Commercy (Meuse). 

Pr uniers ( Loir-et-Cher ) . 

St. Nazaire (Loire-Inf4rieure). 

Clermont-Ferrand ( Puy-de-D6me ) . 

Vannes (Morbihan). 

Autun (Saone-et-Loire). 

Quiberon (Morbihan). 

Perigueux (Dordogne). 

Mout-Dore (Puy-de-D6me). 

Hygres (Var). 

Brest (Finist&re). 

Laf auche ( Haute-Marne ) . 

Orleans (Loiret). 

Poitiers (Vienne). 

Vincenza (Italy). 



ORGANIZATIOX OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 



61 



<Janip hospitals: 

Roanne (Loire). 

Gondrecourt (Meuse). 

Bourmont (Haute-Marne). 

Genicart (Gironde). 

Humes (Haute-Marne). 

Chateauvillain ( Haute-Marue ) . 

Prautlioy (Haute-Marne). 

Mailly-le-Camp ( Aube ) . 

Coetquidan (Ille-et-Vi!aine). 

Souge (Gironde). 

Langres (Haute-Marne). 

Tours (Indre-et-Loire). 

Le Corneau (Gironde). 

Meucon (Morbilian). 

Romsey (England). 

Winchester (England). 

Southampton (England). 

Liverpool (England). 

Bar-sur-Aube (Aube). 

Gievres (Loire-et-Cher). 

Riom (Puy-de-D6me). 

Aix-les-Bains (Savoie). 

Le Mans (Sarthe). 

Bassens (Gironde). 

Joinville (Seine). 

Barisey-la-C6te ( Meurthe-et-Mo- 
selle). 

Montigny-le-Roi (Haute-Marne). 

St. Nazaire (Loire-Inferieure). 

Le Valdahon (Doubs). 

Issoudun (Indre). 

La Courtine (Creuse). 

B ou rbonn e ( Ha u te-M a rn e ) . 

Noyers (Loir-et-Cher). 

Nevers (Ni^vre). 

St. Maixent (Deus-Sevres). 

Brest (Finist^re). 

Romorantin (Loir-et-Cher). 

Chatillon-sur-Seiue (Cote-d'Or). 

La Rochelle (Charente Infgrieure). 

Is-sur-Tille ( Cote-d'Or ) . 

Landerneau ( Finist^re ) . 

Recey-sur-Ource ( Cote-d'Or ) . 

Laignes (C5te-d'0r). 

Tonnerre (Yonne). 

Marseil le ( Bouches-du-Rh6ne ) . 
Hospital centers : 

Allerey ( Saone-et-Loire ) . 

Bazoilles-sur-Meuse (Vosges). 

Beau Desert (Gironde). 

Beaune (Cote-d'Or). 

Clermont-Ferrand ( Puy-de-D6me) . 



Hospital centers — Continued. 

Commercy (Meuse). 

Lerouville (Meuse). 

Kerhornou (Finist&re). 

Langres (Haute-Marne). 

Mars (Ni^vre). 

Mesves (Nievre). 

Pau ( Basses-Pyrgnees ) . 

Perigueux (Dordogne). 

Rimaucourt (Haute-Marne). 

Riviera (Alpes-lMaritimes). 

Savenay ( Loire-Inf grieure ) . 

Toul ( Meur the-et-Moselle ) . 

Tours (Indre-et-Loire). 

Vannes (Morbihan). 

Vichy (Allier). 

Vittel (Vosges). 

Contrexgville (Vosges). 

Nantes ( Loire-Inf grieure ) . 
American Red Cross military hos- 
pitals : 

Neuilly (Seine). 

Paris (Seine). 

Auteuil (Seine). 

Liverpool (England). 

Paddiugtou (England). 

London (England). 

Bellevue (Seine). 
Convalescent hospitals: 

Nice (Alpes-Maritimes). 

St. Raphael (Var). 
Convalescent camps : 

Savenay (Loire-Iuferieure). 

Nantes (Loire-Inferieure). 

Angers (Maine-et-Loire). 

Paris (Seine) 

Langres ( Haute-Marne ) . 

Liffol-le-Grand (Vosges). 

Limoges ( Haute- Vienne ) . 

Tours ( Indre-et-Loire ) . 

Beau Desert (Gironde). 

Mesves (Nievre). 

Mars (Nigvre). 

Allei-y (Sa6ne-et-Loire). 

Beaune (C5te-cV0r). 

Jledical supply depots and stations : 
Brest (FinistSre). 
St. Sulpice (Gironde). 
Gievres ( Lolr-et-Cher ) . 
St. Nazaire (Loire-Inferieure). 
Marseille (Bouches-du-Rhone). 
Is-sur-Tille (Cote-d'Or). 
Cosue (Nigvre). 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 



Medical laboratories: 

Brest (Finistere). 

Bordeaux (Gironde). 

Neuf chfiteau ( Vosges ) . 

St. Nazaire (Loire-Inf§rieure). 

Dijon (Cote-d'Or). 

Tours (Indre-et-Loire). 
Veterinary hospitals : 

Xeuilly-rEveque ( Haute-Marne ) . 

Ti-iconville (Meuse). 

Treveray (Meuse). 

Valdahoo (Doubs). 

Carbon Blanc (Gironde). 

Souge (Gironde). 

Toul ( Meurthe-et-Moselle ) . 



Veterinary hospitals — Continueil. 
Neufchateau (Vosges). 
Coetquidan (Morbihan). 
Meucon (Morbihan). 
Bourbonne (Haute-Marne). 
Gi6vres (Loir-et-Cher). 
Commercy ( Meuse ) . 
Lux (Cote-d'Or). 
Epinal (Vosges). 
Longuyon (Meu)-the-et-^Ioselle) . 
Sougy (Nievre). 
Verdun (Meuse). 
Nevers ( Nievre ) . 
Treves (Germany). 
St. Nazaire (Loire-Inferieure). 



XII.— MOTOR TRANSPORT CORPS, AMERICAN EXPEDI- 
TIONARY FORCES. 

The Motor Transport Corps had technical supervision over all 
motor transportation in the Expeditionary Forces. 

Authorized strength, 1,985 officers and 44.485 enlisted men. 
Strength at armistice, 1,135 officers and 26.957 enlisted men.^^ 
Vehicles for which Motor Transport Corps (20) was responsible: 

Passenger cars 7, 551 

Trucljs 36,943 

Motor cycles 13, 784 

Trailers 4.323 

Bicycles 17, .577 

Reception parks. 9 ; service stations, 52 ; heavy repair shops, 5 : 
reconstruction parks. 

ORGANIZATION. 

The Motor Transport Service, as it was first called, was controlled 
at first in the Expeditionary Forces by the Quartermaster Corps and 
was authorized as a division of the duties of the chief quartermaster, 
by General Orders, No. 70, Headquarters, Expeditionary Forces, De- 
cember 8, 1917. (20) It was charged with the supply of motor 
vehicles, spare parts, tools, and accessories, the technical supervision 
of motor vehicles and their repair. No authority was given the 
Motor Transport Service for the operation of its vehicles and units 
after their assignment by competent orders to the other services. The 
chief of the Motor Transport Service was an assistant to the chief 
quartermaster. The Engineer and Signal Corps, the Ordnance and 
Transportation Departments, and the Field Ambulance Service as- 
signed officers, one from each, to serve as assistants to the chief. The 

« Page 1, Motox- Transport Corps Section, Part I, Appendix A — Report board appointed 
by paragraph 79. S. O. 141, headquarters Services of Supply, 1919, on file Historical 
Branch, General Staff. 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 63 

duty of these officers was to represent their own services in motor 
transportation matters. The chief quartermaster of each army was 
designated as the chief of Motor Transport Service for that army 
and he had as assistants representatives from each of the foregoing 
services just as the chief of the Motor Transport Service did; but the 
chief of each army motor transport service was subordinate to the 
particular army commander concerned, although authorized to com- 
municate directly with the chief of the Motor Transport Service and 
the officer in charge of Advance Motor Transport Service Group, 
Services of Supply, in technical ^^ matters. (20) This plan of organi- 
zation remained in force until February 16, 1918, when the Motor 
Transport Service was removed from the control of the Quartermas- 
ter Corps and mxade a part of the Service of Utilities.*" Under all 
these orders the Motor Transport Corps was given technical super- 
vision and operation in the Services of Supply. In July, 1913, the 
Service of Utilities was abolished and the Motor Transport Service, 
as the " Motor Transport Corps," was made an independent service of 
the Services of Supply.*^ The duties of the service had already been 
defined in General Orders, No. 74, General Headquarters, May 11. 
1918, as follows : 

(a) The technical supervision of all motor vehicles, 
{h) The procurement, reception, storage, maintenance, and replace- 
ment of all motor vehicles. 

(c) The procurement, storage, and supply of spare and repair 
parts, tools, accessories, and supplies of all motor vehicles. 

(d) The establishment and operation of all Motor Transport Serv- 
ice garages, parks, depots, and repair shops. 

(e) The organization and technical training of Motor Transport 
Service personnel. 

(/) The salvage and evacuation of damaged motor vehicles. 

(g) The homogeneous grouping of motor vehicles. 

(h) The operation, in accordance with instruction from the proper 
commanding officer as to their employment, of groups of motor ve- 
hicles of Class A as defined in paragraph 5. 

Class A, as defined in paragraph 5, included all cargo carrying or 
passenger carrying motor vehicles for general transportation pur- 
poses in the Services of Supply, and the motorized portion of such 
reserve trains as might be held for general transportation in or in 
the rear of the army under control of the army commander. 

Class B included all motor vehicles other than in Class A. 

When the Motor Transport Service became the Motor Transport 
Corps the " chief " gave place to a " director." Assisting the direc- 

•* General Orflers, No. 70, General Headquarters, 1917. 
*" General Orders, No. 31, General Headquarters, 1918. 
*^ General Orders, No. 114, Headquarters, Services of Supply, 1918. 



64 ORGAlSriZATION" OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

tor was a deputy director and an executive officer. The work of 
the director was handled through nine divisions, viz. Executive, 
Supply, Repair, Operations, Inspection and Engineering, Training, 
Liaison, and Plans and Projects. 

The Executive Division coordinated the work of all other divi- 
sions and, in addition, controlled personnel, publications, finance, 
and accounting and statistics. 

The Supply Division handled all the Expeditionary Force motor 
supplies. 

The Repair Division had entire direction of repairs to all motor 
vehicles and controlled the distribution of spare parts and other 
accessories. 

The Operations Division was charged with the assignment and 
distribution of motor vehicles, operation of convoys, and the super- 
vision of motor vehicle operation in the Services of Supply. 

The Inspection and Engineering Division inspected all Motor 
Transport Corps activities and handled the technical problems which 
were arising continually. 

The Liaison Division maintained, largely by officers who made 
regular trips between Tours and Washington, close relation between 
the director of the Motor Transport Corps, Expeditionary Forces, 
and the chief of the Motor Transport Corps in the United States. 

The Plans and Projects Division planned all buildings and other 
Motor Transport Corps projects. 

For a few weeks there was a Reconstruction and Main Supply 
Depots Division, but its duties were absorbed by the Repair Divi- 
sion before it got fairly started. 
REPAIR. 

The beginning of all motor transport activities in France nat- 
urally was at the base ports where vehicles were received from ships 
and taken to reception parks. Here they were assembled, painted, 
numbered, registered and placed in perfect running order. Then 
they were sent to points of distribution. The reception parks were 
at St. Nazaire, La Pallice, Rochefort, Brest, Le Havre, Rouen, and 
Nantes. 

Repair work was accomplished through three agencies: Service 
parks, overhaul parks, and reconstruction parks.*^ Service parks 
were units for minor repair work. They proved invaluable both 
in the Services of Supply and the Zone of the Armies. Some of 
them were equipped with machine shop trucks, tire presses and the 
like, which enabled them to take a part of the burden off the busier 

*2 Page 15, Motor Transport Corps Section, Part I, App. A — Report board appointed by 
par. 79, S. O. 141, Headquarters, Services of Supply, 1919, on file Historical Branch, 
General Staff. 



ORGANIZATIOIN' OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 65 

and better equipped shops. Others had only hand tools, but could 
be sent to points where needed on short notice. In general prac- 
tice the personnel of a service park consisted of 1 first lieutenant 
and 35 enlisted men, but often it was found necessary to increase 
it to meet peculiar conditions. Usually the commanding officer of 
the unit was an expert mechanic and among the enlisted personnel 
were some men of unusual mechanical ability. These men were 
picked because they could do a great deal of work with very little 
equipment. The service parks were located in many sections of the 
Services of Supply, and in many centers in the Zone of the Armies, 
and three were assigned to each division. 

Overhaul parks received vehicles for repair and overhaul from 
units to which assigned and also from service parks when the repair 
was too heavy to be handled at the service parks within reasonable 
time.*^ They were permanent or semipermanent, required heavy 
machinery and, in some cases, specially constructed buildings. These 
overhaul parks were established at Neuf chateau (Vosges), Sampigny 
(Meuse), Dijon, and Paris. 

Reconstruction parks were establishments where vehicles damaged 
or worn beyond repair could be actually reconstructed or rebuilt. 
There were two: One at Verneuil (Nievre) and one at Romorantin 
(Loir-et-Cher). That at Verneuil handled American makes of 
vehicles and that at Romorantin handled foreign makes and special 
light and heavy aviation trucks and trailers. 

POOLING. 

In the early months of the Expeditionary Forces, motor transpor- 
tation was issued to units or to authorized individuals who operated 
the vehicles practically independent of central control. All vehicles 
thus assigned were dcA'^oted to the individual use of the assignee. 
There was neither coordination of operation nor proper control of 
vehicles. (20) This condition also necessitated more motor trans- 
portation than was required under a pooling arrangement, and a 
pool therefore would make motor transportation available to more 
persons in the military service. The same conditions had prevailed 
with regard to cargo transportation. Moreover, assignment to units 
or individuals made for excessive repair work and excessive con- 
sumption of spare parts. Consequently it was decided forthwith to 
pool all motor vehicles. 

By pooling was meant collecting all motor vehicles under one au- 
thority for general transportation and assigning them from such 

** Page 15, Motor Transport Corps Section, Part I, Appendix A — Report board appointed 
by paragraph 79, S. O. No. 141, Headquarters, Services of Supply, 1919, on file Historical 
Branch, General Staff. 

178841°— 20 5 



66 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

collection to meet the actual needs in each specified case. Creation 
of a vehicle pool meant unity of control and did not mean that all 
vehicles must be parked in one place. (20) The general assignment 
of vehicles in the Services of Supply to the several sections was made 
by the Chief of the Motor Transport Corps, subject to policies laid 
down by G-4, Headquarters, Services of Supply, and the sec- 
tion commanders controlled section pools. The pool justified itself 
fully in the opinion of high command. It was found that it made for 
proper operation and maintenance, brought a greater return from a 
given amount of vehicle equipment, and tended to eliminate waste or 
misuse of motor transportation and needless varieties of vehicles. 
The pool was established first at Headquarters, Services of Supply, 
by General Orders, No. 1, Headquarters, Services of Supply, March 
13, 1918. 
PERSONNEL. 

When war was declared and voluntary enlistments were at their 
maximum there was no motor transport service to absorb thousands 
of experienced motor men. "VVlien the Motor Transport Service was a 
part of the Quartermaster Corps it received onh'^ such personnel as the 
Quartermaster Corps thought it could afford to take away from other 
duties. "When it began as a separate service it received only such per- 
sonnel as the Quartermaster Corps and other services had already as- 
signed to it. It was not until about three months before the armistice 
that the Motor Transport Corps was able to get definite action on its 
statements of personnel needs. The result was that personnel, or 
rather the lack of it, was conspicuously the great Motor Transport 
Corps problem in the Expeditionary Forces. (20) Personnel was 
always short ; never more than 33 per cent of the requirement. It was 
necessary in the Services of Supply to use every possible makeshift in 
the way of operating and mechanical personnel. Men had to be 
secured from other ser^'ices, no matter whether they had much or 
practically no motor experience. For months at the base ports the 
chief motor transport officer had to borrow thus from arriving 
organizations and after a time had to release men thus acquired to 
their own organizations and borrow other inexperienced personnel 
as replacement. Even line regiments were drawn upon. It was 
natural that these men would take no particular pride in equipment 
they were handling only in passing. Consequently equipment suf- 
fered.** Anybody who knew anything at all about repair work, no 
matter how little, had to be put on repair work. 

Commissioned officers for the Motor Transport Corps came from 
the ranks of motor experts in the United States, where they were 

** Page 18, Motor Transport Corps Section, Part I, Appendix A — Report board convened 
by paragraph 79, S. O. 141, Headquarters, Services of Supply, 1919, on file Historical 
Branch. General Stafif. 



ORGANIZATIOlSr OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 



67 



more numerous in 1917 than in any other country. These officers 
had had long training in civil life and this training showed itself 
in the Expeditionary Forces, especially in what they accomplished 
with such a paucity of materiel and men. 

A number of Americans who had been in the service of the French 
joined the American Army. These men were of a high average of 
intelligence and ability and, in addition, were thoroughly experienced 
in war-time motor transportation. Many of them reached comm.is- 
sioned rank and the rest occupied responsible positions as noncom- 
missioned officers. 

Organization chart, Motor Transport Corps, A. E. F. 



DIRECTOR. 



Deputy. 



Executive OfBcer. 



Exeoutive 
Division. 



Supply 
Division. 



Inspection and 

Enfdneering 

Division. 



Training 
Division. 



Repair 
Division. 



Operations 
Division. 



I-iaison 
Divi«ion. 



Plans and 
Projects 
Division. 



Reconstniction 
Parks and Main 
Suppl.v Depots. 



When the tables of personnel requirement were submitted in 
August, 1918, the corps asked for 44,485 men and 1,985 officers for 
an army of 1,300,000 in the Expeditionary Forces. This amount of 
personnel never was furnished. The strength of the Expeditionary 
Forces had passed that figure when the tables went into effect. The 
final result was that when the Motor Transport Corps had procured 
about half the number of officers and men needed for an army of 



68 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

1,300,000 it had only about one-third the number needed to do the 
work for an army of the size which the Exj^editionary Forces had 
then attained. In September, 1918, the War Department transferred 
the enlisted personnel of divisional supply trains to the Motor Trans- 
port Corps, but this increased the strength of the Motor Transport 
Corps only on paper, because this personnel was engaged in combat 
work, and Expeditionary Forces, by order, did not come under Motor 
Transport Corps control ; at least it was impracticable to move them. 
A number of Engineer units which had been working with the Motor 
Transport Corps were transferred also in September, 1918. Newly 
arrived personnel was trained in schools at the base ports and at 
other points in France. 

MATERIEL. 

The materiel used by the Motor Transport Corps in the Expedi- 
tionary Forces consisted of passenger automobiles, light and heavy 
trucks, trailers, motor cycles, bicycles, spare parts, and repair equip- 
ment. About 2^ per cent of this materiel came from European 
markets and the rest from the United States.'*^ Altogether 160 
makes of vehicles were used, of which 112 makes were European, but 
these 112 makes represented less than 3 per cent of the total number 
of vehicles. The history of the acquisition of American materiel 
does not form a part of this paper, but relates to the supply in the 
United States. Gasoline and lubricating oils were handled by the 
Quartermaster Corps. 
ACTIVITIES. 

The locations of the various Motor Transport Corps activities in 
the Expeditionary Forces were as follows: 

Spart parts depots: 

Langres ( Haute- ]\rarne). 
Verneuil ( Nievre) . 



Reception parks: 

St. Nazaire (Loire-Inf^rieure). 

Bordeaux (Gironde). 

Nantes (Loire-Inferieure). 

La Pallice (Cbarente-Inf^rieure) 

Rochefort (Cliarente-Inf^rieure). 

Brest (Finist&re). 

Le Havre (Seine-Inf^rieure). 

Rouen (Seine-Inf^rieure). 
Overhaul parks: 

Neufchateau (Yosges). 

Sampigny (ileuse). 

Dijon (Cote-d'Or). 

Paris (Seine). 
Reconstruction parks : 

Verneuil (Ni^vre). 

Roraorantin (Loir-et-Clier) . 



Nevers (Ni&vre). 

Nogent-en-Bassigny ( Haute-Marm 
Supply depots : 

Verneuil (Nievre). 

Romorantin (Loir-et-Cher). 
Service parks : 

Coetquidan ( Morbihan ) . 

Meucon (Morbilian). 

St. Nazaire (Loire-Infgrieure). 

Savenay (Loire-Inferieure). 

Nantes (Loire-Inf4rieure). 

Angers ( Maine-et-Loire ) . 

La Pallice (Charente-Inf^rieure). 

Rochefort ( Charente-Inf erieure ) . 



** Appendix D, Report of G-4, General Headquarters, to the commanding general, Ameri- 
can Expeditionary Forces, on file Historical Brancli, General Stafif. 



ORGA2s^IZATI02s OF THE SERVICES OF SX7PPLY. 



69 



Service parts — Continued. 
Souge (Gironde). 
Lormont (Gironde). 
Libourne (Gironde). 
Le Corneau (Gironde). 
Bordeaux (Gironde). 
Poitiers (Vienne). 
Le Mans (Sartlie). 
Paris (Seine). 
Blois (Loir-et-Cher). 
Jlontierchaume ( Indre ) . 
Bourges (Cher). 

Clermont-Ferrand (Puy-de-D6me). 
Haussimont (Marne). 
Chatillon-sur-Seine ( Cote-d'Or ) . 
St. Dizier (Haute-Marne). 
Triaticourt (Meuse). 
Sampigny (Meuse). 
Colombey-1 e s-Belles (Meurthe-et- 

Moselle). 
Is-sur-TiUe (Cote-d'Or). 
Dijon (Cote-d'Or). 
Lyon (Rtione). 
Marseille (Bouches-du-Rhone). 



Service parks — Continued. 
Vannes (Morbihan). 
Melun (Seine-et-Mame). 
Saumur ( Maine-et-Loire ) . 
Tours ( Indre-et-Loire ) . 
Le Havre (Seine-Inferieure). 
Rouen (Seine-Inferieure). 
St. Aignan (Loir-et-Cher). 
Limoges (Haut-Vienne). 
La Courtine (Creuse). 
Nevers (Nigvre). 
Vemeuil (Ni&vre). 
Chaumont (Haut-Marne). 
Donjeux (Haut-Marne). 
Toul (Meurthe-et-Moselle). 
Xeuf chateau ( Vosges ) . 
Langres (Haut-Marne). 
Yaldahon (Doubs). 
Allerey (Cote-d'Or). 
Decize (Ni&vre). 
Cannes (Alpes-Maritimes). 
Loudeac (Cotes-du-Xord). 
Issoudun (Indre). 



XIII.— ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT, AMERIC\N EXPEDI- 
TIONARY FORCES. 

The problem of the Ordnance Department, Expeditionary Forces, 
was to acquire materiel from the United States and Europe and dis- 
tribute it to meet the needs of American forces, and to requisition, 
distribute, and administer the personnel necessary to carry out this 
work. Outstanding facts about the department in the Expeditionary 
Forces are : 
Strength : ^^ 

Authorized, 4,471 officers and 100,084 enlisted men. 

On November 11, 1918, 1,661 officers and 20,339 enlisted men. 

Maximum, 1,804 officers and 22.172 enlisted men. 

ORGANIZATION. 

The establishment of the Ordnance Department of the Expedi- 
tionary Forces was provided in General Orders. No. 1. Headquarters, 
American Expeditionary Forces, May 26, 1917, issued before Gen. 
Pershing and his party sailed from the United States, in which order 
the department was charged with administration matters overseas, 
through a chief ordnance officer. The first officers of the oversea 
department were chosen from line officers particularly qualified 
for ordnance work. (13) The chief ordnance officer reported di- 



« History Ordnance, A. E. F., vol. 1, page 205, on file Hist. Branch. G. S. 



70 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 



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OEGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 71 

rectly to the commanding general, Expeditionary Forces, and was 
also later a stajff officer of the commanding general, Services of Sup- 
ply, He had his headquarters in Paris until March, 1918, when he 
moved to Tours with the other supply services. 

Properly and efficiently to conduct his department, the chief ord- 
nance officer distributed the work among six divisions. These were, 
Administration, Supply, Construction and Maintenance, Personnel, 
Engineering and Requirements. 

The Administration Division coordinated the work of the other 
divisions and collected for record or distribution all information of 
general character. The Supply Division was just what its name im- 
plies, and had charge of all depots and of the distribution of ma- 
teriel to forces in the field. The Division of Construction and Main- 
tenance provided and maintained ordnance buildings and their fa- 
cilities ; was responsible for the installation of the necessary machin- 
ery, tools and other equipment and their upkeep ; operated the gen- 
eral ordnance repair shops; supervised the operation of all other 
ordnance repair shops, cooperated in the assignment of the personnel 
therefor, and cooperated with the salvage service in the repair and 
disposition of ordnance materiel. 

The Personnel Division secured, assigned, instructed, and moved 
personnel, and had general supervision of all personnel in the Ord- 
nance Department, and maintained a record of all. 

The Engineering Division was charged with everything pertain- 
ing to the design, experiment, and determination of types ; prepared 
all technical pamphlets, drawings, charts, and specifications pertain- 
ing to ordnance and ordnance stores that it was necessary to prepare 
in France; investigated defects in ordnance materiel and prescribed 
corrective measures; operated proving grounds and laboratories; 
advised and instructed other divisions in technical matters; main- 
tained technical relations with allied forces and other American 
Expeditionary Forces services ; and established, maintained, and ad- 
ministered courses of instruction in all ordnance activities. 

The Eequirements Division established and maintained tables of 
requirements of all ordnance materiel; prepared priority schedules 
for procurement and shipping of materiel from the United States 
and in Europe and made estimate of tonnage requirements; sub- 
mitted all requisitions to the Ordnance Department in the United 
States; cooperated with the salvage service in matters pertaining to 
salvage as a source of ordnance supply ; and maintained such records 
and statistics as were necessary for the performance of its duties. 

PERSONNEL. 

Like all other services in the Expeditionary Forces, the Ordnance 
Department was handicapped by a shortage of personnel, but plans 
were well under way when hostilities ended for the acquisition 



72 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

of sufficient force to take care of the program already mapped out 
and to allow for a reasonable expansion. Ordnance personnel was 
supplied from officers and men in the military service before the 
declaration of war who were familiar with ordnance work, from 
civilians in the United States with technical and scientific train- 
ing, and from Class B and Class C officers and men from combat 
units. Those from the first source were found efficient in nearly 
every case ; those from the second became fairly efficient when prop- 
erly trained, but courses of instruction were always necessary ; while 
those from the third class were generally found unsatisfactory, a 
condition that prevailed in all services of supply. 

The first call for ordnance personnel was for 351 officers and 9,798 
men to take care of 20 combat divisions and 10 replacement and 
training divisions which were to be organized into 5 corps. This 
estimate was forwarded to the United States by the commanding 
general, Expeditionary Forces, on July 6, 1917. He asked at the 
same time for 11,000 laborers, expecting that this labor could be sup- 
plied partly from the United States and partly from Europe.*^ 
Soon it was found that this estimate was too small and that the 
proper kind of labor could not be had, and accordingly the work had 
to be done by skilled enlisted ordnance personnel. The estimate for 
personnel went through various changes until June 27, 1918, when a 
project was submitted calling for 10,819 officers and enlisted men. On 
July 18, 1918, the War Department was asked to ship 27,600 men be- 
tween October, 1918, and July, 1919, and on July 21 of the same year 
a project was forwarded for 2,398 officers to be in France by July 1, 
1919. This latter project was approved but subsequent changes were 
made in the personnel program until 4,471 officers and 100,084 en- 
listed men were authorized. It was contemplated that these forces 
should be organized into companies of 250 men, each one to have two 
officers for military administration. But in August, 1918, the Ord- 
nance Department was ordered to take over the Ammunition Supply 
Service, which had been operated previously by the French. To 
carry on this work it was necessary to take away much of the ord- 
nance personnel from the Services of Supply depots and many skilled 
mechanics. To replace these men, the commanding general, Ex- 
peditionary Forces, forwarded a cable calling for 21 officers and 
1,641 men for Ammunition Supply for the First Army and a like 
number for the Second Army. It was intended to transfer the men 
thus procured to the units which had lost because of the assumption 
of the supply work; but the Services of Supply never regained the 
men taken away from it. Properly to handle ammunition supply, 
one company was planned to accompany each division from the 

** Vol. V, page 30, History of Ordnance Department, American Expeditionary Forces, on 
file Historical Branch, General Staff. 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SEEVICES OF SUPPLY. 73 

United States. Each company was to consist of 6 officers and 216 
enlisted men. (13) 

There was confusion over the control of ordnance officers on 
duty with divisions. Whether they should be controlled by the 
chief ordnance officer or by the division commanders, never was 
definitely decided. Much confusion resulted over this dual claim 
to control and finally a check was made whereby it was found that 
some ordnance officers were claimed by two divisions and some 
were claimed by none. (13) Steps were being taken to remedy this 
situation when the armistice intervened. 

On August 1, 1918, a classification of the personnel was completed 
which showed approximately the following results: 

Per cent. 

One year at college 3. 2 

Two years at college 3.6 

Three years at college 2.6 

College graduates 5. 7 

Post graduates (two degrees) 0.9 

College, no length stated 3.0 

Total college men 19. 

High school 24. 

Business special schools 6. 8 

Grammar schools and nondeclai'ants 50. 2 

Total 100.0 

The ordnance personnel sent overseas w^as divided into seven 
classes as follows : 

(a) Personnel attached to line organizations. 

(b) Automatic replacement troops. 

(c) Mobile ordnance repair shops. 

(d) Heavy mobile ordnance repair shops. 

(e) Provisional ordnance depot companies and battalions. 
(/) Casual officers. 

(g) Casual enlisted men. 
The movement of Class A men was automatic. They were assigned 
to line organizations in the United States and kept with them in 
France. Class B personnel was also sent overseas without special 
request and ordered to the concentration barracks at Mehun and then 
to ordnance schools before being distributed. Class C personnel was 
sent automatically also, one unit for each division, the units being 
given intensive training at Is-sur-Tille before joining divisions. Class 
D men were included in the original troop projects and went to or- 
ganization and training centers before entering the Army area. 
Class E personnel was sent overseas upon request from headquarters, 
American Expeditionary Forces, and went to the concentration bar- 
racks at Mehun, whence the men were distributed to stations in the 
Services of Supply. Class F officers were ordered automatically 



74 ORGAIsriZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

from the base ports to Tours for a one-day conference before assign- 
ment to duty. Class G personnel was ordered automatically to 
Mehun for classification and assignment. 

For a time it was thought that many of the ordnance activities 
could be carried on by reclassified officers and men, but time proved 
that personnel, from combat divisions, classed physically as B or C, 
could not be used successfully except on very light duty. These men 
were geaerally returned to combat divisions when they got well. 
However, reports on reclassification finally showed that about 2,000 
officers and men were on the lists who could be used in ordnance work, 
and on October 16, 1918, request was made for 1,000 of these 
officers. (13) 

On July 17, 1918, the educational section of the Development 
Division was established for personnel instruction. This was made 
a function of the Engineering Division, which replaced the Develop- 
ment Division, and it was transferred to the Personnel Division when 
that division was created November 11, 1918. It was the duty of the 
educational section to establish, maintain, and administer courses of 
instruction for ordnance personnel in all branches of ordnance work 
and to provide such military instruction as might be necessary, and 
to cooperate with and assist the Personnel Division in the classifica- 
tion and assignment of personnel.*'' The.se schools were served by 
instructors picked from the commissioned personnel with special 
care ; and from the outset the improvement in the men was so marked 
that the courses were constantly elaborated so that every phase of 
ordnance work was included finally. The location of these schools is 
given in the list of ordnance facilities below. 

MATERIEL. 

The greater part of the materiel for the Ordnance Department of 
the Expeditionary Forces was bought in Europe, this being especially 
true in the case of the heavier items. Broadly, Europe and the 
United States were the two sources of supply.^'* The principal 
reason for this was that the need for materiel became serious even 
before anybody could outline the requirements. Artillery, artillery 
ammunition, fire control instruments, and trench warfare materiel, 
were practically all furnished by France and England. Until the 
summer of 1918 machine guns and automatic rifles were supplied 
largely by the Allies and up to the same period much personnel and 
horse equipment had to be provided for by commercial substitutes 
purchased in the European markets. Requirements were handled 
through estimates based on initial equipment, wastage, consumption 

** History of Ordnance Department, American Expeditionary Forces, Vol. I, pages 51 to 
240 ; on file Historical Branch, General Staff. 

^ History of Ordnance Department, American Expeditionary Forces, Vol. I, pages 133, 
137, 138, and 139 ; on file Historical Branch, General Staff. 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 



< D 



and reserves, which estimates were filled from foreign availabilities 
and fi'om the United States through automatic and exceptional 
supply.^^ Spare parts, accessories, etc., were procured on schedules 
by individual items and by sets; but changes finally settled the sys- 
tem down to schedules of so man}' spare parts for each 25,000 men 
in France, thus making the supply automatic. 

A resume of the combat materiel supplied through the Ordnance 
Department ^^ is given : 





From 
France. 


From 
United 
States. 


From 
England 


Total. 


Guns: 

75 mm. guns 


1,862 
796 


160 
2 
71 
26 
74 




2,022 






798 






71 









26 









74 




233 




233 




88 


120 

40 


208 






40 


S-inch S C guns 




6 

15 
18 


6 








15 




66 




84 








Total 


2,957 


460 


160 


3,577 


Caissons: 

75 mm. gun. 


1,862 
796 


4,948 

1,198 

219 




6,810 




1,944 


4 7-inch gun 




219 










Total . 


2,658 


6,365 




9,023 








Trench mortars: 




843 


914 


1,757 




136 


136 


6-inch Newtons . . 


48 


513 


561 




101 


101 










Total 


237 


891 


1,427 


2,555 






Automatic machine and 37 mm. guns: 




30,089 
10,411 




30,089 








10,411 




5,255 





5,255 




43,368 




43,368 




19,241 

15,988 

641 




19,241 








15,988 




60 




701 










41,125 


83,928 




125,053 








Tanks: 


227 


10 
12 

14 




237 




12 
14 


24 


Mark V and Mark VI 




28 








Total 


227 


36 


26 


289 






Tractors: 




5 

i,ei8 

933 

226 

83 




5 








1,018 








933 






225 


451 






83 




28 
104 




28 








104 












132 


2,265 


225 


2,622 







» History of Ordnance Department, American Expeditionary Forces, Vol. I, pages 133, 
137, 138, and 139 ; on file Historical Branch, General Stafif. 

^History of 'Ordnance Department, American Expeditionary Forces, Vol. I, page 205; 
on file Historical Branch, General Staff. 



76 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 



Shells: 

From France 

From United States. 
From England 



1,983,500 

6,972,300 

427, 100 



Total. 



9,382,900 



Small arms and ammunition: 

From France rounds.. 47,559,000 

From Umted States do 1,475,549,000 

Total do.... 1,523,108,000 

FACILITIES. 

The facilities of the department in the Expeditionary Forces con- 
sisted of ammunition depots, general storage depots, ordnance repair 
shops, schools of instruction, organization and training centers, and 
proving grounds and laboratories. The locations of these several fa- 
cilities, as shown by the History of the Ordnance Department, Ameri- 
can Expeditionary Forces, are as follows: 



Ammunition depots : 

St. Loubes (Giroiide). 

Foecy (Cher). 

Issoudun (Indre). 

Jonchery (Haute-Marne). 

Donges (Loire-Inf^rieure). 
General storage depots : 

Calais (Pas-de-Calais). 

Deniange-au.x-Eaux (jNIeuse). 

Gievres ( Loir-et-Cher ) . 

Is-.sui--Tille (Cote-d'Or). 

Mehun (Cher). 

Miramas ( Bouches-du-Rhone) . 

Montoir ( Loirc-Inf 6rieure ) . 

Nevers (Ni^vre). 

St. Sulpice (Gironde). 
Ordnance repair shops: 

Angers (Maine-et-Loire). 

AngoulGme (Charente). 

Bourg (Gironde). 

Bourges (Cher). 

Chalindrey (Haute-Marne). 

Clermont-Ferrand (Puy-de-Dome). 

Coetquidan ( Morbihan ) . 

Colombey-les-Belles ( Meurthe-et- 
Moselle). 

Courbevoie (Seine). 

Demange-aux-Eaux (Meuse). 

Doulaincourt (Haute-Marne). 

Foecy (Cher). 

GiSvres ( Loir-et-Cher ) . 

Haussimont (Marne). 

Is-sur-Tille (Cote-d'Or). 

La Courtine (Creuse). 

Langres ( Haute-Marne ) . 



Ordnance repair shops — Continued. 

Le Blanc (Indre). 

Le Corneau (Gironde). 

Libourne (Gironde). 

Limoges ( Haute-Vieune ) . 

Mehun (Cher). 

Meucon ( Morbihan ) . 

Neuvy-Pailloux (Indre), 

Orly Field (Seine). 

Romorantin (Loir-et-Cher). 

St. Jean-de-Monts (Vendee). 

Saumur (Maine-et-Loire). 

Souge (Gironde). 

Valdahon (Doubs). 

Void (Meuse). 
Schools of instruction : 

Bourges (Cher). 

Foecy (Cher). 

Is-sur-Tille (Cote-d'Or). 

St. Jean-de-Monts (Vendee). 

St. Aignan (Loir-et-Cher). 

Jonchery (Haute-Marne). 
Organization and training centers : 

Angers ( Maine-et-Loire ) . 

Angouleme (Charente). 

Clermont-Ferrand (Puy-de-DSme), 

Libourne (Gironde). 

Limoges (Haute-Vienne). 
Proving grounds and laboratories : 

Bourges (Cher). 

Gavre et Quiberon (Morbihan). 

Montlugon (Allier). 

Mehun (Cher). 

Versailles (Seine-et-Oise). 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 77 

XIV.— QUARTERMASTER CORPS, AMERICAN EXPEDI- 
TIONARY FORCES. 

The chief duties of the Quartermaster Corps in the Expeditionary 
Forces were to feed, clothe, and pay the Army, although it was 
charged with many others, including the supply of fuel and forage, 
salvage, grave registration, and, at one time, dock operation and 
motor transportation. It had to perform these varied functions for 
an Army of 2,000,000 men and, at the same time, prepare for an Army 
twice that size. 

JMaximmn strength, 4,229 officers, 96,451 men, and 42 field clerks 
on December 15, 1918. 

Strength at armistice, 4,027 officers, 96,006 men, and 38 field clerks. 

Forage received, 824,410 tons; from United States, 391,215, and 
from Europe, 30,122. 

Animals received, all sources, 243,560. 

Remount depots, 35. 

Mechanical bakeries, 4 ; field bakeries, 61 ; coffee-roasting plants, 3. 

Ice-making plants, 7 ; cold-storage plants, 21. 

Main gasoline-storage depots, 6; gasoline-storage and distributing 
stations, 28. 

Motor gasoline consumed, 87,663,056 gallons; aviation gasoline 
consumed, 5,627,572 gallons. 

Coal receipts to May 1, 1919, 1,953,777 tons. 

Salvage depots, 4; salvage shops, 17. 

Decreasing and rendering plants, 4. 

Clothing received, 119,461 tons ; from United States, 107,429 ; from 
Europe, 12,032. 

Food, from United States, 1,313,525 tons; from Europe, 248,150; 
total, 1,561,675, in the following commodities: 



Tons. 

Meat 421, 322 

Sugar 74, 4.55 

Tobacco 24, 9S6 

Butter 21, 907 

Flour 412, 050 

Beans 58, 767 

Milk 39, 756 

Pepper 871 

Reserve of above on hand November 11, 1918, 93.75 days. 



Tons. 

Fruits 88, 300 

Vinegar 15, 961 

Rice 29, 974 

Coffee 40, 972 

Cinnamon 424 

Salt 21, 249 

Potatoes 309, 478 

Tea 203 



83 Some achievements of the Services of Supply Section, table " Subsistence in Depots 
Nov. 11, 1918." 



Salt 0. 0477 

Vinegar . 0332 

Candy . 0228 

Soap . 0228 

Baking powder . 0051 

Pepper . 0019 

Flavoring . 0013 

Cinnamon . 0009 



Total 4.2887 



78 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

Food consumption, pounds per man per day : ®* 

Potatoes 1. 1770 

Meat 1. 0729 

Flour . 8527 

Sugar . 2409 

Fruit . 2302 

Beans . 1793 

Milk . 0976 

Coffee . 0794 

Rice and hominy . 0734 

Butter .0686 

Tobacco . 0576 

ORGANIZATION. 

Under General Orders, No. 8, July 5, 1917, the Quartermaster 
Corps in the Expeditionary Forces was charged with " the trans- 
portation of personnel and supplies; the supply of quartermaster 
transportation ; repairs to all vehicles of all services, except artillery 
vehicles; clothing, quartermaster equipment; subsistence; fuel; 
forage; lights; water; camp sites; quarters and offices and equip- 
ment therefor ; pay of personnel and general disbursements, laundries 
and baths ; remounts ; claims ; salvage ; quartermaster workshops and 
storehouses; burials; cemeteries; labor; quartermaster personnel; 
and coal storage and refrigerating plants. The same order that 
established the Transportation Department of the Expeditionary 
Forces determined the duties of the Quartermaster Corps.'^^ This 
order charged each with the transportation of supplies and personnel, 
but the function of the Quartermaster Corps was confined by prac- 
tice and not by order to the issue of transportation requests for the 
Expeditionary Forces. Later this function also passed to the Trans- 
portation Corps. By General Orders, No. 20, Headquarters, Expedi- 
tionary Forces, August 13, 1917, the Service of Military Eailways 
was established and it was charged with the transportation of per- 
sonnel and supplies in the place of the Quartermaster Corps, but the 
latter continued operating the ports through its Army Transport 
Service. On September 14, 1917, the Service of Military Railways 
became the Transportation Service, and on December 18, 1917, by 
General Orders, No. 78, Headquarters, Expeditionary Forces, the 
Army Transport Service was transferred to the Transportation Serv- 
ice with its equipment and personnel. On February 16, 1918, there 
was a reorganization, under General Orders, No. 31, Headquarters, 
Expeditionary Forces, whereby the Quartermaster Corps became one 
of the services of the Service of the Rear, later the Services of Sup- 
ply. In this order the corps was charged with pay of personnel and 

" Some achievements of the Services of Supply Section, table " Food — Total Issues and 
Rate of Consumption." 

^ General Orders, No. 8, General Headquarters, July 5, 1917, all on file Historical Branch, 
General Staff. 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 79 

general disbursements; quartermaster materiel, including clothing, 
subsistence, fuel, and forage; transportation of water beyond the 
water point; remount service; laundries and baths; disinfection of 
clothing; salvage service; quartermaster shops, depots, and store- 
house ; cold storage and refrigeration ; grave registration and inspec- 
tion of Quartermaster Corps activities. To these later were added 
sales stores and rolling sales stores, effects depots, and garden service. 

The initial work of the chief quartermaster, Expeditionary 
Forces, was to take care of the troops already in France and those 
coming with the first convoy, which arrived at St. Nazaire June 26, 
1917, before the chief quartermaster had had time to organize his 
office on anything like a permanent basis. St. Nazaire had been se- 
lected as one of the French ports for American use and by the time 
the first convoy reached there officers and men were on hand to take 
care of it. Unloading the first convoy was done by French labor. 
It was at this port that the Army Transport Service began oper- 
ations. It branched out to the other ports as they became available 
and its work was not interrupted by the transfer to the Transporta- 
tion Department. The chief quartermaster moved from Paris to 
Chaumont with the commanding general, and then removed to Tours 
on March 11, 1918. The office of the chief quartermaster, line of 
conmiunications, was absorbed by the office of chief of quartermas- 
ter when the latter moved to Tours. In the final plan of organiza- 
tion the chief quartermaster was assisted by a deputy chief quar- 
termaster and assistants to the chief quartermaster and the follow- 
ing divisions : ^'^ 

Administrative Division^ which handled all records, mail, tele- 
grams, and cablegrams, messenger service, precedent and research 
and administrative action on contracts. 

Supplies Division^ the work of which was distributed among 15 
branches, viz, clothing, subsistence, bakeries, animal-drawn transpor- 
tation, traffic, traveling officers, supplies and stationery, fuel, forage, 
cold storage and refrigeration, administration, storage and warehous- 
ing, garden service, gasoline and oil, and miscellaneous. 

Personnel Division handled all quartermaster personnel in the 
Expeditionary Forces, preparation of priority schedules of quarter- 
master troops in the United States for shipment overseas, organiza- 
tion of new units in the Expeditionary Forces, and distribution of 
all quartermaster personnel, including labor organizations. 

Finance Division handled supply of disbursing officers and funds 
for their disbursements, instruction of finance officers, and adjust- 
ment of certain classes of claims. 

6« Quartermaster Section, Part II, Appendix A — Report board convened by paragraph 
79, Special Order No. 141, 1919, on file Historical Branch, General Staff. 



80 OKGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

Inspection Division, through traveling ofTicers, inspected and re- 
ported on the several activities of the Quartermaster Corps. 

Accounting Division examined and analyzed the accounts, both 
property and funds, and audited subsistence returns of all quarter- 
masters in the Expeditionary Forces. 

Salvage Service operated salvage depots and shops, rendering 
plants for the recovery of fats, kitchen economic activities, and 
laundries and disinfectors and police of the battle fields. 

Remount Division acquired by purchase in Europe and shipment 
from United States all animals of the Expeditionary Forces. 

Construction and Repair Division designed equipment, chevrons, 
and other insignia, made maps and organization charts, and did 
quartermaster illustrating. This division had no construction or 
repair function. 

Graves Registration Service acquired, maintained, and controlled 
cemeteries, identified the dead, registered burials, and corresponded 
with relatives of deceased soldiers. 

PERSONNEL. 

The quartermaster personnel accompanying Gen. Pershing to 
France consisted of IG oflicers, 10 enlisted men, and 12 field clerks. 
By November 11, 1918, there were 4,027 officers, 96,006 enlisted men, 
and 38 field clerks. The maximum was 4,229 officers, 96,451 enlisted 
men, and 42 field clerks. Besides these the Quartermaster Corps had 
transferred 600 officers and 18,000 enlisted men to the Motor Trans- 
port Corps and 300 officers and 13,000 enlisted men to the Trans- 
portation Corps. The commissioned personnel was drawn from 
the line of the Eegular Army, from former quartermaster non- 
commissioned personnel of the Army, and from men with wide 
experience in commercial life. The enlisted men came from the 
usual sources — the selective draft and voluntary enlistments. Quar- 
termaster personnel was slow in arriving. Although troops began to 
arrive in the latter part of May, 1917, there were less than 2,500 
quartermaster officers and men in France by October 6 of the same 
year. Labor organizations did not appear in any appreciable amount 
until the middle of December, 1917, despite repeated representations 
of the commanding general. Expeditionary Forces. During 
January and February, 1918, the corps began to catch up with its 
quota, but in March and April the demand for combat troops 
became pressing, and priority schedules were changed so radically 
that Quartermaster Corps troop arrivals fell off seriously, and 
the shortage began to grow again. By the middle of April general 
headquarters had to take up this question and numerous cablegrams 
were sent urging an increase in the shipment of Quartermaster 



OKGANIZATIOST OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 81 

Corps troops. In May, June, and July these shipments increased and 
the shortage became less serious, although it never did disappear. 

MATERIEL. 

The aim of the American Expeditionary Forces was to have always 
90 days' reserve of supplies based upon the entire number of Ameri- 
can troops in Europe. This decision was arrived at after a series of 
conferences with the chiefs of several services and the War Depart- 
ment was notified by cable September 7, 1917. It was told that this 
reserve was to be based on authorized issues where such issues were 
regular and on actual periodic consumption of other articles based on 
British and French experience. It was the aim of the Quartermaster 
Corps to keep the reserve at that figure, but it was able to do so only 
in the matter of subsistence. Other articles fell short just as in other 
services. The flow of tonnage was always worked out as nearly as 
possible so as not to interfere with the flow of troops. At no time 
was there as much ship tonnage available as was needed. This 
forced the purchase of many quartermaster supplies in Europe, as it 
did in other services. 

The principal base storage depots were at Montoir (Loire-In- 
ferieure), St. Sulpice (Gironde) and Miramas (Bouches-du-Rhone). 
The intermediate depots were at Gievres (Loir-et-Cher) and Mon- 
tierchaume (Indre) , with an auxiliary depot at Paris. The advance 
depots were at Is-sur-Tille (Cote-d'Or) and Liffol-le-Grand (Vos- 
ges). Gievres had the largest depot in the Expeditionary Forces 
and one of the largest storage places in the world. 

The American soldier in France consumed 4.2887 pounds of food 
a day. The Quartermaster Corps managed to keep ahead of him all 
the time in subsistence, but was often behind in clothing. The daily 
production of bread increased from the first baking of 11,378 pounds 
on August 3, 1917, to 1,830,000 pounds on November 30, 1918. At 
the time of the armistice bakeries were being operated in practically 
every section of France. The largest bakery was at Is-sur-Tille, 
which was put into operation on December 1, 1918. This bakery had 
a capacity of 550,000 pounds a day, which could be increased to 
750,000 in case of emergency. When hostilities ended plans were 
under way for two additional mechanical bakeries there. 

The Garden Service was started in the spring of 1918 and dur- 
ing the period of its operation it produced 75,000,000 pounds of 
vegetables at cost, not including the pay and subsistence of en- 
listed men, about one-third the prices prevailing in the open 
markets. 

Four cold storage plants were added after the armistice. On 
November 11 there were 17 in operation, with a capacity of 10,374 
178841°— 20 6 



82 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 



tons, and 15 more were projected, with an additional capacity of 
15,065 tons. The largest plant was at Gievres. It had a capacity of 
5,200 tons.^^ 

Forage was always a serious problem in France because of the 
scarcity of ship tonnage. In all, the receipts were 824,410 tons, the 
bulk of which came from the United States. At one time the 
French refused to permit the American forces to buy in the open 
market, but offered to turn over certain monthly credits of hay 
from their reserve on condition that it be replaced pound for pound 
from America. At the signing of the armistice, the French had 
delivered only about 30 per cent of their contract, but in spite of 
this the American Forces had built up a 21-day reserve. 

Organization chart, Quartermaster Corps, A. E. F. 



c o 


,. 




















■ 








Assistant to C. Q. M. 










Deputy 


C. Q. M. 





Inspection 
Division. 



Administrative 
Division. 



Finance 
Division. 



Personnel 
Division. 



Accounting 
Division. 



Supplies 
Division. 



Salvage 
Service. 



Remount 
Division. 



Construction 

and Repair 

Division. 



Graves 
Registration 

Service. 



Coal for the Expeditionary Forces came from England, and gaso- 
line, oils, and other greases from the United States. Wood was pro- 
cured from French forests and cut by American Forestry troops. 

FACILITIES. 

The facilities of the Quartermaster Corps were found in nearly 
every section of France. They were located with a view to the 
needs of the troops thej^ were to serve or the sources of supply 
they were to draw from. The storehouse locations were governed 
by the line of communications and those of other activities depended 



*'' Quartermaster Section, Part II, Appendix A — Report board convened by paragraph 79, 
Special Order No. 141, 1919 ; on file Historical Branch, General Stafif. 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 



83 



upon climatic, geographical or agricultural conditions, 
tions of these facilities were as follows : 



The loca- 



CofEee roasting plants: 

Le Havre (Seine-Infgrieure). 
Bordeaux (Gironde). 
Corbeil (Seine-et-Oise). 
Mechanical bakeries : 
Bordeaux (Gironde). 
St Nazaire (Loire-Inferieure). 
Is-sur-Tille ( Cote-d'Or ) . 
Field bakeries: 

Brest (Finistere). 

St. Nazaire (Loire-Inffirieure). 

Savenay ( Loire-Inferieure ) . 

Nantes (Loire-Inf6rieure). 

Montierchaume (Indre). 

Issoudun (Indre). 

Gi^vres (Loir-et-Clier). 

St. Aignan (Loir-et-Cher). 

Orleans (Loiret). 

St. Maixent (Dordogne). 

Montmorillon (Vienna). 

Angouleme (Charente). 

Pons (Charente-Infgrieure). 

Genicart (Gironde). 

Beautiran (Gironde). 

Le Corneau (Gfironde). 

Marseille (Bouches-du-RMne). 

Clermont-Ferrand (Puy-de-D6me). 

St. Amand (Cher). 

Verneuil (NiSvre). 

Bourges (Cher). 

St. Florent (Cher). 

Beaune (Cote-d'Or). 

Dijon (C6te-d'0r). 

Chfitillon Cote-d'Or). 

Paris (Seine). 

Meucon (Morbihan). 

Coetquidan ( Morbihan ) . 

Angers ( Maine-et-Loire ) . 

Saumur (Maine-et-Loire). 

Le Mans (Sarthe). 

Chateau-du-Loire (Sarthe). 

Tours ( Indre-et-Loire) . 

Blois (Loire-et-Cher). 

Cour-Cheverny (Loir-et-Cher). 

La Pallice (Charente- Infgri- 
eure) : 

Limoges (Haute- Vienna ). 

La Courtine (Creuse). 

Neuvic (Dordogne). 

Souge (Gironde). 

St. Sulpice (Gironde). 



Field bakeries — Continued. 

Pontens-les-Forges (Landes). 

Valbonne ( Alpes-Maritimes ) . 

Vichy (AUier). 

Mars (Nievre). 

Nevers (NiSvre). 

Mesves (Nievre). 

Mehun (Cher). 

Allerey (Cote-d'Or). 

Is-sur-Tille ( Cote-d'Or) . 

Langres (Haute-Marne). 

Chaumont (Haute-Marne). 

Mailly (SaSne et-Loire). 

Vittel (Vosges). 

Neufchateau (Vosges). 

Gondrecourt (Meuse). 

Montigny-le-Roi ( Haute-Marne ) . 

Rimaucourt (Vosges), 

Liffol-le-Grand (Vosges). 

Toul ( Meurthe-et-Moselle ) . 
Cold storage plants: 

Brest (Finistere). 

Grand Blotterau (Loire-Inferi- 
eure). 

La Pallice (Charente-Inf^rieure). 

Arcachon (Gironde). 

Tours (Indre-et-Loire). 

Orleans (Loiret). 

ViclTj- (Allier). 

Rimaucourt (Vosges). 

Bazoilles-sur-Meuse (Vosges). 

Bendorf (Germany). 

Savenay (Loire-Inferieure), 

Angers (Maine-et-Loire), 

Bassens (Gironde), 

Le Havre (Seine-Inf6rieure), 

Blois (Loir-et-Cher). 

Gievres ( Loir-et-Cher ) . 

Beaune (Cote-d'Or). 

Vittel (Vosges). 

Toul ( Meurthe-et-Moselle) . 

Hook of Holland (Holland). 
Ice-making plants : 

Savenay (Loire-Inf6rieure). 

Allerey ( Saone-et-Loire ) , 

Bazoilles-sur-Meuse ( Vosges ) , 

Gievres (Loir-et-Cher), 

Rimaucourt (Vosges). 

Grand Blotterau (Loire-Inferi- 
eure). 

Beaune (Cote-d'Or). 



84 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 



Main gasoline storage depots: 

La Pallice (Charente-Infgrieure). 

P"'urt (Gironde). 

Gievres ( Loir-et-Clier ) . 

Blaye (Gironde). 

St. Loubes (Gironde). 
Gasoline and oil distributing stations: 

St. Nazaire (Loire-Infgrieure). 

Angers ( Maine-et-Loire ) . 

Tours ( Indre-et-Loire ) . 

Limoges ( Haute- Vienne ) . 

St. Aignan (Loir-et-Cher). 

Romorantin (Loir-et-Cber). 

Orly Field (Seine). 

Sens (Yonne). 

Nevers (Nifivre). 

Clermont-Ferrand (Puy-de-D6me). 

Toul ( Meurthe-et-Moselle ) . 

Neuf cbateau ( Vosges ) . 



Gasoline and oil distributing sta- 
tions — Continued. 
Langres (Haute-Marne). 
Is-sur-Tille (Cote-d'Or). 
Miramas (Bouches-du-RhSne). 
Chatenay ( Loire-Inf erieure ) . 
Le Mans (Sartbe). 
Bordeaux ( Gironde ) . 
Chateauroux (Indre). 
Issoudun (Indre). 
St. Amand (Cher). 
Silly-le-Poterie (Aisne). 
Coincy (Aisne). 
Verneuil (Nievre). 
Clermont-en-Argonne (Meuse) . 
Gondrecourt (Meuse). 
Rimaiicourt (Vosges). 
Chavelot (Vosges). 
Marseille (Boucbes-du-RliGne) . 



XV.— SIGNAL CORPS, AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY 

FORCES. 

The Signal Corps installed, leased, maintained, and operated the 
general service telephone and telegraph for the American Expedi- 
tionary Forces in tlie Services of Supply as well as in the Zone of the 
Advance. It maintained radio, press, and intercept stations and, on 
the formation of the Third Army, provided a network in that area 
as an auxiliary to the wire telegraph system. (14) (3) 

Initial strength, 13 officers and 286 enlisted men. 

Maximum strength, 1,665 officers and 34,206 enlisted men. 

Strength November 11, 1,462 officers and 33,038 enlisted men. 

Pole lines constructed, 1,742 miles. 

Wire run on above, 20,708 miles; wire run on other than S. C. pole 
lines, 1,984 miles. 

Leased wire maintained by the French and operated by S. C, 
12,333 miles; leased wire both maintained and operated by S. C, 
3,019 miles. 

Stations served from 260 telephone offices, 8,152. 

Number of local calls, 25,184,000; number of long-distance calls, 
870,000. 

Telegraph offices in operation, 102. 

Messages handled to January 1, 1919, 8,685,960. 

Still pictures taken, 40,344; moving picture film taken, nearly 
2,000,000 feet. 

Covered storage, 350,000 square feet; open storage, 1,500,000 square 
feet. 

Miles of lines in combat area, 38,750. 



ORGANIZATIOlNr OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 85 

ORGANIZATION. 

This corps had the same experience as all other services in that it 
went through several reorganizations. By the terms of General 
Orders, No. 8, Headquarters, Expeditionary Forces, July 5, 1917, the 
chief signal officer was made a member of the Administrative and 
Technical Section of the staff of the commanding general, Expedi- 
tionary Forces, and was charged with the control of Signal Corps 
personnel and material and wire communication; message receipt 
and transmission; radio telephone and telegraph services; pigeon 
service; pyrotechnics; American codes and ciphers; photography; 
meteorology; technical inspection of signal organizations and estab- 
lishments, and dispatch riders. The definition of these functions was 
elaborated somewhat but not changed in General Orders, No. 25^ 
General Headquarters, August 12, 1917. (14) When the Service of 
the Rear, which became the Services of Supply, was created, the 
chief signal officer exercised his functions as a member of the tech- 
nical staff of the commanding general. Expeditionary Forces, 
through the commanding general. Services of Suppl}^, although re- 
taining his status as a member of the staff of the former, through a 
representative at general headquarters. The work of the corps was 
separated broadly into that done in the Services of Supply and that 
in the Zone of the Armies. The former was accomplished through 
departments or divisions, and the latter through the corps, divisional 
or regimental signal officers. The headquarters of the chief signal 
officers were located first at Paris and then at Tours, moving to the 
latter place when the general headquarters were moved to Chaumont 
in March, 1918. 

Originally the Air Service was a function of the Signal Corps, 
but this service was made a separate corps early in the history of 
the American Expeditionary Forces, and was so recognized in 
General Orders, No. 8, July 5, 1917, the first general order dealing 
with organization in the Expeditionary Forces. 

The administration of the corps' affairs was distributed among 
nine divisions. These were Personnel, Telephone and Telegraph, 
Supply, Engineering, Photographic, Research and Inspection, 
Radio, Records, and Special Services. 

The Personnel Division had the functions usually charged to the 
personnel office of any corps. It handled, in addition to supply and 
distribution of personnel, much of its sjDecial training, and it also 
was responsible for matters relating to the supply of officers and 
men from the United States. 

The Telephone and Telegraph Division handled all wire commu- 
nication for the American Army. It was one of the first divisions 



86 ORGANIZATION" OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

of the Signal Corps' activities to begin functioning. What it accom- 
plished can be seen in the second paragraph of this chapter. (14) 

The Supply Division began to function coincidentally with the 
Telephone and Telegraph Division. It had to organize so that it 
could expand as the number of troops in the Expeditionary Forces 
increased, and after hostilities it contracted in the same ratio. Its 
first depot was at Nevers, but soon it became necessary to have larger 
establishments, and the depot at Gievres was the first one of the 
more extensive program. It had branches at the base ports and at 
all the base storage depots.** Its depot for supplying the Photo- 
graphic Section was opened at Paris in August, 1918, and after that 
all the supplies for that section were shipped there directly from the 
base ports. The division had to take care of purchases in Europe, 
as well as requisitions on the United States for material. 

The Engineering Division had charge of all Signal Corps con- 
struction in France. This duty carried its members to every sec- 
tion of the country, and over to England and into the occupation 
area after the armistice." 

The Photographic Di^dsion was just what its name implies. It 
had representatives with each division and units in the Services of 
Supply. It paralleled every activity of the Army, but was handi- 
capped seriously because of a lack of photographers with sufficient 
familiarity with military affairs. Often views of actions and of 
activities in the Services of Supply which would have been of inesti- 
mable value were missed, and many views, both still and motion, 
that were taken could have been left out and the material used to 
better advantage.^® 

The Research and Inspection Division grew out of the necessity 
for laboratories for the development of ideas at the battle front, and 
for the study of ideas to meet new needs in signaling as demonstrated 
by modern warfare. The inspection feature was the result of the 
necessity for testing signal apparatus arriving from the United 
States and from European factories, it having been found that fac- 
tory inspection was not a safe guide because of the hard usage scien- 
tific instruments often had in transit. (14) 

Their names best describe the functions of the Radio and the Rec- 
ords Divisions. The Special Service Division looked after the work 
of such services as were not taken care of by the divisions already 
mentioned. The Pigeon Service, Meteorology, Codes and Ciphers, 
and Visual Signaling were its most important branches. The divi- 
sion was created purely for organization purposes. 

** Volume I, page 67, History of Signal Corps, American Expeditionary Forces ; on file 
Historical Branch, General Staff. 

^ Volume I, pages 16 and 19. History of Signal Corps, American Expeditionary Forces : 
on file Historical Branch, General Staff. 



ORGANIZATION" OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 



87 



PERSONNEL. 

Suitable personnel was hard to get and, moreover,*" had to be 
specially trained in signal work after it had been acquired. In the 
rank and file of the National Guard, Signal Corps, there was a grati- 
fying percentage of very fine types of young manhood, but there was 
a lack of organic strength and a disconcerting range in efficiency. 
Steps had been taken to organize the Signal Corps Reserve with the 
active cooperation of the officials of telephone, telegraph, and electric 
companies. These officials had helped in enrolling the men of their 
companies, and had even specified those of more advanced positions 
capable of becoming officers. From this source the most desirable 
recruits were had. 

Organization chart, Signal Corps, A. E. F. 



CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER. 



Executive Officer. 



Assistant Executive Officer. 



Personnel 
Division. 



Director of 
Supply 
Service. 



Photo- 
graphic Di- 
vision. 



Radio 
Division. 



Records 
Division. 



Director 
Telephone 

and 
Telegraph 

Services. 



Engineer 
Division. 



Research 

and 
Inspection 
Division. 



Special 

Service 

Division. 



Because of the nature of the work, the Signal Corps had been dis- 
tributed over vast territory in more or less small detachments en- 
gaged on telegraph, telephone, and kindred lines of work, including 
wireless and cable operation and maintaining communication be- 
tween temporary field forces. When the Regular Army was ex- 
panded to full strength to meet war needs the National Guard units 
were also placed on a war footing. With the Signal Corps Reserve, 
these formed the nuclei for Signal Corps units of the Expeditionary 
Forces. Chambers of commerce, brokers' offices, public utilities com- 



8« Summary S. C. activities during period of preparation in United States ; on file in the 
Historical Branch, General Staff. 



88 0RGA3'IZATI02T OF THE SEEVICES OF SUPPLY. 

panies. and like concerns kept the needs of the corps to the fore and 
aided materiallv in recruiting. Skilled men mustered into other 
arms of the service were transferred and the balance were obtained 
through the selective draft. 

A course of standard instruction prepared by the chief signal 
officer was issued to signal units, through the general staff, in the 
form of training circulars. Divisional signal officers supervised the 
schools and field exercises of the field signal battalions. Practically 
all the Signal Corps officers were commissioned directly from civil 
life." Men from telephone and telegraph companies found their 
way naturally iuto Signal Corps units and were valuable men. But 
other young men were needed, and it was necessary to instruct these 
in the elementary principles of electricity and their application to 
modern means of rapid communication. For this work facilities were 
provided at several colleges in the United States, and the work was 
continued after the units arrived in France. 

aiATEKLlL. 

Signal Corps material came from the United States on requisi- 
tion and from the markets of Europe. In many cases it was neces- 
sary to install special machinery in French shops to turn out new 
instruments that were made especially to meet peculiar needs that 
had developed at the front. The call upon the American market 
made lUecessary the expansion on broad lines of many of the factories 
in the United States, and the conversion of other plants into estab- 
lishments for the manufacture of signal supplies for the Army. 
From the standpoint of production the following broad classifica- 
tion ^- of Signal Corps material may be made : (14) 
1) Telephone and telegraph apparatus. 

[2) Eadio apparatus. 

[3) Line construction material. 

[4) Electrical supplies. 

[5) Wire and cable. 
f6) Wire reels and carts. 

') Photographic supplies. 
[S) Tool chests and kits, mechanical signals, meteorological 

apparatus and pigeons. 
(9) Field glasses, wrist watches, etc. 

(10) Signal equipment common to all branches of the service, 

such as pyrotechnics, flags, smoke signals, cloth panels, 
and panel lights. 

(11) Xew devices growing out of the present war. 

•'Monograph on S. C. in file of Historical Branch, General Staff. 

■Appendices to Vol. I, History of Signal Corps In American Expeditionary Forces, on 
file BUstorical Branch, General Staff. 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 89 

The principal Signal Corps facilities were located as follows: 

Supply depots : Army parks : 

Gievres (Loir-et-Cher). Toul (Meurthe-et-Moselle). 

Is-sur-Tille (Cote-d'Or). Lieusaint (Seine-et-Marne). 

Montierchaume (Indre). Parois (Meuse). 

Montoir (Loire-Inferieure). 
St. Sulpice (Gii'onde). 
Paris (Seine). 
Orly Field (Seine). 

XVI.— TRANSPORTATION CORPS, AMERICAN EXPEDI- 
TIONARY FORCES. 

This corps landed troops and supplies at 31 ports on the Atlantic 
and Mediterranean coasts of France and carried them to the front 
or to points in the interior, over 5,831 miles of railway, with an aver- 
age haul of 580 miles. The facts about it between June 1, 1917, and 
June 1, 1919, are : 

Authorized strength, 6,000 officers and 200',000 enlisted men to 

take care of an army of 4,000,000. 
Maximum strength, 1,935 officers, 58,353 enlisted men, January 

1, 1919. 
Strength at armistice, 1,810 officers and 46,976 enlisted men. 
Cargo landed, 9,577,945 tons. 
Animals landed, 64,918. 
Troops debarked, 1,967,267. 
Troops embarked, 1,275,251. 
Locomotives erected, 1,610. 
Cars erected, 18,664. 
French cars repaired, 57,533. 
French locomotives repaired, 1,947. 

Shops built and equipped, car erecting shops at La Rochelle. 
locomotive erecting shops at St. Nazaire, and car and loco- 
motive repair shops at Nevers. 
Railroads made use of, Paris-Orleans, Etat, Est, Midi, Nord, 
and the Paris-Lyon-Mediterranean. 

CONDITION OF FRENCH RAILROADS IN 1917. 

The railroad situation in France was first studied by a commission 
sent over by the Secretary of War in May, 1917. It found that the 
French had to tear up a great deal of second track from double-track 
lines in order to get the necessary rails, and that the railroad systems 
were 1,200 locomotives short of normal because none had been bought 
to replace those seized or destroyed by the enemy and none of the 
bad order locomotives had been repaired. The shortage of freight 
cars was even greater in proportion. The French, therefore, had 



90 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 
Organization chart, Transportation Corps, A. E. F. 



DIRECTOR GENERAL OF TRANSPORTATION 



Deputy D. G. T., 
French Ministry. 



Business Manager. 



Adjutant. 



Deputy D. G. T., 
Zone of Advance. 



Deputy D. G. T., 

s. o. s. 



Railroad Operation. 



Deputy Director General, General Affairs. 



Deputy D. G. T., 
Britisli Ministry. 



Supt. Army Trans- 
port Serv. 



Port Operation. 



Director of Military Affairs. 



Engineer of Con- 
struction. 



Hist. OIT. 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 91 

been compelled to call on the British to furnish additional rolling 
stock and assume a greater share of British transportation in North- 
ern France. It was seen that similar demands would have to be 
made on the Americans. (2) (4) 

At the beginning transportation was a function of the Corps of 
Engineers and was under the chief Engineer officer of the Expedition- 
ary Forces. The service had to be organized in this way tentatively 
to meet immediate conditions. A permanent and satisfactory organi- 
zation was not authorized until June 25, 1918, and not finally ^" 
accomplished until November 12, 1918. The location of the ports 
immediately available for the American Forces fixed the lines of 
communication and determined the transportation problem and, in 
the final analysis, affected to a great degree the selection of the field 
of American operation. 

UNDER THE COMMANDING GENERAL, LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS. 

In the absence of any organization, transportation was put in 
charge of the chief Engineer officer, and was first known as the 
" Transportation Department " by General Orders, No. 8, Headquar- 
ters, Expeditionary Forces, July 5, 1917. This arrangement was 
only intended to hold while the commanding general. Expeditionary 
Forces, and his staff were making a study of the general problem 
of supply. The Line of Communications became an established fact 
by General Orders, No. 20, general headquarters, August 13, 1917, 
whereby transportation was made a Department of Military Kail- 
ways with a director who was a staff officer of the commanding gen- 
eral. Line of Cummunications. The Department of Military Rail- 
ways was charged with the operation, maintenance, and construc- 
tion of such railways as might be turned over by the French and 
the supervision of all movements of American troops and supplies 
over lines operated by the French. Construction was retained tem- 
porarily by the Engineers, until such time as enough transportation 
construction troops had arrived overseas to take care of the work. 
This arrangement was never changed and the Engineers always 
constructed transportation facilities, although transportation offi- 
cials designed them. 
TECHNICAL SERVICE OF GENERAL HEADQUARTERS. 

Further study led the commanding general, Expeditionary Forces, 
to the conclusion that " rail transportation should be organized as a 
separate department of army field headquarters and coordinate with 
existing administrative and supply departments, since it occupies 
in this war a function apart from the Quartermaster and Engineer 

«3 Chapter III, History of Transportation Corps, American Expeditionary Forces, con- 
taining General Orders, No. 52, Services of Supply, 1918, and General Orders, No. 35, 
Transportation Department, on file Historical Branch, General Staff. 



92 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

Corps." °* Acting on this conclusion, the commanding general ap- 
pointed a director general of transportation by General Orders, No, 
37, general headquarters, September 14, 1917, wherein the "Trans- 
portation Service" was created as a technical service of general 
headquarters. 
PART OF THE SERVICE OF UTILITIES. 

Soon the burden on general headquarters became so heavy that it 
was determined to create a general supply service. This was done in 
General Orders, No, 31, general headquarters, February 16, 1918, 
wherein the Transportation Service was made a part of the Service of 
the Rear, the first name for the Services of Supply. A few weeks 
later it was thought best, however, to coordinate the rail and motor 
transportation services and construction, and General Orders, No. 31, 
corrected, were issued March 12, 1918, whereby the name " Service of 
the Rear " became " Services of Supply " and a Service of Utilities 
was created, the component parts of which were the Transportation 
Service, the Motor Transport Service, the Department of Light Rail- 
ways and Roads, and the Department of Construction and Forestry. 
The Army Transport Service had been made a department of the 
Transportation Service on December 8, 1917, the transfer being made 
by General Orders, No, 78, general headquarters. The Service of 
Utilities, however, was ended July 11, 1918, by General Orders, No. 
114, Headquarters, Services of Supply. By the redistribution of 
the services under this order the Department of Light Railways 
and Roads and the Department of Construction and Forestry were 
charged to the chief engineer, Expeditionary Forces, and the Trans- 
portation Service and the Motor Transport Service were made 
separate departments of the Services of Supply. The railroad and 
dock organization continued in this relation to the commanding 
general. Services of Suppl}^, even after the Transportation Corps 
was organized by General Orders, No. 52, Headquarters, Services of 
Supply, November 12, 1918. 

A glance at the railroad map of France will show that the princi- 
pal roads of France radiate from Paris like spokes from the hub of 
a wheel. With this condition, it is obvious that the bulk of traffic 
is always north and south and that Paris is the general receiving 
and distributing point for all of France, This peace-time situation 
was not adequate during the war, especiall}' after the Americans 
arrived. With the theater of American operations almost directly 
east of the ports the American Army was to use, it was necessary 
that supplies be carried over the most direct route and over the route 
least likely to interfere with the densest flow of railway traffic. This 

«* Cable 171, paragraph 12, commanding general, American Expeditionary Forces, to The 
Adjutant General, Sept. 21, 1917, on file Historical Branch, General Staff. 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 93 

was the east and west route through Tours, Nevers, and Dijon. The 
line of communications as set forth in General Orders, No. 20, 
general headquarters, 1917, took in a route covered mostly by the 
Paris-Orleans Eailroad and by a small part each of the Est and 
Paris-Lj'on-Mediterranean systems. This line took care of opera- 
tion from the South Atlantic ports, beginning at St. Nazaire. But 
early in November, 1917, it was seen that Brest would have to be 
used by the American Army, and it became eventually the principal 
troop port. This necessitated the use of the Etat railway from 
Brest to Tours by way of Le Mans. When Marseille w^« opened, 
after the submarine situation in the Mediterranean was under con- 
trol, the main line of the Paris-Lyon-Mediterranean Eailroad on 
the east side of the Rhone was put into use. 

The second line of communication used portions of the Est-Paris- 
Lyon-Mediterranean Railways, while the third and fourth lines of 
communication ran entirely over the Est system. 

INTERNAL ORGANIZATION. 

The internal organization of the Transportation Corps remained 
fairly constant at headquarters, but the general field organization 
was evolved only after many months of study and experiment. The 
director general of transportation was assisted by a deputy director 
general for general affairs, a deputy director general for the Services 
of Supply, a deputy director general for the Zone of the Advance, and 
deputy directors general with the British and French ministries, a 
business manager, an engineer of construction, a director of the 
Army Transport Service, and a director of military affairs. The 
deputy director general, Services of Supply, had charge of railroad 
operation within the Services of Supply; the deputy for the Zone 
of Advance had similar functions within that zone, and the deputies 
with the British and French ministries were the representatives of 
the director general with those two governments. The business 
manager had charge of requisitions, contracts, claims, accounts, and 
statistics. The engineer of construction designed all railroad and 
port facilities, and the director of the Army Transport Service had 
charge of X)ort operations, and the director of military affairs of 
personnel. 

The rail lines of communication were divided into grand divisions 
with a general superintendent at the head of each. Each of the 
principal ports was made a grand division and similar disposition 
was made of the inland water transport and the transportation serv- 
ice in England. (22) 

At first the transportation field organization was by regiments 
on the engineer regimental table. It was soon found, however, that 
an engineer regimental table would not furnish enough troops for a 



94 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY, 

grand division to operate with efficiency and it was decided that 
organization on the basis of an infantry regiment would meet the 
needs better. But before a reorganization on this basis had gone 
very far the transportation problem had grown so that a more fluid 
organization was thought necessary. In the first place the regiment 
would have to be scattered if made up of entirely one kind of trans- 
portation specialist, and if made up of all kinds needed, there would 
not be enough of any kind. The same thing would hold true of a 
battalion. Then, too, the needs were not the same in any two grand 
divisions because of relations with the French. Finally it became 
evident that the unit of organization for transportation purposes 
should be a company of 250 men with 6 officers, 1 of whom, a lieuten- 
ant, should be the military administrator. The number of troops 
needed to operate a grand division was reckoned in multiples of 250. 
(2) This plan of organization was put into effect November 12, 1918, 
by General Orders, No. 52, Headquarters, Services of Supply, and 
General Orders, No. 35, Transportation Corps, and may be considered 
as the result of our experience in France. 
PERSONNEL. 

The Transportation Corps had to train most of its enlisted per- 
sonnel and the greater portion of its junior officers. (2) Out of the 
draft it should have had all the stevedores, engineers, firemen, con- 
ductors, brakemen, yardmasters, and switchmen. Many of these 
men got away, however, to combatant units, and it was only possible 
to find enough of them in the Expeditionary Forces for five trans- 
portation battalions. The recruiting officers in the United States 
had to accept volunteers at the valuation placed on them by the rail- 
road officials of America and these railroad officials frequently classi- 
fied switchmen as yardmasters, firemen as engineers, and traffic men 
as railroad operators. The laborers supplied for the docks knew 
nothing about stevedoring and had to be trained. The Transporta- 
tion Corps made hundreds of railroad men and stevedores out of 
green material. All the time taken to train these men could have 
been used to much better advantage if the right kind of men had been 
selected through some S5^stem whereby their qualifications could have 
been checked adequately. The commissioned personnel in the junior 
grades was in as bad shape. Men were commissioned as stevedores 
who had no experience. Former Army noncommissioned officers 
were given the higher grades because they showed up better in camps 
before the troops went overseas than the technical officers did. The 
result was that when technical operations began the technical officers 
did not have sufficient rank to enforce their orders and no promotion 
was possible for many months. 



OKGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 95 

Another source from which commissioned and enlisted personnel 
was supplied for transportation was from reclassified men from the 
front or who had been disabled. Generally the former class failed 
just as badly in transportation and the latter class was equally un- 
able to work along the railroads or at the docks. 

Promotions served in the end to give the technical men the neces- 
sary rank, and time and teaching made the unskilled labor and un- 
skilled commissioned personnel fairly skillful. 

The higher transportation officials, both on the railroads and on 
the docks, were especially selected men and men of mark in their 
lines in civil life. These officers were efficient, and it was owing to 
this efficiency that the Transportation Corps was able to discharge 
its duties and deliver supplies promptly and in sufficient volume. 

MATERIAL. 

The first major projects for transportation were designed by en- 
gineer officers, but these were men who had been commissioned for 
railway work. They were recommissioned later in the Transporta- 
tion Corps. After the ports and lines of communication had been 
selected, the necessity became obvious for the construction of such 
facilities as the new docks at Bassens, near Bordeaux, much double 
tracking, storage yards, and the like. Two officers drew up what 
was known as Requisition No. 6. This was the initial order for 
transportation material. The requisition was so drawn that prac- 
tically everything that would be needed for transportation in France 
was listed, although the quantities were for initial work only. 
Everything from locomotives and freight cars to nails and screws, 
including all the necessary machinery for locomotive and car erection 
and repair, was mentioned. As the months went by it was found, 
generally, that it was only necessary to order in multiples of the 
items of Requisition No. 6. (12) 

Although transportation was a separate service in the Expedition- 
ary Forces, it was a function of the Corps of Engineers in America, 
and all material was ordered through the Chief of Engineers and 
shipped to France and distributed by the Engineer Supply Depot. 
This was logical because the service which did the designing naturally 
should do the ordering, while the distribution of the material should 
go to the service which was to use it in construction. 

FACILITIES. 

The facilities constructed for transportation were of the following 
general classes : 



Locomotive and car erection and 

repair shops. 
Inland waterway barge docks. 
Piers and lighterage wharves. 



Ammunition docks. 
Port equipment and facilities. 
Multiple tracking and cut-offs. 
Wj'e connections. 



96 



ORGANIZATION" OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 



Passing sidings. 

Forestry sidings. 

Hospital sidings. 

Camp spurs. 

Water facilities. 

Coal-storage yards. 

General shop and factory spurs. 

Many of these facilities were too numerous, too small, and too 
much a matter of routine to list here ; such as sidings, spurs, multiple 
tracking, etc. The major facilities, however, were: 



Troop foi'warding facilties. 
Gasoline station spurs. 
Artillery unloading spurs. 
Storage depots. 
Regulating stations. 
Engine terminals. 



(During 
in the 



Regulating stations: 

Is-sur-Tille (Cote-d'Or). 
Liffol-le-Grand ( Vosges ) . 
St. Dizier (Haute-Marne) 
Gi^vres ( Loir-et-Cher ) . 
the German offensive 
spring of 1918.) 
Railheads : 

Neuf chateau (Vosges). 
Epinal (Vosges). 
Toul (Meurthe-et-Moselle) 
Locomotive and car repair 

Nevers (Ni6vre). 
Locomotive erecting shops : 

Parc-de-Mean (St. Nazaire). 
Rennes (Ille-et-Vilaine). 
Car erecting shops, La Rochelle (Cha 
rente-Infgrieure) . 



shops, 



General storage depots: 

jNIontoir ( Loire-Inf erieure ) . 

GiSvres (Loir-et-Cher). 

St. Sulpice (Gironde). 

Montierchaume (Indre). 

Is-sur-Tille (Cote-d'Or). 
Ammunition storage depots : 

St. Loubes, near Bordeaux. 

Foecy (Cher) in the Intermediate 
Section. 

Issoudun (Indre). 

Jonchery (Haute-Marne) in the 
Advance Section. 

Donges, on the Loire River near 
Nantes. 
Engine terminals : 

Saumur (Maine-et-Loire). 

Perigueux (Dordogne). 

La March (Ni&vre). 

At each general storage depot. 

The ports at which Americans operated and the kind of freight 
handled were : 

Debarkation: Brest and Cherbourg, St. Nazaire. 

Heavy lifts and general cargo: St. Nazaire, Bassens, Nantes, 

La Pallice, Marseille, Bordeaux, Caen (Calvados), Honfleur 

(Calvados). 
General cargo: Le Havre, Rouen, Montoir, Pauillac, French 

Bassens, Cette (Herault). 
Explosives: St. Loubes, St. Pardon (Gironde), Donges. 
Coal: Rochefort, Baj^onne, Les Sables-d'Olonne (Vendee), 

La Rochelle, St. Malo (Ille-et-Vilaine), St. Brieuc (Cotes- 

du-Nord), Lorient, Granville, Marens (Charente-In- 

ferieure), Surrol (Gironde), and Tonnay-Charente (Cha- 

rente-Inf erieure) . 
Oil: Furt (Gironde) and Blaye (Gironde). 
Troop debarkation: Liverpool and Glasgow. 
Troop embarkation: Southampton. 
Coal: Cardiff, Barry, Penarth, Newport, Newcastle. 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 97 

General cargo: London, Swansea, and Portsmouth. 

Lumber : Hull and West Hartlepool, 

Potatoes : Belfast. 

General cargo, slightly : Leith, Blythe, Sunderland. 

The rolling stock used by the American Army was of the Ameri- 
can type for locomotives and both American and French type for 
cars. The corps received from America consolidation locomotives 
with a tractive effort of 36,000 pounds. They were shipped over 
knocked down and were erected at the St. Nazaire and Rennes shops. 
The American cars were shipped over the same way and were erected 
at the shops at La Rochelle. These cars were of 60,000 pounds 
capacity and included box cars, low and high side gondolas, and flat 
cars. In addition, as many French freight cars as could be spared 
were used by the American Forces. These cars were of the same 
classification but the range of their capacity was only from 10,000 
to 20,000 pounds. As the track facilities at the ports and other 
points along the lines of communication were improved to allow 
switching other than b}^ small turntables, as in the French practice, 
the use of French cars for other than shuttle service decreased until, 
at the time of the armistice, the greater part of freight of the Amer- 
ican Expeditionary Forces was being transported in American cars. 

The Transportation Corps did not operate the French railroads; 
it operated on them subject to French regulation. The reason for 
this was obvious. The French railroad traffic was a large part of 
the business of the roads and only French methods of operation, of 
which the Americans knew comparatively little, was necessary as 
long as French personnel was employed. The Americans ran their 
own trains, but under French regulation. Yard operation for Amer- 
icans was wholly and entirely American, however. Just before the 
armistice the French requested the Transportation Corps to take 
over the Paris-Orleans Railroad entirely and operate it both for the 
French and the Americans after American methods. Had the war 
continued this transfer of entire control of this railroad was to have 
been effected January 1, 1919. 
178841°— 20 7 



98 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 



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ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 101 

XVII.— RENTING, REQUISITIONS, AND CLAIMS SERVICE, 

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES. 

The Renting, Requisition and Claims Service in the American Ex- 
peditionary Forces provided the billeting, leased all lands and build- 
ings, and passed on all questions arising out of those functions. 

Maximum strength, 561 officers, 1,400 enlisted men, 45 field clerks, 
and 55 civilian'^;. 

Claims disposed of to March 15, 1919, 12,324. 

Rental of billets used, 42,000,000 francs. 

The service was organized on March 30, 1918, by General Orders, 
No. 50, general headquarters. It was made one of the Services of 
Supply and by this order its duties were : 

(a) To rent all lands and buildings required for all departments 
of the United States military forces in France other than those ob- 
tained as provided in paragraph I, section II, General Orders, No. 
29, 1918, general headquarters. 

(5) To requisition all lands and buildings for all departments of 
the United States military forces in France, possession of which can 
not be acquired on reasonable terms by amicable agreement. 

(c) To provide and supervise the billeting and quartering of the 
United States forces in France under General Orders. No. 18, general 
headquarters, 1918, and amendments thereto. 

(d) To investigate, assess, and settle claims arising out of the ex- 
ercise of the foregoing functions. 

(e) To investigate all claims for injuries to persons and damages 
to property resulting from the acts or omissions of members of the 
military forces in France. 

After April 18, 1918, the date on which the President of the United 
States signed the necessary enabling act, the claims department as- 
sessed and settled, in accordance with the law and practice of the 
country in question, all the claims " of inhabitants of France or any 
other European country not an enemy or ally of an enemy " for in- 
juries or damages by the military forces. 

The headquarters of the Renting, Requisitions, and Claims Service 
were at Tours and were under a director, who was responsible to 
the commanding general, Services of Supply. The director was also 
always judge advocate. Services of Supply, of the Expeditionary 
Forces, but the two services had no relation other than that the same 
officer was the head of each. The service, under the director, was in 
charge of three officials — the chief billeting officer, the chief renting 
and requisitions officer, and the chief claims officer. On the staff of 
every section commander was a section officer of the Rents, Requisi- 
tion, and Claims Service and under him were district rents, requisi- 
tion, and claims officers, zone majors, and town majors. Under 



102 



GRGAinZATIOX OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 




«0 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 103 

authority of General Orders, No. 78, general headquarters, 1918, the 
commanding general, Services of Supply, designated an officer for 
each tactical division as a division rent's, requisition, and claims 
officer. This officer could be sent to the division or could be such offi- 
cer of a division as the division commander might recommend. These 
officers were attached to the staff of the division commander, but they 
had the same jurisdiction as zone majors and were regarded as zone 
majors serving with troops. After the armistice, officers of the 
Rents, Requisition, and Claims Service were stationed in Belgium, 
Holland, and Luxemburg. 

For the proper administration of billeting areas there was assigned 
to each area a company of the Rents, Requisition, and Claims Serv- 
ice troops of the Army Service Corps, with a total personnel of 45. 
This personnel was composed of 5 commissioned officers, to be used 
as zone and town majors, 11 noncommissioned officers, 10 privates 
first class, and 19 privates. The noncommissioned officers were inter- 
preters, billet wardens, and clerks. The privates were billet wardens. 

The principal function of the billeting department was to pro- 
vide for and to supervise the billeting and quartering of American 
forces under the French law and to exercise the right to billet and 
quarter troops upon the inhabitants in France in the same manner 
as the French Army. The department organized all billeting areas. 
It first made a careful survey of the area, sent officers actually to 
secure the billets and billet troops upon their arrival, kept accounts 
of all billets occupied, prepared the billet distribution list, which 
it forwarded to the proper disbursing officers for settlement, and 
when the area was desired no longer, settled all claims. There 
were 127 areas at the disposal of the American forces in France, 
but 37 of these never were organized. The size of an area depended 
upon the kind of troops to occupy it. The area required for an 
infantry division was the largest and generally comprised about 30 
communes to accommodate 1,200 officers and 30,000 men. 

The renting and requisitions department was in charge of the 
acquisition of all American installations in France, and it endeavored 
to regulate the rental of properties acquired before the organization 
of the department. It drew up a form of lease that was acceptable 
to the French Government and French people and at the same time 
adequately protected the United States Government. 

The claims department was authorized under the act of Congress 
approved April 18, 1918. Claims growing out of the acquisition 
and occupation of leased properties were not payable under this act 
and consequently were not handled by the claims department, but 
by the renting and requisitions department. The claims department, 
however, adjusted all other claims for damages against the Ameri- 



104 ORGANIZATION OF THE SEimCES OF SUPPLY. 

can military forces except claims growing out of breach of contract. 
The claims adjusted by the department were divisible usually into 
the following classes : 

Damage to billets. 

Damage caused by fires and explosions. 

Claims arising out of wrongful taking of property. 

Claims for personal injury caused by negligence of American 
Expeditionary Forces personnel, of which by far the largest 
number were due to A. E. F. automobile accidents. 

Admiralty claims except such as arose on the high seas. 
By virtue of a decision of the Assistant Comptroller of the 
Treasury of the United States in France and an arrangement with 
the Navy officials, the claims department investigated and settled 
many claims against the Navy. A naval liaison officer was attached 
to the department. The decisions of the claims department were 
final, no machinery for appeals from such decisions having been 
provided. 

The personnel for the service came from many sources. The offi- 
cers assigned to the service were commissioned in the Army Service 
Corps, and the same corps also supplied the enlisted personnel. By 
far the greater number of commissioned officers were not assigned 
but attached, and these came from every branch of the Army. 
Among the officers were some of the best legal talent the Army pro- 
duced. These men had had wide experience in civil life both in the 
legal settlement and in the investigation of claims, in realty trans- 
actions, and in admiralty. The enlisted personnel, which came from 
the Army Service Corps, was picked with a view of selecting men 
with qualifications for the peculiar service they were to render. 
Often it was hard to get enough men who possessed these peculiar 
qualifications, and it was necessary to take men most nearly meeting 
them and then put the men so selected through a course of training. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY. 



105 



BIBLIOGRAPHY. 



GENERAL SOURCES. 

(1) " Report of Assistant Chief of StafE, G-3, G. H. Q., to C. G., A. E. F." On 
file Historical Branch, War Plans Division, General StafE. 

This report deals with operations in the A. E. F. 

(2) "History of Transportation Corps, A. E. F." On file Historical Branch, 
War Plans Division, General StafE. 

Detailed study of organization, personnel, railroad and port operation, and 
engineering activity, supported by copies of original documents from 
D. G. T. files. 

(3) "Report of C. G., S. O. S., to C. G., A. E. F., Tours, May 25, 1918." On 
file Historical Branch, War Plans Division, General StafE. 

Review of activities of S O. S., supported by special reports from chiefs 
of supply services. 

(4) "Report of Military Railway Commission to England and France." Sub- 
mitted June 13, 1917, to C. G., A. E. F. On file Historical Branch, War Plans 
Division, General Staff. 

Deals with rail conditions in France, the needs of the French railroads, the 
ports available for A. E. F., and the kind of equipment necessary. 

(5) " Report of Board on Ports appointed by C. G., A. E. F., en route to France." 
In files of G. H. Q., and copy on file Historical Branch, War Plans Division, 
General StafE. 

Report recommends the use of Atlantic ports of France, specifying those 
immediately available and the troops and equipment necessary. 

(6) "Memorandum from Maj. Gen. J. G. Harbord to C, G., A. E. F., May, 
1919." On file Historical Branch, War Plans Division, General Staff. 

Refers to conditions when C. G., A. E. F., and staff arrived in France in 
June, 1917. Specific reference deals with the railroad situation and 
the rail lines of communication then available. This memorandum was 
dictated personally by Gen. Harbord while he was C. G., S. O. S. 

(7) "Confidential cable No. 24 to W. D., July 2, 1917." On file Historical 
Branch, War Plans Division, General Staff. 

This cable embodies the decision of Gen. Pershing as to the front to be 
occupied by the A. E. F., the line of communications, and the available 
ports. 

(8) "History of G-1, S. O. S." On file Historical Branch, War Plans Divi- 
sion, General Staff. 

This is a history of the various activities by G-1, S. O. S., prepared by 
that section for the Historical Section, General Staff, S. O. S. 

(9) "History of G-2, S. O. S." On file Historical Branch, War Plans Divi- 
sion, General Staff. 

This is a history of the various activities by G-2, S. O. S., prepared by 
that section for the Historical Section, S. O. S. 

(10) "G-4, S. O. S., Files." On file Historical Branch, War Plans Division, 
General .Staff. 

107 



/ 



108 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

(11) "Report of American Member of the Militaiy Board of Allied Supply" 
to C. G.,' A. E. F., March 27, 1919. On file Historical Branch, War Plans 
Division, General Staff. 

Methods of dealing with shortage, in particular, supplies among the Allies. 

(12) "Memorandum by Col. W. J. Wilgus," formerly Deputy Director Gen- 
eral of Transportation, dated October 11, 1919. On file Historical Branch, 
War Plans Division, General StafE, 

Deals with practicability of ordering and requisitioning railroad material 
for use in foreign countries and makes observations on system of getting 
advanced railroad information. 
vl3) "History of Ordnance Department, A. E. F." On file Historical Branch, 
War Plans Division, General Staff. 

(14) "History of Signal Corps, A. E. F." On file Historical Branch, War 
Plans Division, General Staff. 

(15) "History of Corps of Engineers, A. E. F." On file Historical Branch, 
War Plans Division, General Staff. 

(16) "History of Army Service Corps." On file Historical Branch, War Plans 
Division, General Staff. 

(17) "Report of General Purchasing Agent, A. E. F." Written and submitted 
to C. G., A. E. F. On file Historical Branch, War Plans Division, General Staff. 

(IS) "Report of A. C. S., G^, G. H. Q., to C. G., A. E. F., June 1, 1919. On 
file Historical Branch, General Staff. 

(19) "History of Chemical Warfare Service, May, 1919." On file Historical 
Branch, War Plans Division, General Staff. 

Shows particularly the C. W. S. activities in the Army Zone and the plans 
of organization in the S. O. S. 

(20) "History of Motor Transport Corps." On file Historical Branch, War 
Plans Division, General Staff. 

Deals particularly with S. O. S. activities and general corps organization, 
personnel and materiel. 

(21) " Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing to the Secretary of War." Sept. 
1, 1919. 

(22) " Comparison of Operating Methods of American and French Railroads," 
by Lieut. Col. M. Andriot, of the French Army. On file Historical Branch, 
War Plans Division, General Staff. 

SPECIAL SOURCES. 

Army Service Corps. 

Cable 11S9, C. G., A. E. F., to A. G. In files of Historical Branch, War 
Plans Division, General Staff. Outlines qualifications for A. S. C. per- 
sonnel. 

Cable 1598, A. G., to C. G., A. E. F. In files of Historical Branch, War 
Plans Division, General Staff. Authority for the Army Service Corps. 

Cable 1426, C. G., A. E. F., to A. G. In files of Historical Branch, War 
Plans Division, General Staff. Suggests numerical strength of Corps. 
Chemical W\4LEi-Ar.E Service. 

Report of Board convened by par. 79, S. O. No. 141, S. O. S., May 21, 1919. 
to recommend S. O. S. organization and the relation of S. O. S. to G. 
H. Q. In files of Historical Branch, War Plans Division, General Staff. 
This board was commonly known as the "Booth Board." The appen- 
dices are reports from chiefs of services containing suggestions and de- 
scriptions called for by the Board. 
Chief Engineer, A. E. F. 

Engineer Section Booth Board Report. 



ORGANIZATION' OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 109 

Medical Coeps. 

Bureau of Statistics, G. S., data on file from Medical Corps reports. In files 
of Bureau, State, War, and Navy Building. 

Report Capt. E. O. Foster, M. C. In files of Historical Branch, War Plans 
Division, General Staff. This report is a history of the Medical Corps 
compiled on order of and approved by the Chief Surgeon, A. E. F. 

Letter of Chief Surgeon to C. G., A. E. F., August 11, 1917. In flies of 
Historical Branch, War Plans Division, General Staff, and Office of the 
Surgeon General. 

Cable 1037, C. G., A. E. F., to A. G., par. I. In files of Historical Branch, 
War Plans Division, General Staff. 

Booth Board Report, Medical Section. In files of Historical Branch, War 
Plans Division, General Staff, and in files of G. H. Q. 

Letter Chief Surgeon to C. G., A. E. F., May 17, 1918. In files of Historical 
Branch, War Plans Division, General Staff. 

" Some Achievements of the S. O. S.," compiled by Statistical Branch, Gen- 
eral Staff, S. O. S. In files of Historical Branch, War Plans Division, 
General Staff. 
Motor Transport Corps. 

Booth Board Report, M, T. C. Section. In files of Historical Branch, War 
Plans Division, General Staff. 
Quartermaster Corps. 

G. O. No. 8, G. H. Q., 1917. In files of Historical Branch, War Plans Divi- 
sion, General Staff. 
Signal Corps, A. E. F. 

Monograph on Signal Corps, by Lieut. Col. R. H. Fletcher, jr. In files of 
Historical Branch, War Plans Division, General Staff. 
Transportation Corps. 

G. O. No. 52, S. O. S., 1918, and G. O. No. 35, T. C, 1918. In files of His- 
torical Branch, War Plans Division, General Staff, 

There is a further source of information relating to the activities of the 
various services. This consists in the collection of histories of each geographi- 
cal section of the S. O. S., except Base Section No. 9. These histories were 
prepared by section historians, under the supervision of the section commanders, 
for the Historical Section, General Staff, S. O. S. They include a description 
of the section and the activities therein of the various services as well as 
nontechnical descriptions of the important projects. Section organization charts 
and maps are attached ; also photographs illustrating the subject matter. These 
histories are on file in the Historical Branch, War Plans Division, General Staff. 

The histories of the services, which consfttute an important source for this 
monograph, consist not only of accounts of the activities of the several services, 
but also have many original documents appended. These documents are so 
numerous that it has been found necessary to refer to the histories in general 
and not to specific documents. 

The Medical Department, A. E. F., prepared no history, but there is being 
prepared in the Office of the Surgeon General a complete medical history of 
the war. 

The Air Service is not referred to in this monograph, as it functioned 
directly under G. H. Q. (G. O. 81, G. H. Q., 1918). However, this service pre- 
pared a complete history of its activities in the A. E. F., which is now filed 
in the office of this service in the War Department. 

The activities of the Provost Marshal General are omitted, as this service was 
directly supervised by G. H. Q. 



APPENDICES. 



Ill 



Appendix A. 



EXTRACT FROM REPORT OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3, 
TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL, AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY 
FORCES. 

EVENTUAL AMERICAN SECTOR. 

Before the commander in chief left Washington certain features as to the 
part of the western battle front on which the American forces should be 
employed had been discussed. But no decision other than that our troops 
wei'e to be employed in closer relation to the French than to the British front 
had been reached. 

Naturally, the selection of the region in which the American Expeditionary 
Forces should be built up and operate, and the choice of lines of communica- 
tion as well, was largely dependent upon the plans as to the size of those forces 
and as to whether or not they should be developed under their own flag, A 
small force could be employed anywhere along the front, and no distinctly 
American zone was necessary if our troops were, as they arrived, to be turned 
over to our allies. The commander in chiefs original instructions had directed 
him to keep in view " That the forces of the United States are a separate and 
distinct component of the combined forces, the identity of which must be 
preserved." Before arriving in France the commander in chief had decided 
that a very large American force would be required, and his first observations 
after landing confirmed his view that all plans must be based upon the employ- 
ment of several million Americans in France. 

The primary considerations in the choice of the region in which we should 
operate were then that we should be able to develop and employ a force 
numbered by millions and that conditions should favor the retention of the 
Identity of our forces. 

Now, the course of the war, as fixed by the operations of 1914, had kept the 
masses of both sides in northern France and Belgium. Paris was all important 
to the French as were the channel ports to the British. It was manifest that 
our Allies must keep their masses in northern France and Belgium as long 
as the German chose to keep his masses in those regions. It was equally clear 
that the French must command the armies which covered the approaches to 
Paris and that the British must command the armies covering the channel 
ports. Both on account of the masses already there and because of the 
difficulties which it was evident must be encountered in preserving our identity, 
it appeared undesirable, therefore, to consider organizing and employing our 
forces in northern France. 

On the other hand, Lorraine was occupied by comparatively few troops. 
This had long been a quiet sector and was, therefore, favorable for under- 
taking the training and development of a new army. The French had proposed 
that our first troops go to Lorraine for training and it was desirable that we 
agree at once to that proposal. But it was not likely that the French had made 
their proposals in view of tlie employment of millions of Americans as a dis- 
tinctive American force. The commander in chief, therefore, at once (June 
21) sent staff oflicers to Lorraine and studied the suitability of this as a region 
178841°— 20 8 113 



114 OKGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

in which not only to develop but to employ a great American army in a de- 
cisive offensive. From this visit and these studies tlie commander in chief 
decided that Lorraine satisfied both conditions. So far as concerned tlie possi- 
bilities of an offensive in this region it is sufficient to point out that the 
Briey iron basin to the west of Metz, the coal regions to the east of Metz, the 
vital railway communications in the same regions, and the fortress itself were at 
least as important to the Germans as were Paris and the channel ports to the 
French and British. 

Such were the considerations on which the commander in chief decided, prior 
to July 1, to choose Lorraine for the development and employment of the 
American forces. 

But the studies undertaken led to the further conclusion that the first oper- 
ation to be undertaken by the first American Army to be formed should be the 
reduction of the Saint Mihiel salient. In the face of difficulties of all kinds 
this plan was ultimately realized. It is certain that the early decision upon 
the general region in which our troops were to operate, and, above all, the con- 
stant determination of the commander in chief to unite all American troops 
under their own flag, were indispensable factors in the realization of the allied 
victory. 

LINES OF COMMUNICATION. 

But while the considerations outlined in the preceding paragraph pointed to 
Lorraine as our eventual sector, the possibilities of supplying in that region 
forces of the size contemplated wei'e dependent upon the availability and suit- 
ability of ports, railroads, and other facilities. Thus the choice of the imme- 
diate theater of operations and that of lines of communication were inseparable. 
The necessary studies were, therefore, carried on concurrently, and these 
studies required the closest cooperation between the various sections of the 
commander in chiefs staff as well as with the French. 

So far as ports were concerned, the question was simple, since the only ports 
which could be developed to meet the necessities of an army of several millions 
were those of southwestern France — Brest, St. Nazaire, La Pallice, and 
Bordeaux. 

The choice of a region within which interior depots and other facilities 
could be located was more complicated. Existing rail facilities had to be 
considered. It was necessary to avoid crossing important supply lines used 
by our allies. Finally, while the region of interior depots must be primarily 
located \Aith a view to supplying our troops in Lorraine, our depots must 
allow considerable latitude in the location of our troops, since eventualities 
of battle might require changes in plans. The region around Tours, Bourges, 
and Nevers satisfied these conditions. In short all considerations pointed to 
the development and employment of our forces in Lorraine, the use of the 
ports of southwestern France, and the utilization of the rail lines leading 
from those ports through Tours, Bourges, Nevers toward Epinal and Toul. 
After having personally discussed the questions involved with Gen. Petain, 
the commander in chief cabled, on July 1, 1917, the basic plan for the em- 
ployment of our troops and that on which the Services of Supply developed. 

No material change was made in this plan, and when the armistice was 
signed the Services of Supply projects had materialized to meet the needs of 
nearly 2,000,000 men, while further expansions for an additional 2,000,000 
men were possible and were under way. 



OKGAinZATIOlSr OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 115- 

LOCATION OF TRAINING AREAS. 

The same studies which pointed to the reduction of the Saint Mihiel salient 
as the first operation to be undertaken by a purely American Army also 
pointed to the desirability of grouping our training areas around Chaumont. 
To secure this, the cooperation of the French was necessary, and conversa- 
tions were at once begun. Relations between headquarters, A. E. F., and both 
Gen. Foch's and Gen. Petain's headquarters were necessary. Gen. Foch, as 
chief of staff in the Ministry of War, controlled many matters in the Zone of 
the Interior. Gen. Petain, as commander in chief of the Armies of the North 
and Northeast, was supreme in the French Zone of the Armies. 

The ultimate result was the acquisition by the American Expeditionary 
Forces of the training areas * * *. With but few exceptions each of these 
areas were capable of accommodating a division. But these training areas 
were not suitable, on account of the number of villages, for extensive firing 
for field artillery, and this fact had been recognized by officers of the opera- 
tions section who visited the region In June, 1917. Consequently officers of 
the operations section undertook to secure suitable artillery ranges from the 
French, with the result that during June and July the camps of Le Valdahon, 
Coetquidan, Meucon, and Souge were placed at our disposal. Later additional 
camps were secured at La Courtine, Le Corneau, Clermont-Ferrand, Montmo- 
rillon and, for railroad artillery, at Mailly. 



Appendix B. 



American Espeditioxaey Forces, 
On Board Steamship Baltic, May SI, 1917. 
Trom : The Adjutant General. 
To: Col. D. E. McCarthy, Chief Quartermaster. 
Subject : Selection of base for American Expeditionary Forces. 

1. It is the intention on arrival in France to detail a board, of which you are 
to be the senior member, to consider the advantages and disadvantages of such 
ports as may be indicated at that time as possible bases for the American Ex- 
peditionary Forces. These should include the adequacy of the suggested ports 
in space for anchorage, depth of water, protection from sea and submarines, 
docking and disembarking facilities, mean ordinary tide, climate, switching and 
entraining facilities, railways, rolling stock, etc., auto roads, dust, rain and other 
violent storms, shelter for troops or space, if necessary to erect the same, 
space for remount accommodations, storehouses or go-downs or space to erect 
them, ice plant and cold storage facilities, etc., etc. ; in short the informa- 
tion necessary to enable the commanding general to reach a conclusion. 

2. As the information referred to- will be needed at the earliest moment 
practicable after a tentative port or ports are suggested, it is desired that 
your board meet informally on the Baltic, formulate its plan for making this 
study, and submit the same to the chief of staff. 

3. The other members of the board, to wliom copies of this letter have 
been furnished, are Col. Harry Taylor, Corps of Engineers ; Col. ]MeiTitte W. 
Ireland, Medical Corps; Maj. Hugh A, Drum, General Staff, and Capt. Hugh 
B. Moore, quartermaster, O. R. C. 

Adjutant General. 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL: 

HeADQUABTEBS, AilERICAN EXPEDITION-VBY FOBCES, 

Savoy Hotel, London, England, June S, 1917. 
Subject: Travel. 

1. The commanding general directs that the board to investigate the matter 
of a base, of which Col. D. E. McCarthy is the senior member, proceed not 
later than Sunday, June 10, 1917, to the following places in France: Saint 
Nazaire, La PaUice, Bordeaux and the Gironde ports, Nantes, Nevers, and 
Marseille, visiting Marseille as the last port. The travel to Xevers should be 
to inspect the possibilities for a depot 

2. Attention of Col. :McCarthy and his board should be invited to inclosed 
copies of telegrams, furnished by the American Military Mission in Paris, at- 
tention being particularly invited to Nos. 19 and 21. A telegraphic report, in 
cipher, of the recommendation of the board should be sent to the Adjutant 
General, American Expeditionary Forces, Paris, France, and may be sent before 
the port of Marseille is visited. 

3. Capt Gustav Porges, Quartermaster Corps, U. S. R., and John K. Manock, 
Quartermaster Corps, will accompany the board as interpreter and stenog- 
rapher, respectively. 

J. G. Habbobd, 
Lieut. Colonel, Cavalry, Chief of Staff. 
116 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 117 

REPORT OF BOARD ON PORTS. 

June 20, 1917. 
PROCEDURE OF THE BOARD: 

The board, consisting of Col. D. E. McCarthy, Col. Harry Taylor, Eng., Col. 
Merritte W. Ireland, M. C, Maj. H. A. Drum, G. S., convened informally oa 
board the steamship Baltic and studied the project of bases preliminary to ar- 
rival in France. The board left Loudon on June 10 and arrived at Paris- 
June 11. After consultation with the American Mission and French officials,, 
the board, accompanied by two French officers, visited the following Frenclii 
ports in the order named : Nantes, St. Nazaire, La Pallice, Bordeaux, Basseasv 
Pauillac, and Verdun. Every courtesy was shown the board. The results of 
the board's investigations are given below. 

FRENCH PLAN FOR HANDLING TROOPS AND SUPPLIES OF THE AMERICAN FORCES. 

Succinctly the French plan for handling troops and supplies of the American 
forces is as follows : 

1. The ports of the western coast of France are to be grouped into two 
zones. From each port zone a main line of railroad runs to the east, enter- 
ing the zone of the armies in the vicinity of where the American forces are 
to be trained. The scheme contemplates the landing of troops and supplies 
in these two port zones and immediately reshipping them either to depots 
located in the interior of France or directly to the training areas of the 
American forces. In other words, the ports are not to be used as bases, but 
as reshipping points. 

2. The northern zone of ports includes the main port of Saint Nazaire and 
Nantes, located on the Loire River, and the naval port of Brest. Brest is to 
be used if necessary. The railroad line of communications for this port zone 
runs through Saint Nazaire-Nantes-Tours-Orleans-Troye, with a line con- 
necting from- Tours to Nevers via Bourges. 

3. The southern zone of ports included the ports on the Gironde River, which 
are especially the ports of Bassens and Pauillac. The port La Pallice is to be 
used as an annex to the ports of the Gironde. The railroad line of com- 
munications for this port zone, except for La Pallice, runs through Bordeaux— 
Limoges-Bourges-Nevers-Dijon. Due to railroad condition, the line of Lo" 
PaUice is given as joining the Saint Nazaire-Tours line at Saumur. 

4. The French contemplate turning over gradually and as needed to th& 
American forces the magazine (depot) at Nevers. This depot, it is claimed,, 
handles broad and all supplies for 200,000 men. The two railroad lines men>- 
tioned above reach Nevers. In order to provide for large forces, the French 
expect us to start at once the construction of several other depots on the two 
main lines. The location of these depots has not been definitely settled to 
date. The French plan also contemplates the landing of our troops anc8 
supplies in the following ratio at the various ports mentioned above r Two- 
fifths to be handled by the ports on the Gironde River, one-flfth at La Pal- 
lice, and two-fifths in the ports of the Loire River. 

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS. 

1. Labor. — At every port that the board visited it was impressed by tile- 
great scarcity and poor quality of the labor used in discharging vessels. Due- 
to the scarcity of labor and the prevailing practice of piecework payment, the 
cost of discharging cargoes is extremely high. But the scarcity of labor is of 
even greater importance than its high cost, as all available labor is now occu- 
pied in commercial work and none could be diverted to work of discharging: 



118 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

our vessels without seriously crippling the present commercial facilities. Every- 
where the board was met by statements from the local authorities that addi- 
tional labor was of the greatest importance and that labor for doing all of our 
construction work and work of operation should be given first consideration. 
In addition to the foregoing the commercial labor that we would have to use 
would not be subject to the necessary control in discharging ships, either in 
the conduct of the work or the efficiency and time in w'hich the work was done, 
as they will not work overtime or nights except as it may suit their pleasure. 
The board is of the opinion that the labor question should receive immediate 
consideration and is of immediate importance, and also that the only solution 
is the supply of labor regularly enlisted in the military forces of the United 
States. The board feels that this question should be taken up at once and 
definitely settled. 

In connection with the question of scarcity of labor it became apparent to the 
aboard that the American forces in France would have to provide the necessary 
man-power to cut and deliver the timber for use not only in connection with the 
<docks, but also for fuel. It is, therefore, recommended that any plan of hring- 
m^ laborers to France from the United States should include foresters. 

The scarcity of labor for handling merchandise at all of the ports is re- 
ferred to above. The remarks which are there made relative to the scarcity 
of labor for handling all classes of material apply equally to all classes of 
construction work. The only materials we can expect to find on the French 
markets would be cement, sand, stone, and timber. The French officials were 
very emphatic in their statements that we could not expect any reinforced 
iron structural beams or shapes, nor any skilled men or laborers for its erec- 
tion. It became very evident that a large number of skilled workmen would 
be required for the dock construction and other forms of construction which 
must be undertaken in the establishment of the bases and ports. It is, there- 
fore, recommended that the orfjanization of a regiment of skilled lahorers, in- 
cludiny bridge carpenters, masonry icorkers, plumbers, steam fitters, etc., be 
taken under consideration icithout delay. 

2. Lumber. — The board learns that there is a large supply of lumber avail- 
able in the forests between Bordeaux and the Spanish border that will be 
available for dock construction and other construction purposes. The most 
advantageous manner of obtaining timber from the standing trees would be 
by having a portable sawmill which could be installed near where the trees 
are felled. Whether one mill will be sufficient to produce the amount of lum- 
ber which will be required or not tlie board is unable to say. It believes 
that one complete portable sawmill should be shipped as early as practicable 
and that the fxiture needs should be investigated by some competent man with 
as little delay as possible in order that such additional machinery as might be 
required for future needs could be ordered without unnecessary delay. 

3. Refrigerating plants. — The board found practically no facilities in the 
way of ice plants or cold-storage plants at any of the ports investigated. The 
.hoard believes that these are necessary for the supply of American forces in 
France and that steps should be taken tmthout delay to have all of the material 
except lumber, necessary for the construction of these plants, brought from 
the United States. The labor required for the construction of these i)lants 
should be American, specially skilled in this kind of work. 

4. Slaughtering of animals. — The board finds that the French in supplying 
beef to their troops follow the system of driving cattle on the hoof and slaugh- 



ORGANIZATIOISr OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 119 

tei-ing them near the issue points in the zones of the army. Whether this system 
or the one of supplying cold-storage beef is followed by the American forces, 
men trained as butchers will be needed. Steps should be taken to have men 
skilled in this work attached not only to each division, hut also to the line of 
communication and its various bases. 

5. Wells. — In investigating the water supply at the various ports the board 
found that in only one case did this supply come from artesian v,ells. In the 
other cases the water supply came from surface wells. Conversations wUh the 
inhabitants and French engineers lead the board to believe that artesian wells 
are practicable in a number of localities along the coast line. It is recom- 
mended that the question of bringing from the United States a crew of skilled 
well diggers with the necessary tools and machinery be considered. 

6. Bases. — The board has considered the system of establishing our bases in 
the interior in accordance with the French plan instead of along the coast line, 
as contemplated by our field service regulations. In view of the congestion 
existing at the various ports and also of the evident prevalence of venereal 
disease at these ports, the board believes that concentration camps for troops 
and bases for supplies should be established in the interior of France, in the 
general zone to be controlled by the American forces. This will result in the 
use of the ports as reshipping points. 

7. Railroad control. — The question has come to the board as to the system 
to be followed in connection with the management and operation of railroad 
lines running from the reshipping ports to our bases and concentration points. 
The French advocate the system of their retaining control of these lines, using 
their own personnel for the operation thereof. In other words, they desire to 
be considered as the railroad company which transports the American troops 
and their supplies. The board has considered this point in connection with 
the other phase of the situation ; that is, our complete control of the railroads 
needed for the supplies, etc., of our troops. The board has come to the con- 
clusion that the most efficient supply of the American forces in France will 
be secured by the control and operation of the railroad lines running from 
reshipping ports to our bases and our zone of operations. However, the board 
realizes that for the present it is undesirable and unnecessary for the Ameri- 
can military forces to take over the railroads. Nevertheless, the board believes 
that ultimately this will have to be done. The board therefore recommends 
that in the initial agreement made to-ith the French Government provision be 
included for our control at any time when the situation develops the neces- 
sity therefor of the railroad lines and communications used to supply the 
American forces. The board feels that the accomplishment of such an under- 
standing in the initial agreement will avoid serious difficulties in the future. 

8. Ports. — The French plan contemplates the American use of the following 
ports : 

With berthage of — 

Nantes 4 ships.' 

St. Nazaire 5 ships. 

La Pallice 3 ships. 

Bordeaux 3 ships.* 

Bassens 6 ships. 

Pauillac 2 ships." 

1 These ports looked upon as emergency ports only, on account of shallow water and 
poor dockage and railway facilities. 



120 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

The board's conclusions as to the port facilities which should be turned over 
to the American forces were as follows : 
For permanent use : Berthage. 

St. Nazaire 3 ships. 

La Pallice 6 ships. 

Bassens 10 ships. 

For emergency use: 

Nantes 4 ships. 

Bordeaux 3 ships. 

Pauillac 2 ships. 

The board further recommends that steps be taken ivithout delay for the 
construction of the necessary additional wharves, storage buildings, etc., at the 
folloui/ng ports on the basis indicated: 

At Saint Nazaire for the disembarkation and forwarding of supplies and ani- 
mals, a maximum of 150,000 men and 30,000 animals, w-ith a rest camp for 
15,000 men and 2,500 animals. 

At La Pallice for the disembarkation and forwarding of supplies and animals, 
a maximum of 350,000 men and 100,000 animals, with a rest camp for 15,000 
men and 2,500 animals. 

At Bassens for the disembarkation and forwarding of supplies and animals, 
a maximum of 500,000 men and 200,000 animals, with a rest camp for 25,000 
men and 10,000 animals. 

9. Control of ports. — The board recommends that the American forces have 
absolute control of all camps, barracks, stables, and other features connected 
with rest camps at the ports; also the docks, storehouses, railroad tracks, 
cranes, and other features pertaining to unloading ships at each port mentioned 
above; that in all other matters relating to the ports the American official at 
these ports confer icith the designated French official in charge. It is under- 
stood that the French contemplate placing at each one of the ports a French 
staff officer for the above purpose. 

10. American commander for service of rear. — The board recommends that 
steps be taken tvithout delay to secure from the United States a general officer 
of the line of the Regular Army for the duty of commanding the service of the 
rear of the American forces. This officer should be sent to France without 
delay and be supplied with an efficient staff. All questions relating to the 
service of the rear should be turned over to this officer for settlement under 
such general instructions as the commanding general may see fit. In order to 
secure cooperation and coordination and to free the general headquarters 
of the American Expeditionary Forces of the many minor but important details 
of the service of the rear, the board believes that the above action is necessary 
and should be taken without delay. 

(Signed) D. E. McCarthy. 

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS. 

1. The French plan of establishing concentration camps (instruction camps) 
and bases of supplies in the interior, and utilizing the ports as reshipping points, 
be accepted. 

2. The initial agreement with the French Government relating to railroad 
facilities includes a provision which will insure American control of railway 
lines of communication whenever the situation makes such control necessary for 
the successful supply and operation of the American Army in France. 

3. The French Government turn over gradually to the American forces for 
exclusive use the following port facilities: 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 121 

For permanent use: At St. Nazaire, berthage for 3 ships; at La Pallice, 
berthage for 6 ships ; at Bassens, the present dock facilities and sufficient river 
front to extend these facilities for berthage of 10 ships. 

For emergency use : At Nantes, berthage for 4 ships ; at Bordeaux, berthage 
for 3 ships ; at Pauillac, berthage for 2 ships. 

4. Steps be taken for the construction of wharves, storehouses, camps, etc., 
for the reshipping and transit accommodations indicated at the following points : 
At St. Nazaire, 150,000 men and 50,000 animals; at La Pallice, 350,000 men 
and 100,000 animals ; at Bassens, 500,000 men and 200,000 animals. 

5. American forces have absolute control at ports of all camp arrangements 
and facilities and all dockage and warehouse facilities connected with the 
berths assigned the American ships; all other features of port control to be 
arranged through French military staff officers. 

6. A general officer of the line of the American Army, with a sufficient staff, 
be sent to France without delay and detailed as commander for the service 
of the rear. 

7. A definite understanding be had with the French Government at the present 
time relative to reimbursement for use of docks, wharves, railroads, etc. 

8. Americans enlisted in the military forces of the United States be brought 
to France for the following purposes : Dock laborers, foresters for construction 
work, including bridge carpenters, masonry workers, plumbers, etc. 

9. Personnel and material be sent to France without delay for the following 
purposes : Collecting and sawing of timber in the French forests ; for construc- 
tion and operation of refrigerating plants; for the operation of slaughter- 
houses ; and for the driving and operation of artesian wells. 

10. There be accepted from the French Government, or the American Govern- 
ment immediately start the construction of, bases in the interior of France 
sufficient to provide ultimately for the maximum American force to be sent 
to France. 



Colonel, Quartermaster Corps, President. 



Appendix C. 



EXTRACT FROM MEMORANDUM DICTATED AT TOURS, FRANCE, 
DURING MAY, 1919, BY MAJ. GEN. J. G. HARBORD, COMMANDING 
GENERAL, SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 

The Field Service Regulations of the United States Army prior to the war 
contained an outline of a supply service through a line of communications. It 
contemplated a commanding general and a staff for that command, with an 
assistant chief of staff competent to give orders in the name of the command- 
ing general in the several subsections of the line of communications. The 
conditions which confronted the American Expeditionary Forces on arrival in 
Europe were without precedent in our history. The distance of 3,000 miles 
from our own shores, the growing submarine menace, the unknown factor of 
the amount of tonnage that would be available, and the uncertainty as to the 
part of France in which we would operate, complicated our supply situation as 
compared to any other in our history. The channel ports and the railroads of 
northern France were congested by British and French traffic. The Mediter- 
ranean ports were 900 miles farther from our shores than the other ports of 
France, and submarine activity was greater and under less control in the 
Mediterranean than in the open Atlantic. This limited our selection to the 
Atlantic ports south of Brest, which port itself was uusuited for the discharge 
of supplies and at that time was reserved for naval uses. It became evident, 
however, early in 1918, that the French Atlantic ports would not suffice for our 
needs, and arrangements were made for the use of Mediterranean ports in spite 
of the longer distance and the submarine menace. From the ports of western 
France there were available railroad lines to the northeast, including the double 
track lines from Bordeaux and Saint Nazaire forming a junction near Bourges, 
thence running east and north beyond Dijon, with radiations toward Epinal 
and Nancy. It was estimated that these lines, assisted by collateral lines 
which were available, could handle a traffic for American uses of 50,000 tons per 
day. These considerations, with the probability that pressure from the 
French would dictate the employment of oi:r forces well toward the east, led 
to the selection of the ports of Saint Nazaire, La Pallice, and Bassens for 
permanent use, with Nantes, Bordeaux, and Pauillac for emergency use. Several 
smaller ports, such as Saint Malo, Sables d'Olonne, and Bayonne, were used 
chiefly for the importation of coal, and from time to time certain ships were 
sent to Cherbourg and Le Havre. Brest later became a great passenger port. 

The probability that our forces would be employed well toward the eastern 
end of the western front indicated a line of communications from the 
Atlantic to our front of perhaps an average length of 500 miles. The forces on 
the western front were still very evenly balanced. The probability of an 
offensive from any one of several directions had to be considered. Manifestly, 
with an aggressive enemy of equal strength, it would be unwise to crowd all 
our supplies immediately behind the front, even if transportation facilities per- 
mitted it. The probability of interruption by storm, congestion by develop- 
ment of new theaters, air attacks, etc., made it imprudent to divide the storage 
between that at the seaboard and that immediately behind the forces, and to 
limit the advance storage to merely the necessities of the time with the main 
storage at the bases. This led to the division of our supplies into base, inter- 
mediate, and advance storage. This system of distribution, with half the 
122 



ORGANIZATIOISr OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 123 

storage at the base, would give us our supplies echeloned in depth and ready to 
be shipped with equal facility to various portions of the allied front, eliminat- 
ing back and cross railroad hauls. 

The state of the submarine warfare in June, 1917, was by no means en- 
couraging. The Navy was hopeful but not to the point of confidence, and 
the enemy was building submarines faster than they were being destroyed. 
The resources of Europe in allied and neutral countries were unknown to us. 
Our allies were by no means sanguine as to our ability to transport, land, and 
supply a considerable army at a distance of 3,000 miles sea travel from our 
own country. The study by the French general staff placed the extreme limit 
of tonnage which we could ever hope to land in France at 30,000 tons per day. 
All these things considered by the General Staff led to the adoption of a reserve 
of 90 days' supplies for the American Expeditionary Forces, this for a force 
contemplated at that time as a maximum of 2,000,000 men. The same con- 
sideration determined a division of the storage into one-half at the base, one- 
third in the intermediate, and one-sixth in the advance. The immediate loca- 
tion of the intermediate and advance storage depended on the courtesy of the 
French. Their whole country was more or less given over to installations for 
their own armies. The great majority of all available institutions were in use 
by the French or British, and the facilities which adequately served the popu- 
lation in time of peace were totally inadequate to the added strain imposed 
by our Army from two to four million men. For these reasons it was neces- 
sary for us to construct entirely or to very greatly enlarge installations that 
were contemplated for the supply of our Army. Certain railroad lines were not 
available to us. Certain lines running parallel to the front must not be crossed 
by more than a certain number of trains each 24 hours because iieeded for 
the rapid movement of troops from flank to flank. The question of streams 
affording water for installations ; the existence of power already developed for 
such installations as would require machinery; quantity of land available; 
topography suitable for the rapid erection of large storehouses and attendant 
tracks ; and the amount of labor, particularly female labor for such installa- 
tions as those for salvage ; were considerations that weighed in the determina- 
tion of the location of the intermediate storage. One-third of the storage 
facilities were provided at Gi&vres and Montierchaume, the location of which 
points would admirably serve as a second line of supply for almost any part 
of the western front, and from there supplies could move east or north, de- 
pending upon the location of our armies. It was very evident to all that the 
initiative during the first half of 1918 would rest with the enemy and that we 
would have to place our forces to meet his attack ; and this central location 
of the intermediate depots would admii'ably serve any part of the western 
front, a condition which was not true of any advance depot which we could 
locate. The location of Gievres was such that when Paris was seriously 
threatened in July, 1918, this depot was able to supply direct the American 
divisions operating before Paris. Advance depots were planned in the advance 
section north of Dijon and in the neighborhood of Chaumont to serve what 
seemed as our most probable sector of activity. These depots directly served 
our Army when we were forced by the enemy to operate in the part of the 
line northeast of Paris. 

In August, 1918, the diminution of the submarine menace and other condi- 
tions justified a reduction of the reserve to be carried from 90 to 45 days, 
distributed in the same proportion. The size of the force which we were then 
estimating upon had increased from two million to four million and the same 
depots which served the smaller army for 90 days would suffice for the larger 
army for 4.5 days. 



Appendix D. 



FULL COPY OF CABLEGRAM RECEIVED FROM PERSHING, JULY 2, 

1917. 

2 CO. Pakis. 
The Adjutant General, Washington: 

Number 24. Confidential, Question of handling American Army and its 
cooperation with French Army, including points of debarkation, use of railroad 
lines, location of depots of hospitals, and zone(s) of operation has been fully 
discussed with Gen. Petain, Plan proposed well considered and finally agreed 
upon subject to such alterations as military situation may demand. Only 
available ports as yet already reported are those on Loire and Gironde Rivers 
and La Pallice, Rochelle, all of which are also commercial ports. Main railroad 
lines leading northeasterly pass through districts favorable for location supply 
depots embraced by Orleans, Bourges, and Montargis and Nevers. The general 
area for training is included by Neufchateau, Nancy, Espinao. Method of 
training contemplates division of French troops camped near division of 
American troops, utilizing French officers and noncommissioned officers to 
instruct in various new appliances and tactical formations developed during 
the war. First division will be billeted in the vicinity of Gondrecourt. Artillery 
of First Division will go to Valdehon, near Besancon, where barracks and 
stables are available, and later joining infantry for liaison work. Use of the 
ports above mentioned avoids interference with British bases, while railway 
routes indicated avoid French and English line and staff with whom front. 
Location of area(s) for depots permit shipment supplies and direction training 
area(s) not hitherto used and contains considerable quantities supplies, with 
villages ample for billeting. After thorough discussion agreed our troops gradu- 
ally occupy sections of the French lines instead of entering between French 
and English, as latter would unquestionably lead to confusion. American 
troops will probably enter north of Nancy, where country is open and fighting 
less severe, but will not be put in until thoroughly ready. Later on American 
troops will be used as circumstances dictate and as may be agreed upon. Most 
cordial relations have been established with French war office and with Gen. 
Petain, whose headquarters I have already visited several times. Have detailed 
American liaison officers with Gen. Petain, and several French officers are 
already on duty at my headquarters. Everything working harmoniously and 
to my entire satisfaction. Shall visit British headquarters next week. 

Pershing, 
124 



Appendix E. 




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B»st SErno 
NOTt 



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6 




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RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION 

PRINCIPAL LINES OF FRENCH RAILWAYS USED BY AMERICAN EXPED FORCES 
AND CENTERS OF AMERICAN RAILROAD CONSTRUCTION 



JRACH^ pan 
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LLVKo'RAn* lY*fT-Bu 



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125 



Appendix F. 



ORGANIZATION CHART OF LINES OF COMMUNICATION, AUGUST 29. 1917. 

[Ct. O. L L. of C, 1917; also F. S. R.] 





COMMANDING 


GENERAL, L. OF C. 






















Aide-de-Camp. 


















Chief c 


i Statl. 
















Staff. 


Assistant Chier of StaflE. 


1 


-| Adjutant. 


1 


Adm 




mistrative and Technical 
















Judge Advocate, L. of C. 












Quartermaster, L. of C. 
















A. C. of S. in Charge of Base 
Section Xo. 1. 


C.roann T ntr 




























A. C. of S. in Charge of Base 
Section No. 2. 


1?Ti<Tin<kor T. ntr 






' ■ ■ 












Ordnance Officer, L. of C. 














A. C. of S. in Charge of Base 
Section No. 3. 










Signal Officer, L. of C. 












A. C. of S. in Charge of Inter- 
mediate Section. 








Aviation Ofl5cer, L. of C. 






















Assistant Director of Railwaj-s. 


















Dir. Oversea Transportation. 









126 



Appendix G. 



ORGANIZATION CHART OF SERVICE OF THE REAR. (UNDER FIRST 

COPY OF G. O. 31.) 

[G. 0. 1, S. 0. R., February IG, 191S.] 



COMMANDING GENERAL, S. O. R. 



Aide-de-Camp. 



Chief of Staflf. 



Deputy C. of S. 



Secretary, G. S. 



A C. of S., G-1. A. C. of S., G-2. A. C. of S., G-3. A. C. of S., G-4. 



Adjutant General, S. O. R. 



Chief of Gas Service. 



Inspector General, S. O. R. 



General Purchasing Agent. 



Judge Advocate, S. O. R. 



Chief of Air Service. 



Chief Signal Officer. 



Director, Motor Transport 
Corps. 



Provost Marshal General. 



Chief Ordnance OflBcer. 



Director General of Trans- 
portation. 



Chief Engineer Officer. 



War Risk Section, 



Chief Surgeon. 



Chief Quartermaster. 



127 



Appendix H. 



ORGANIZATION CHART OF SERVICES OF SUPPLY. (UNDER SECOND 
COPY OF G. O. 31, ISSUED ABOUT MARCH 31, 1918.) 



COMMANDING GENERAL, S. O. S. 



Aide-de-Camp. 



Chief of Staff. 



Deputy C. of S. 



Secretary, G. S. 



A. C. of S., G-1. A. C. of S., G-2. A. C. of S., G-3. A. C. of S., G-4 



Adjutant General, S. O. S. 



Chief of Utilities. 



Inspector General, S. 0. S. 



Judge Advocate, S. O. S. 



Transportation Dept. 



Dept. Con. and Forestry. 



Dept. Lt. Rys. and Roads. 



Motor Trans. Service. 



Provost Marshal General. 



Chief Signal Officer. 



War Risk Section. 



Chief Ordnance Officer. 



Chief of Gas Service. 



Chief Engineer Officer. 



General Purchasing Agent. 



Chief Surgeon. 



Chief of Air Service. 



Chief Quartermaster. 



128 



Appendix I. 



CFGAMZAIION CHART OF SERVICES OF SUPPLY, JULY 12, 1918. 



COMMANDING GENERAL, 
SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 



Deputy C. of S. 



Asst. C. ofS., G-1. 



Aide-de-Camp. 



Chief of Staff. 



Secretary, General Staff. 



Asst. C. of S., G-2. 



Asst. C. of S., G-4. 



Adjutant General, S. O. S. 



Inspector General, S. O. S. 



Judge Advocate, S. O. S. 



Chief Engineer. 



Dept. Const, and Forestry. 



D. M. E. and E. 8. 



Dept. Lt. Rys. and Roads. 



Provost Marshal General. 



Director, Motor Transport Corps. 



War Risk Section. 



Chemical Warfare Service. 



General Purchasing Agent. 



Asst. Chiefs of Air Service. 



Supply— Tours. 



Personnel— Paris. 



Chief Signal Officer. 



Chief Ordnance OflScer, 



Chief Surgeon. 



Chief Quartermaster. 



Director General of Trans- 
portation. 



178841°— 20 9 



129 



Appendix J. 



ORGANIZATION CHART, HEADQUARTERS, SERVICES OF SUPPLY, 
NOVEMBER 11, 1918. 



COMMANDING GENERAL, S. O. S. 



Aides. 



Chief of Stafl. 



Deputy Chief of Stafl. 

Assists Chief of Stafl and acts 
as such during his absence. 
Assignment of commissioned 
personnel. 



Secretary of Gen. Stafl. 



Asst. Chief of Stafl, G-1. 

1. Ocean tonnage. 

2. Requisitions on War De- 

partment. 

3. Priority of oversea ship- 

ments. 

4. Replacement of losses in 

men. 

5. Organization and equip- 

ment of S. O. S. troops. 

6. General Purchasing Board. 

7. Renting, Requisition, and 

Claim Service. 

8. Disnosition of casual offi- 

cers and soldiers. 

9. Administration of replace- 

ment and casual officers 
depots. 
10.. Organization and admini.s- 
tratioji of leave areas. 

11. Provost .Marshal Service. 

12. AVar Risk Bureau. 

13. Red Cross, Y. M. C. A., 

and other similar agen- 
cies. 

14. Questions of liaison with 

allied authorities and 
services. 
, 15. Data, graphics, and charts 
of S. O. S. acti\ities. 
16. War diary. 



Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2. 



S. 



1. Counter-espionage 

O. S. 

2. Raihvay, steam.ship, garni, 

transport, and passport 
regulation and control. 

3. Register of American civil- 

ians in France. 

4. Censorship reports on mo- 

rale of troops and civil- 
ians. 

5. Control of civilian labor of 

A. E. F. 

6. Prevention of sabotage and 

enemy propaganda. 



Asst. Chief of Stafl, G^. 

1. Supply, construction, and 

transnortationin France 
including location of 
raihvay and supply es- 
tablishments. 

2. Statistics concerning 

above. 

3. Hospitalization and evac- 

uation of the sick and 
wounded. 

4. Movements of troops. 

5. Assignment of all new 

S. o. S. units arriving 
in France. 

6. Assignment of all labor 

and labor troops. 

7. Remoimt and Veterinary 

Services. 

8. Labor Bureau. 

9. Salvage Service. 

10. Graves Registration Serv- 

ice. 

11. Garden Service. 

12. Fire protection and se- 

curity a-;aLnst enemy 
air altack.s. 

13. Billets and billeting. 

14. Military board of allied 

supply. 

15. All operations of the serv- 

ices of supply not as- 
signed to other sections 
of the General Stafl. 



Functions of Procurement, Supply, Transportation, Construction, Hospitalization, and Communication. 



Chief Quartermaster. C. Q. M. 



Adjutant General. S. O. S. 



Chief Surgeon. C. S. 



Chief Ordnance Officer. C. O. O. 



Air Service Supply and Personnel. 



Chief Chemical Warfare Ser. C. W. S. 



Chief Signal Officer. C. S. O. 



Dire3tor Motor Transport Corps. M. T. C. 



Chief Engineer Officer. C. E. O. 



t ]Directer G3neralof Transportation. D.G.T 

130 



Inspector General. S. O. S. 



Judge Advocate. S. O. S. 



Provost Marshal Department. 



Army Service Corps 



Z- 



War Risk Bureau. 



Renting, Requisition, and Claim Service^ 



General Purchasing Agent. G. P. A. 



Headquarters Commandant. 



o 



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